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Monograph Prospectus 
 
Minding the Gaps: Fairness, Welfare, and the Constitutive Structure of 
Distributive Assessment 
 
Robert Hockett 
 Despite over a century’s disputation and attendant opportunity for clarification, 
the field of inquiry now loosely labeled “welfare economics” (WE) remains surprisingly 
prone to foundational confusions.  The same holds of work done by many practitioners of 
WE’s influential offshoot, normative “law and economics” (LE).   
 A conspicuous contemporary case of confusion turns up in recent discussion 
concerning “fairness versus welfare.”  The very naming of this putative dispute signals a 
crude category error.  “Welfare” denotes a proposed object of distribution.  “Fairness” 
describes an appropriate pattern of distribution.  Welfare itself is distributed fairly or 
unfairly.  “Fairness versus welfare” is analytically on all fours with locutions of the form 
“warmth versus clothing” or “35 mph versus tennis balls.”  Framing disputes in this way 
leads us nowhere.  It only miscarries our thinking. 
 A more venerable source of perplexity is found in the hallowed Pareto criterion 
(PC) and its conceptual kin.  One proffered advantage of the PC is its purportedly 
enabling “us” to sidestep contested questions of interpersonal comparison, aggregation 
and distribution.  But what manner of collective agent – what “we” – might plausibly be 
expected to take interest in unavoidably resource-distributive prescriptions, without view 
to the propriety with which these treat each member of the collectivity effectively 
addressed by the prescriptions, is left unidentified.  And as soon as we plausibly fill-in the 
gap, the PC and kin prove prescriptively sterile.  We get nowhere until we confront 
distributions – and de facto distributors – head-on. 
 This Monograph seeks to lay out with some care both when, and how, such 
confronting should be done.  It specifies both the conditions, and the appropriately 
structured mode of analysis, under which distributive-ethical assessment is called for and 
apt to bear fruit.   The means to success lie in carefully mapping the constitutive structure 
– the full valence grammar – of distribution-implicative claims. 
 Effectively normative claims concerning distributions wrought by legal rules, 
programs or policies, if they would be so much as cognitively complete let alone ethically 
assessable, must assign values to all variables opened by the case grammar of “to 
distribute” and cognate infinitives – “to allocate,” “to apportion,” “to mete out,” etc.  
They must, that is, determinately and inter-compatibly indicate to whom claims are in 
effect being addressed, what is effectively being distributed, pursuant to what pattern the 
latter is being distributed, by what means and to whom.  To be normatively defensible, in 
turn, such claims must not only carefully specify, but also must ethically justify, the 
jointly compatible values they proffer for filling those variables.   
 The normative payoff of the mode of analysis proposed here is a compelling 
distributive ethic, a means of rendering past and present foundational disputes both 
tractable and conclusively resoluble, and in the end a new research agenda for what the 
Monograph labels an “ethically intelligible law and economics.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Despite over a century’s disputation and attendant opportunity for clarification, 
the field of inquiry now loosely labeled “welfare economics” (WE) remains surprisingly 
prone to foundational confusions.1  The same holds of work done by many practitioners 
of WE’s influential offshoot, normative “law and economics” (LE).2   
 A conspicuous contemporary case of confusion turns up in recent discussion 
concerning “fairness versus welfare.”  The very naming of this putative dispute signals a 
crude category error.  “Welfare” denotes a proposed object of distribution.3  “Fairness” 
describes an appropriate pattern of distribution.4  Welfare itself, that’s to say, is 
distributed fairly or unfairly.  “Fairness versus welfare” is thus analytically on all fours 
with locutions of the form “warmth versus clothing,” or “35 mph versus tennis balls.”  
Framing disputes in this way leads us nowhere.  It only miscarries our thinking.5 
                                                 
 1 My claim here is general, not universal.  I discuss particular examples infra, Part III. 
 2 As with the previous note, so here.    
 3 Or a byproduct of some such object’s – a distribuendum’s – distribution.  Infra Parts II.C and 
II.D.  
 4 That is, a distribution formula.  Infra Part II.D.  
 5 There is a restricted set of conditions under which such statements might serve as elliptical for 
more fully specified phrases bearing sense.  Those currently employing the phrase “fairness versus welfare” 
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 A more venerable – and somewhat more subtle – source of perplexity is found in 
the hallowed Pareto criterion (PC) and its conceptual kin.  One proffered advantage of the 
PC is its purportedly enabling “us” to sidestep contested questions of interpersonal 
comparison, aggregation and distribution.  But what manner of collective agent – what 
“we” – might plausibly be expected to take interest in unavoidably resource-distributive 
prescriptions, without view to the propriety with which these treat each member of the 
collectivity effectively addressed by the prescriptions, is left unidentified.  And as soon 
as we plausibly fill-in the gap, the PC and kin prove prescriptively sterile.6  We get 
nowhere until we confront distributions – and de facto distributors – head-on.7 
 I therefore propose in this monograph to lay out with some care both when, and 
how, such confronting should be done.  I specify what I take to be the conditions, and the 
appropriately structured mode of analysis, under which distributive-ethical assessment is 
called for and apt to bear fruit.  To succeed in discharging this task, I believe, is to afford 
means of bringing systematic clarity to WE and LE discussion bearing normatively 
assessable distributive significance.  The means to success, I believe, lie in carefully 
mapping the constitutive structure – the full “grammar,” so to speak – of distribution-
implicative claims, be the latter overt or covert in their distributive import.   
 Effectively normative claims that either speak directly, or lay themselves open, to 
questions concerning the propriety of distributions wrought by legal rules, programs or 
policies, if they would be so much as cognitively complete let alone ethically assessable, 
                                                                                                                                                 
do not fulfill these conditions.  Infra note 14 and Parts II.D, III.B.  On the “miscarrying” of thinking, see 
infra Part II.  
 6 I discuss the very narrow class of circumstances in which Paretian prescription is, rather than 
sterile, simply trivial, infra Parts II.D, III.  
 7 This claim is in sympathy with that made by Judge Calabresi in Guido Calabresi, The 
Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L. J. 1211 (1991).  While Calabresi’s point 
appears to be primarily pragmatic, however, my intention here is to speak more foundationally.  In that 
sense this might, I hope, complement Calabresi’s.  See in particular infra, Parts II.E and III.    
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must assign compatible values8 to all variables opened by the valence grammar9 of “to 
distribute” and cognate infinitives – “to allocate,” “to apportion,” “to mete out,” etc.10  
They must, that is to say, determinately single out to whom the claims are effectively 
being addressed (de facto distributors), what is putatively being or thought ought be 
distributed (distribuenda), pursuant to what pattern the latter is being or thought ought be 
distributed (distribution formulae), by what means it is being or thought ought be 
distributed (distribution mechanisms), and to whom it is being or thought ought be 
distributed (distribuees).  To be normatively defensible, in turn, such claims must not 
only carefully specify, but also must ethically justify, the values they proffer for filling 
those variables. 
 The argument, then, proceeds as follows:  Part I preliminarily characterizes the 
conditions under which distributive assessment is apt.  These are the circumstances under 
which who holds what can sensibly be, and thus is ethically required to be, evaluated as 
globally right, wrong, better or worse.11  Though these conditions are foundational and 
ought to be evident, their brief enumeration serves both to ground, and to facilitate fuller 
assimilation of, the discussion that follows.  They also appear to have gone oft-forgotten 
in much of the theoretical literature.12    
                                                 
 8 “Compatible” in a sense that will grow plain through Part II.  We’ll see there as well that they 
need be not only compatible, but also “of the right analytical type.”  One does not distribute a distribution 
formula, nor can an object of distribution – a distribuendum – itself serve as a distribution formula.  
“Fairness versus welfare” violates precisely that structural stricture.  
 9 Valence grammar also goes by the name “case” grammar.  More, again, infra, Part II.  
 10 It is customary in the economics literature to reserve “allocate” for the spread of inputs among 
producers, “distribute” for the spread of resultant goods among consumers.  For present purposes such 
distinctions will be without difference, particularly given the way in which I shall construe goods-recipients 
and the goods they receive – as boundedly responsible agents who transform resource allocations into 
welfare outputs.  Hence I shall use such terms interchangeably save when specifically indicating otherwise.   
 11 Absent the conditions, that is, distributive-ethical assessment will be unimplicated, so that 
proffered such assessments will be “out of place,” senseless.  Given the conditions, on the other hand, 
distributions will be subject to critique whether foreseen or intended as distributions or not.  
 12 Infra, Part III.  
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 Part II elaborates the valence grammar of “to distribute” (as well as cognate 
infinitives) and its significance.  The gaps opened up by that grammar, it turns out, are all 
analytically interconnected:  Selection of particular values to fill one or more variables 
partly constrains the ranges of plausible values with which one can sensibly fill others.13  
What is more, a single distributive upshot – one invariant pattern of entailed allocation – 
appears both to follow upon and indeed to constrain differing plausible fillings of a 
particular variable, provided that plausible compensating variations are made in the 
fillings of other variables:  Appropriate allocations turn out to be rather like isoquants.14   
 The discussion over Parts I and II also gradually converges upon what appears to 
be the correct macro-social allocation isoquant.  It is, in short, the distributive-ethical 
theory jointly entailed by our core value commitments on the one hand, the grammar-
grounded metatheory here elaborated on the other hand.  I suggest a few implications that 
this appears to entail for the future agendas of WE and, especially, LE.    
 Part III briefly “applies” the metatheory and theory developed over the course of 
Parts I and II in taking stock of two familiar foundational controversies occasioned by 
some of the canonical WE and LE literature:  First it revisits the “wealth as a value” 
dispute of the 1980s, showing that all sides were, metatheoretically speaking, less than 
optimally inarticulate, while one side in consequence was, theoretically speaking, 
                                                 
 13 Expositorily speaking, one consequence of this interdependence is that the argument of Part II is 
cumulative in nature:  Part II’s subsections, because analytically interdependent, might not be fully 
appreciated until the full Part is read-through.  I must accordingly beg the reader’s indulgence, both for that 
fact and for my frequent resort to cross-reference between subsections.  It might not be beautiful, but it will 
be symphonic, so to speak.  
 14 One consequence is that it is theoretically possible for a locution of the form “[distribution 
formula] versus [distribuendum]” to bear sense, if employed elliptically for some more fully elaborated 
locution.  “Fairness versus Unweighted-Welfare,” for example, might be employed as short for “Fairly 
Distributed Welfare versus Aggregate Welfare as Summed Over Unweighted Individual Welfare 
Functions,” and in such case will avoid simple category-error.  For “Unweighted-Welfare” is itself 
shorthand for unfairly distributed welfare.  See infra Parts II.D.5 and II.D.6.  Current users of the locution 
“Fairness versus Welfare,” alas, do not do so elliptically.  The phrase ends up meaning quite literally 
nothing at all.  See infra Part III.B.      
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egregiously wrong.  Then it takes the measure of present day “fairness versus welfare” 
discussion, showing that this features metatheoretic confusion, and indeed incoherence, 
such as can leave one quite nearly nostalgic for the comparative infelicities plaguing the 
1980s debate. 
 I conclude by briefly indicating some other disputes that the theory and 
metatheory here offered should now render more tractable. 
 
I. DISTRIBUTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 Most things we find in the world are distributed, allocated, meted or spread out, 
etc.  Not all such spreads lend themselves to intelligible normative critique.  The chairs 
and the table on one’s porch are laid out in a certain arrangement, say:  They’re 
“distributed” over the floor in a particular, geometrically specifiable way.  And they 
could be redistributed over that surface in many alternative ways.  But absent some 
purpose or value the effectuation or realization of which significantly rides upon such 
arrangements, no particular distribution within the domain class of possible arrangements 
will be sensibly subject to any form of assessment bearing behavioral import:  There will 
be nothing to say whose upshot is that the arrangement “ought” to be changed. 
 It also happens that many distributions of things do implicate values and 
purposes.  These accordingly fall subject to one or another mode of normatively 
intelligible assessment:  Insofar as you are sensitive to considerations of geomancy, the 
distribution of your furniture itself will be apt to evaluation.  Some arrangements will 
aesthetically dominate others, so that you will incline toward redistributing your furniture 
until it accords with the “best” possible arrangement.15  Counterpart remarks hold in 
                                                 
 15 Or with one that belongs to the best-ranking class of mutually indifferent arrangements.  
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respect of any other value under the aspect of which the furniture arrangement might be 
sensibly evaluated – ease of reading in the late afternoon light, for example. 
 Normatively evaluable legal arrangements and public policies – the stuff of WE 
and LE – of course have the effect of distributing not simply tables and chairs over porch-
floors, but perceived goods and ills over persons.  Legal rules and rulings, statutory 
enactments, government programs and policies of sundry sorts all tend to produce 
“winners” and “losers”16 – recipients of benefits and burdens at the “receiving end.”  
Patterns of such policy-wrought wins and losses amount, relative to each status quo ante 
they displace, to redistributions of perceived goods and ills.17  And such redistributions, 
like each status quo ante that any of them supplants, are subject to normative assessment 
at least as readily as are furniture arrangements.  Indeed they are more urgently so 
subject.  For they implicate the ethical propriety with which persons are treated.  And the 
comparative ethical valences of varying distributive arrangements are more compellingly 
salient than the aesthetical ones:  More than merely recommending actions as do the 
latter, the former such valences require them.18  
 So much is more or less obvious.  What seems to be less obvious to some is that 
even when allocations wrought by legal rules and policies are neither foreseen nor 
intended, they are nonetheless ethically assessable:  They are subject to “ought” claims 
whose upshots are that the arrangements are right, wrong, better or worse, and are to be 
                                                 
 16 Or at the very least differential winners or losers.  
 17 Or at the very least redistributions of relative advantage and disadvantage.  
 18 There is of course overlap, though it’s short of extensional equivalence, between ethical and 
aesthetic assessment.  Dastardly people or deeds are quite often found “ugly,” “warped,” “grotesque,” etc. 
(The term “tort” itself is derived from the same Old French root as is “torture,” a term that connotes 
twisting.)  And just actions and persons and patterns are often found “beautiful,” “balanced,” 
“harmonious,” etc.  Fair allocations, moreover, like beautiful arrangements, often appear to share some 
manner of symmetry in common.  (The word “fair” itself derives from an Old English root that refers to the 
beauty borne by an attractive face.)  But I’ll not further limn these connections in this paper.    
 8 
left in place or improved accordingly.  In this light it is worth taking summary stock of 
the full – though it’s small – set of circumstances under which distributive consequences 
can be said to be ethically better or worse.  We can call these the prerequisites to aptness 
to distributive-ethical assessment.19  I’ll specify these as minimally and rudimentarily as 
possible.  For, first, that will amount to being as charitable as possible in the matter of 
admitting claims as intelligible.20  And second, fuller detail will build upon the present 
foundations as we turn to distributive-ethical assessment’s full logical form in Part 3. 
 I take it that the minimal conditions to distributive-ethical assessment’s aptness 
are these:  First, there must of course be things that can be variably distributed.21  Second, 
there must be beings to whom (or which – more on which prospect presently) these 
things can be distributed.  Third, those to whom things can be distributed must hold 
preferences or interests in respect of their receiving or not receiving the distributed items:  
The items must be regarded or properly regardable as beneficial or burdensome by, hence 
productive of welfare or illfare among, their prospective recipients.22   
 Fourth, the recipients of items who hold preferences or interests in respect of them 
must hold ethical claims to our regard.  They must be entitled to our consideration of 
their preferences or interests as we distribute.  They must hold, in short, what I shall call 
                                                 
 19 Or, the circumstances under which distributive-ethical assessment is implicated, is called-for.  
The set of conditions is jointly sufficient both to implicate such assessment and to render it apt.  The set’s 
elements are jointly necessary as well, though it will be clear that they are not independent of one another 
in the way that one typically expects of the axioms that determine a formal system.  The non-independence 
of the conditions as I state them is rooted in expository/heuristic considerations that I trust will be evident: 
Each in effect “builds upon,” hence is not unrelated to, its nonetheless analytically distinct predecessor. 
 I adapt the term “aptness” in the present context from Frank Jackson’s “truth-aptness” – the 
propositional attribute of being capable of bearing a truth value.  See FRANK JACKSON, FROM 
METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENSE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (2000). 
 20 One wishes to rule out as “nonsense” as few claims as possible.  
 21 Note that welfare does not appear to be directly distributable.  It seems rather to be something 
produced by beings possessed of welfare functions who transform material inputs into welfare outputs.  
More on that infra Parts II.B, II.C, II.D, II.E, III.B.  
 22 More on preferences and interests, benefits and burdens, welfare and illfare, as well as on 
distributed items – distribuenda – and those who receive them – distribuees – infra, Parts II, III.  
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“distributive-ethical claims,” hence be “distributive-ethical claimants.”  We for our part 
must reciprocally be under obligation so to consider claimants’ preferences or interests.  
It is this entitlement and its correlative obligation that render our assessment of 
distributions to the preference- or interest-holders ethical in nature.   
 Finally fifth, all items the distribution of which would be subject to ethical 
assessment must be “scarce,” meaning there must be potential for interests or preferences 
to diverge or conflict:  Distributions to some subclass of the full class of claimants must 
materially entail the nonsatisfaction of another subclass of claimants’ preferences.23 
 The first condition, though necessary, is of course trivial in the sense that it holds 
of any circumstance in which any form of distributive assessment, ethical or otherwise, is 
apt.  The second condition is trivial of distributive-ethical assessment but presumably not 
of distributive assessment more generally:  It does not seem to hold, for example, of 
distributive-aesthetic assessment.24  The third condition is trivial of distributive-ethical 
assessment but definitely not of distributive assessment more generally:  It does not hold, 
for example, of distributive-aesthetic assessment.25   
 The fifth condition – I’ll return to the fourth presently – is trivial in the sense that 
it holds of all forms of distributive assessment, but not trivial of the class of all things that 
might be distributed:  There are plenty of items that thus far are sufficiently plentiful as 
not to require zero-sum choices in their distributing even when very much needed or 
                                                 
 23 The significance of this obvious point in particular seems sometimes, surprisingly, to have gone 
overlooked.  See infra Part III.  
 24 Unless we idiosyncratically regard physical locations as “beings to whom or which things – e.g., 
furniture – can be distributed.”  That seems not to have been uncommon in centuries past, and there 
evidently are places in the world where something like the phenomenon is still encountered.  
 25 Unless, again, we are animists who believe physical locations to hold preferences.  In such case 
aesthetics would extensionally merge into ethics in more or less plenary fashion.  Locations would be 
viewed in effect as being inhabited by spirits who desire things.  
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desired.26  Distributive assessment is apt only in respect of situations involving 
distributed things not of this type. 
 The fourth condition is that in which specification of distributive-ethical 
assessment-aptness’s prerequisites begins seriously to “cut” – to impart potentially 
controversial information.  The reason is that it contestably rules out some distributive 
scenarios as being so much as susceptible to ethical assessment.  For typically the class of 
ethical claimants whom we regard as entitled to our regard is a proper subclass of the full 
class of literal claimants:  There are beings, that is, who (or which) apparently want 
things, or want to be free of things, whom (or which) not everyone agrees to bear rights 
to have those wants ethically considered.27  We’ll consider this somewhat more fully 
below. 
 
II. DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE 
 
 Distributive assessment is intelligible only by reference to distribution itself.  And 
distribution, for its part, like the infinitives that denote it is internally complex:  It bears a 
structure, a logical form.  Its form tracks the form of the infinitives that name it.  The 
“case,” or “valence” grammar of infinitives cognate with “to distribute” manifests the 
constitutive structure that effectuated distribution must take, hence that determinate 
distributive assessment or prescription must take.28 
                                                 
 26 In most places, breathable air is an obvious example.  Thus far, at any rate.  
 27 Bovines, fish and fowl, for example, presumably do not wish to be killed and eaten, or at any 
rate seek to avoid such harm as is predicate to their being killed and eaten.  That seems the best reading of 
their fight and flight.  More on such matters infra, Parts II.A, II.B.  
 28 Case, or valence grammars divide sentences into predicate functions – typically verbs – and 
their argument places – most filled by nouns and noun phrases, but in some cases fillable by adverbs – 
predicates of predicates (hence second-order predicates).  The number and kinds of arguments that a 
predicate can take constitute its “valency.”  See generally Charles J. Fillmore, Toward a Modern Theory of 
Case, in MODERN STUDIES IN ENGLISH 361-361-75 (David A. Reibel & Sanford A. Schaner eds., 1969); 
Charles J. Fillmore, The Case for Case, in UNIVERSALS IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 1-88 (Emmon Bach & 
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 If we speak of distribution, either directly or indirectly, in a manner that is out of 
conformity with “to distribute”’s case grammar, we shall speak either nothing or 
nonsense.  Our thoughts and our statements will be either semantically empty or 
syntactically miswired:  They will either lead nowhere, actionwise (the clutch won’t 
engage, they will not determinately describe or prescribe); or they will amount not to 
thoughts, but at best to mere proto-thoughts, at worst to mere cognitive cramps.29   
 Call a claim concerning the rightness or wrongness, betterness or worseness of 
some distribution a “distributive claim.”  For such a claim to be complete hence 
determinate – thus to prescribe anything determinately – it must fill all the gaps opened 
by the case grammar of “to distribute.”  It must assign values to the variables that this and 
all cognate infinitives effectively carry with them unfilled.   
 The variables are, in effect, the pronouns and proadverbs that figure into the 
following questions:  Who is being addressed by the distributive claim?  What does the 
claim take for being distributed, or suppose ought to be distributed?  To whom does it 
take that for being distributed, or suppose that it ought be distributed?  What pattern does 
                                                                                                                                                 
Robert Harms eds., 1968); STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (C. Fillmore & D.J. Langendoen eds., 1971).  
The analysis of predicates as argument-taking functions appears to have originated with Frege.  See Gottlob 
Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, in FROM 
FREGE TO GÖDEL: A SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 5-82 (Jan van Heijenoort ed., 1967); 
GOTTLOB FREGE, FUNKTION UND BEGRIFF (1891).     
 29 A case of syntactic faulty-wiring would be a string of words such as “Ate carnival Canaveral.”  
The words all connote and denote, but their arrangement in this case does not seem to assert or command or 
request anything.  A case of semantic emptiness would be a string such as “The king of America in 2003 
ordered an invasion.”  The words and their arrangement all connote – the string succeeds in appearing to 
assert something – hence are syntactically well-ordered, but the first four words, by dint of historic accident 
(there did not happen to be an American king), do not denote anything, which deprives the string of 
semantic valence (truth-value).  A case of combined syntactic faulty-wiring and semantic emptiness might 
be a string of the form, “Socrates was identical.”  The string seems to predicate something, identity, of an 
actual historic personage, Socrates, and thus initially reads as if it were a sentence which might bear a truth-
value.  But identity is a pairwise (or n-wise with n>1) relation, not a monadic predicate, and the string here 
features only one relatee – Socrates.  It’s thus semantically empty – devoid of a truth value – for essential 
syntactical rather than contingently accidental reasons.     
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the claim take properly to characterize such distributions to such recipients?  And how – 
by what physical means – does the claim take the distribution to be effectuable? 30 
 I call the values with which syntactically orderly and semantically complete 
claims fill the variables: distributors, distribuenda, distribuees, distribution formulae, and 
distribution mechanisms.  The middle three variables must be filled for a distributive-
ethical claim to be semantically complete – i.e., for the claim to bear determinate 
cognitive content in respect of whether a particular spread of goods or ills is or would be 
right, wrong, better or worse than some other possible such spread.  The first and last 
variables must be filled for the claim to be what might be called “pragmatically” 
complete – i.e., for the claim successfully to prescribe some course of action that might 
actually be taken.31   
 Counterpoised sides of de facto distributive disputations, I believe, with 
apparently varying degrees of cognizance of the fact, when they really disagree at all are 
disagreeing over how one or more of the just-enumerated variables should be filled.32  
This is most effectively shown by briefly elaborating and discussing the leading variable-
valuing candidates that historically have been proposed.  Many, though possibly not all, 
                                                 
 30 In effect I supplement pure semantics-based case grammar here with argument-places 
additionally derived from linguistic pragmatics.  For a claim actually to be made rather than simply 
entertained propositionally, it must be addressed to someone, and must take into account means by which 
addressees can effectively respond to it.  In making this observation I am in effect melding classical 
valence grammar with what Paul Grice would have called “conversational implicature.”  See, e.g., H. P. 
Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, 3: SPEECH ACTS, (P. Cole & J. Morgan eds., 
1975); H. P. Grice, Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, 9: 
PRAGMATICS, (P. Cole ed., 1978); H. P. Grice, Presupposition and Conversational Implicature, in 
RADICAL PRAGMATICS 183-98 (P. Cole ed., 1981).  All three are reprinted in H. P. GRICE, STUDIES IN THE 
WAYS OF WORDS (1989).  
 31 Semantic completeness is necessary, but does not suffice, to confer pragmatic completeness. 
 32 Sometimes, I’ll indicate, disputants appear not actually to be disagreeing even when they 
suppose that they are.  One source of ersatz disagreement is the indeterminacy of claims owing to 
incomplete variable-filling.  Another is failure to recognize correct distribution’s isoquant-like character – 
the fact that differing valuations of some variables, through effectively compensating variations in other 
variable-valuations, can produce invariant distributive outcomes.  See infra Part II.D.6.    
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of these might look familiar.  Yet I don’t think that any have been discussed under the 
individual rubrics employed here, let alone all together under all of the rubrics here 
employed, in structured relation one to another at once.  And it is precisely the lack of 
that systematically structured and plenary treatment, I believe, which is now tending to 
stand in the way of further progress.33   
  
A. Distributors 
 
 Determinate distributive-ethical claims, like “to distribute” and cognate infinitives 
themselves, take some singular or collective subject:  There must be distributors – those 
who distribute.  Who we understand the distributors to be will quite naturally play a role 
in determining our particular distributive-ethical norms – our “ought” claims in respect of 
distribution.  The converse, of course, also holds:  Particular duties and those who are 
held subject to such duties must categorically “fit” one another.34  Who, then, are the 
beings whom we take to owe each of us the benefit of acting in conformity with our 
distributive-ethical “oughts”?   
 There seems little overt disagreement over who the effective distributors are in 
most modern distributive-ethical disputation.  “We” – the sovereign we, all who 
effectively are addressed by potential disputants – are in effect taken to be the 
distributors.  We are “the people” – the citizenry or humanity at large, all who bear rights 
                                                 
 33 Understanding the variables’ and their plausible fillings’ inter-relations, I think, greatly 
facilitates understanding of the subjects themselves, as well as of the nature of distributive ethics more 
generally.  
 34 One does not take non-parents to owe parental duties, one does not take non-fiduciaries to owe 
fiduciary duties, etc.  Furthermore, one does not suppose all persons equally fit to take on such duties.  
Children, for example, do not typically become fiduciaries – nor, we hope, do they generally become 
parents.  To characterize a duty, then, not surprisingly is in part to characterize the sort of agent who might 
sensibly fall subject to that duty.  
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to take part in deciding distributive-ethical principles.35  Or we are “the policy 
community” – judges, legislators, advocates, academics and others assumed to be 
thinking and acting on behalf of that broader constituency.  The latter constituency, in 
turn, includes ourselves as representative members:  In either case, then, we in effect are 
distributing over ourselves.  One consequence is that the class of distributors, particularly 
in modern polities, typically converges with that of distribuees.   
 Were we gods or, somewhat more humbly, legally sanctioned elites looking over 
a polity in which formal political-decisional rights were allotted unequally, there might 
be some wedge between “us” and the distribuees:  We’d be considering what “we” 
should distribute to “them,” pursuant to what pattern(s) and means.36  Much this disparity 
between would-be distributors and would-be distribuees characterizes discourse among 
animal rights advocates, for example.37  But the “we” and the “they” of most mainstream 
distributive-ethical discourse are one and the same:  We are speaking of how we should 
apportion goods and ills among ourselves.  How, then, should we characterize ourselves 
when considering what is to be distributed, pursuant to what patterns and means?     
 
B. Distribuees 
 
                                                 
 35 Insofar as we are committed to the proposition that there are universal human rights, “we” are 
humanity at large.  Insofar as we commit to the more restricted proposition that rights inhere only within 
political communities, “we” are the citizenry.  I incline to the former commitment, and argue on its behalf 
elsewhere.  No claims advanced in the present paper, however, hinge upon the choice.   
 36 Some theorists appear willing to view scholars and “analysts” as radically distinct from the 
citizenry at large, better able to limn the “real nature” of normativity while the general public proceeds 
about its business in the hold of mere popular myth.  Some such picture as this appears to have prompted 
the surprising – and as it turns out ironic – ruminations offered in KAPLOW & SHAVELL, infra note 261 at 
382-402.     
 37 See, of course, PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1976).  A not entirely dissimilar disparity 
as between distributors and distribuees is of course encountered in debate over the ethics of abortion, 
though in this case a critical feature of the dispute is precisely whether the distribuees are to be considered 
members of the distributor class.  That’s of course why this dispute is more contentious than that over 
“animal rights.”  
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 Determinate distributive-ethical claims, like “to distribute” and cognate infinitives 
themselves, take not only subjects, but indirect objects as well:  There must be distribuees 
– those to whom things are distributed.  And just as there is “fit” between our 
distributive-ethical norms and how we view distributors, so is there fit between those 
norms and how we view distribuees.  How, then, do or should we understand these 
recipients of distributed goods and ills?   
 The fact that “they” are in fact “we” here, I think, offers a critical clue:  Our being 
the distributors, and our being accordingly capable of being responsible for distribution, 
says something important about us as distribuees.  Curiously, however, not everyone 
seems to have caught the hint.  For many distributive-ethical advocates, via positions they 
take as to how we should characterize distribuenda and distribution formulae, effectively 
commit themselves to a view of distribuees that conflicts with the view that their being 
distributors appears to entail.  First, then, that latter view.  And then the other.  
  
 1. Responsible Agents 
 The gradually emergent consensus view of distribuees among those concerned 
with the ethics of distribution appears to be one that is in harmony with their role as 
distributors.  It is the view according to which distribuees are best considered to be what 
I’ll call “boundedly responsible human agents.”  Such agents largely, though of course 
not completely, determine their own well-being.  It is accordingly appropriate to hold 
them responsible in large measure for doing so – on grounds of respect, of equality, and 
even of what I’ll call “ethically cognizable efficiency,” we’ll see.   
 But such agents also are constrained, to not fully determinable degree, in effecting 
their welfare by the environments into which they are born.  Their inherited capacities, 
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incapacities, advantages and disadvantages – themselves features of their environments – 
permit distribuees wide, but nonetheless limited, latitude in altering or exiting their 
environments.   
 This construal of distribuees seems to be that which is most consonant not only 
with our role as distributors, but also with our experience of action – the deeds that both 
we and all those with whom we empathize or identify regularly perform:  We experience 
ourselves and others as both freely choosing and constrained to but vaguely determinable 
degree in the choosing.  That experience in turn is reflected in our capacities to 
experience guilt, shame, ambition for and frustration with self, resentment of and 
gratitude to others, and cognate “reactive attitudes” which would seem to be possible 
only under conditions of relative freedom.38  The same complex of experiences of action 
– in this case, the “boundedness” portion – underwrites our capacities to feel and extend 
mercy, forgiveness, and charity toward self and toward others. 
 The construal of distribuees as boundedly responsible agents carries a cluster of 
analytically interconnected consequences for distributive-ethical assessment:   
 First, to the degree that we view distriubuees as freely choosing, we find it 
appropriate to hold them responsible in part for what they choose.  This is not merely a 
matter of punitive attitude, nor even of incentives-sensitive productive efficiency, though 
of course such considerations also can sensibly underwrite the view.  It is, more 
immediately compellingly, a matter of dignity, of respect.  It is part of what it is to view 
persons as agents – as practical forgers of fate – rather than as patients or addicts – mere 
                                                 
 38 See, classically, P.F. Strawson, Freedom & Resentment, in FREE WILL 59 (Gary Watson ed., 
1982); Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992). 
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passive objects of fate akin to children who “do not know any better” or “cannot do 
differently.”39   
 An oft-ignored corollary of this respect is that all agents must be viewed as 
equally dignified and equally deserving of most forms of respect – including material 
respect – at least “prior to” or “apart from” the operation of their responsible choices.40  If 
“all are created equal,” then all are equally deserving of respect’s material expression – 
access to the materials upon which successful lives are built – at least before their own 
creating enters into the evaluative picture. 
 Second, to the degree that we hold agent-distribuees responsible for fate-forging 
and life-building, we are likely to view appropriate distribuenda, distribution formulae 
and distribution mechanisms as those which give latitude to the operation of responsible 
agency.  Appropriate distribuenda will accordingly be seen as those that amount to inputs 
to individual welfare functions whose outputs are partly the responsibility of distribuees 
themselves.   
 Appropriate distribution formulae, in turn, will speak to the ex ante distribution of 
such responsibility-exogenous inputs.  Persons’ welfare-functional inputs, that is, will be 
what concern us most directly in the matter of distribution mechanisms’ outputs.  Our 
formulae will not be directly concerned with ex post, responsibility-endogenous 
individual welfare-outcomes as such, but rather as byproducts mediated and endogenized 
                                                 
 39 It is tempting to suppose that some such commitment is what ultimately underwrites the Kantian 
idea of a “right to punishment.”  See, e.g., P.S. Greenspan, Responsible Psychopaths, at 
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/rp.html; Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III, 
Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process, at 
http://www.randybarnett.com/assessing_the_criminal_.html.   
 40 The reason for the scare-quotes will become evident as we proceed.  In essence, it is that “prior” 
and “apart from” must be generalized over multiple temporal and spatial locations, because we perform 
many deeds over the courses of our lives for which we are varyingly responsible, and multiple interventions 
of fortune, which also occur over time, interweave with those deeds.   
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by individual responsible agency.  Preferred distribution mechanisms in turn will be such 
as give most effective expression to those ideals.  We’ll see this borne out below. 
 
 2. Patients & Addicts 
 
 The residuum left by incomplete agency might be called “patienthood.”  To the 
degree that one really “cannot help himself,” he is a patient – an object of fate or of 
others, acted upon rather than acting.41  Or he is an addict – one who “cannot resist.”  
 To the degree that our agency is bounded, we are all of us patients.  But we are 
not apt to admit this.  Indeed we are apt to feel disgust or contempt, rooted perhaps in the 
perceived threat posed by exemplars with whom we are able subconsciously though 
unwillingly to identify, for those who seem too quickly ready to admit limitation.  Owing 
to that fact and to the indeterminacy of the boundary in the large number of borderline 
cases that each of us individually encounters each day, we probably tend in consequence 
for the most part to let the boundary line “take care of itself.”  We do so by each simply 
trying as hard as s/he can. 
 Probably for reasons rooted in facts such as these – including cognate concerns 
with incentives their consequences42 – few if any practitioners of distributive-ethical 
assessment wittingly construe distribuees as patients.  Rather, instead some effectively, 
and one assumes non-cognizantly, commit themselves to that construal.  They do so in 
                                                 
 41 I intend “patient” as used here, like “agent” before, in its grammatical sense – specifically, as 
the recipient of rather than initiator of an action.  See, e.g., JOHN LYONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 340, 350 (1967); BERNARD COMRIE, LANGUAGE UNIVERSALS AND LINGUISTIC 
TYPOLOGY: SYNTAX AND MORPHOLOGY 42-43, 58-61 (2d ed. 1989).  Also RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN 
VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 303 (“addicts”); Daniel Markovits, How Much 
Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE. L.J. 2291, 2295f. (2003).  
 42 Those incentives and their consequences are traced infra.  In brief, letting agents too readily “off 
the hook” results in the unjustifiable conscription of those who act responsibly by those who do not.  It also 
– and we’ll see at Parts II.D and II.D.6 that this comes down to the same thing – results in ethically 
cognizable inefficiency.  
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taking particular positions in respect of appropriate distribuenda, distribution formulae, 
and distribution mechanisms:   
 Because welfare is more saliently an output than an input, for example, it is 
difficult, absent a Byzantine distribution formula, to be unalloyedly welfarist without in 
effect treating distribuees as not being responsible for outcomes – hence as patients.43  
Similarly, because resources or wealth are best viewed as welfare inputs – inputs to 
distribuees’ welfare functions – advocates of egalitarian resource or wealth distribution 
even posterior to, or apart from, the working of distribuees’ responsible choices  likewise 
in effect treat distribuees as patients.44   
 Finally, insofar as any distribution mechanism might fully instantiate some 
distribution principle such as that just mentioned, it too treats distribuees as mere 
patients.45  And insofar as it fails to be egalitarian prior to or apart from the operation of 
distribuees’ responsible choices, it violates ethical equality and respect too.  It does so by 
effectively treating some distribuees as deserving of less than others even when all that is 
being considered is pre-choice, action-antecedent claims to material opportunity upon 
which action and choice are to operate.  More on all of this presently.  As I said at the 
outset, our valuations of distribution’s grammar-opened variables indeed interrelate.   
 
C. Distribuenda 
 
 Determinate distributive claims, like “to distribute” and cognate infinitives 
themselves, not only take subjects and indirect objects, hence implicating distributors and 
                                                 
 43 See infra Parts II.C, II.D.  
 44 Again see infra, Parts II.C, II.D.  
 45 This prospect of course suggests that distribution mechanisms might be composite in nature:  
Market allocations followed by taxation and redistribution would constitute a familiar case in point.  The 
suggestion is borne out infra, Part II.E.  
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distribuees; they take direct objects as well:  There must be distribuenda – distributed 
things. 
 On the surface there has been more dispute in the theoretical literature over 
appropriate distribuenda than over who the distributors and distribuees are.  This is 
somewhat surprising.  But I think that it follows directly upon something noted before – 
widespread failure to think-through the deep analytical linkages among all of 
distribution’s constitutive case-variables.  Alternative proposed distribuenda are in effect 
ethical touchstones or flags under which other disputes – disputes over distribuees and 
distribution formulae in particular – are pursued.  We’ll see this as we proceed.  I’ll 
begin, however, with a few measure-theoretic preliminaries.  For these too play a critical 
role in debate over distribuenda – as well as over the other distributive variables. 
 
 1. Measurement Matters 
 
 Adequate discussion of proposed distribuenda, distribution formulae, and 
distribution mechanisms below requires some reference to matters of measurement.  It 
will accordingly be helpful briefly to catalogue a few relevant measurement types and 
challenges before turning to those variables. 
 Both theoretic and practical measurement challenges confront (a) the conception 
and formulation of distribuenda and distribution formulae, respectively, and (b) the 
determinate specifiability and instantiability of distribution mechanisms.  They also, 
accordingly, confront all distributive-ethical assessment.  The challenges fall into roughly 
three types.46  There are multiple conceivable, but as it happens fewer practicable, 
                                                 
 46 The typology is partly a matter of convenience.  Formally speaking the second and third types 
can be amalgamated.  See infra, Part II.C.1.d.  It nonetheless proves heuristically and pragmatically 
convenient to distinguish between them.  
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solutions to each.  These latter in turn ride upon what is to be distributed, to whom it’s to 
be distributed, and how, we shall see.  I’ll call the measurement problems those of 
“simple quantification,” “commensuration,” and “interpersonal comparison.” 
  
  a. Simple Quantification 
 
 Differing conceivable distribuenda vary in their susceptibilities to “absolute” 
cardinal, scale-relative cardinal, or mere ordinal quantification of differing magnitudes.  
Magnitudes are said to be “absolutely” quantifiable when differences as between them 
can be put into correspondence with differing values along the integer, rational, or real 
number orderings.47  It makes sense in such cases to ask, in an “absolute” – i.e., “pure” 
number-system rather than other scale-relative – sense, “how much” or “how many.”48  
Unless they are reducible to endorphins and C-fibers, or perhaps Bentham’s “utils,” 
subjective welfare and illfare do not seem to be “absolutely” quantifiable in this sense.  
Other possible distribuenda, e.g. resources or wealth, do seem to be.49   
 Magnitudes are said to be “scale-relatively cardinally” quantifiable (and hence 
unit-comparable) when differing “amounts” of them can without objection be 
stipulatively correlated to some other, more tractable physical magnitude which can itself 
then be put into correspondence with the integer, rational or real number orderings.  A 
familiar example would be mercury confined to a capillary tube over which it varyingly 
                                                 
 47 For most workaday measurement tasks the rationals are fine-grained enough.  For many such 
tasks even the integers suffice.  
 48 One might, one supposes, maintain that the number systems themselves – reals, rationals, 
integers, even ordinals – are themselves scales.  Some no doubt would argue that this would be incorrect 
for reasons stemming from the same considerations as dictate our not saying the Standard Meter Rod in 
Paris is one meter long.  See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1951).  
Others would argue that the latter statement would be perfectly licit.  See, e.g., SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND 
NECESSITY (1972).  I do not wish here to be taken for committing to a position in that dispute.  Suffice it to 
say that by “scale-relative” I shall simply mean “relative to some scale that is not one of the number 
systems.”  
 49 That’s not in itself to recommend wealth over welfare.  See infra Part II.C. 
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extends in accord with varying external temperatures.  In such cases such questions as 
“how hot?” and “how much hotter?” become answerable with some precision, though all 
the time relative to a scale that is not itself one of the number systems.50  Welfare is not 
thought to admit of scale-relative cardinal quantification any more than of “absolute” 
cardinal quantifiability, though Edgeworth appears to have believed that one day some 
“hedonometer” might afford means.51  Other proposed distribuenda need not be scale-
relatively quantified, because “absolutely” quantifiable.      
 Magnitudes are said to be “ordinally quantifiable” (or simply “orderable”) when 
they can at least be rank-ordered relative one to another, such that one magnitude can  
sensibly be said to be “more” (or “better,” or “higher,” or “preferred to,” etc.) than, “less” 
than, or “equal” to the other.  It is generally understood that no information as to “by how 
much” is imparted through such orderings, and so there is no question of unit-
comparability.  It is of course possible to conceive “second order” and indeed “nth order” 
orderings among apparent differentials between differing ordered pairs; and n’s growth in 
some such cases might lead the given ordinal to come increasingly to resemble a cardinal, 
unit-comparable scale.52  But such conceivabilities typically outrun our perceptual 
                                                 
 50 State S1’s being “two degrees hotter than,” or “twice as hot as,” state S2 on the Fahrenheit scale 
does not immediately translate into the same numerical differences on the Celsius scale, though the 
mathematical relation obtaining between scales will afford precise means of calculating the correct 
translation. 
 51 And though von Neumann & Morgenstern seem to have suggested something similar, perhaps 
taking up a suggestion of Ramsey’s.  See F. Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS 81 (1881) (the 
“hedonometer”); J. VON NEUMANN & O. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 17 
(1944) (“Even if utilities look very unnumerical today, the history of the experience in the theory of heat 
may repeat itself, and nobody can tell with what ramifications and variations.”); F. P. Ramsey, Truth and 
Probability, in F. P. RAMSEY, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (D. H. Mellor ed., 1990).  Also LEONARD SAVAGE, 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1956).  
 52 Say that S1 exceeds S2 in some ordering, and that S2 exceeds S3, and that S1 exceeds S2 by 
“more than,” though there is no stipulated scale such as can render determinate sense to the notion “how 
much” more than, S2 exceeds S3.  Call the differential between S1 and S2 “D1/2,” that between S2 and S3 
“D2/3.”  Then there is a second-order ordering as between D1/2 and D2/3, pursuant to which the former 
exceeds the latter.  Etc.    
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capacities very quickly in respect of such magnitudes as are not already straightforwardly 
quantifiable in an absolute or scale-relative cardinal manner.  And welfare at any rate is 
thought generally to admit of crude “first order” orderings at best.  Other proposed 
distribuenda, for their parts, again needn’t be consigned to mere ordinal quantification at 
all. 
     
  b. Commensurability 
 
 Commensurability is called for when vector quantities of disparate items need be 
expressible as scalar quantities of some singular amalgamandum, or “stuff.”  The scale 
with whose units the differing scalar quantities of “stuff” can be put into correspondence 
is called a “metric” or “index.”  In the construction of such an index, disparate items of 
course must be “weighted”:  It must be stipulated how many units of each vector 
component will “weigh in” at one unit of scalar measure.  Differing components’ index 
weights then yield to expressibility in relation to one another, against the scalar backdrop, 
as value-ratios other than unity.53   
 One might view such ratios, at least in some contexts, effectively as “price ratios” 
or “rates of exchange.”  They are rates at which items are in effect “traded off against,” or 
indeed even literally traded for, one another.  When so, they are rates of the items’ actual 
averaged relative valuations as determined by the aggregation of values that actual traders 
or “weight”-assigners, who ever and how ever many they be, place upon them.  That will 
prove useful when we turn to distribution mechanisms below.  For commensuration, 
when required, raises a critical ethical question for distributive assessment:  If and when 
commensuration is necessary, who should be viewed as bearing the right to determine the 
                                                 
 53 Unity would amount to a degenerate case.  In such case our vectors would trivially reduce to 
scalars.  Simple addition of all units of all items would yield a single unit-expressible sum of all “stuff.”  
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vector components’ weightings, and how should the latter be determined?  The question, 
we’ll see, interacts with our questions concerning distribuees, distribuenda, distribution 
formulae and distribution mechanisms. 
 Commensurability challenges would not threaten distributive assessment were 
welfare both our chosen distribuendum and directly distributable through some workable 
mechanism:  As roughly construed by most of its advocates, welfare amounts to an 
undifferentiated, singulary substance which, insofar as it’s measurable at all, is 
effectively already scalar-measurable.54  Where commensurability difficulties do threaten 
to raise practical problems, then, is in the distribution of variegated items that 
differentially underwrite welfare, such as I’ll discuss at 3.3.   
 
  c. Interpersonal Comparability 
 
 So-called “interpersonal comparison”55 takes either of three forms.  The 
practicability of each rides again on the nature of the distribuendum itself.  Comparisons 
might be (absolutely) “full,” (scale-relatively) “unit,” or (degenerately) “non.”   
 Holdings are fully comparable across persons when what’s held is absolutely 
(hence cardinally and non-scale-relatively) quantifiable.  Holdings are (scale-relatively) 
unit-comparable when that which is held is (scale-relatively) unit-quantifiable.  In both 
such cases the distribuendum is either “objective” – generally physical – in nature or is 
effectively correlated with something physical.   
 Holdings are interpersonally non-comparable only when not manifestly physical 
or physically-correlated.  The converse arguably does not hold:  There might be limited 
                                                 
 54 That is the case whether it be ordinally (as is most often the case), scale-relatively cardinally (as 
with Edgeworth’s “hedonometer,” presumably, and as would be for Ramsey and for von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, one supposes), or absolutely (as for Bentham’s “utils”) quantifiable.   
 55 More precisely, comparative quantification of differing persons’ holdings of given distribuenda. 
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comparability, at least of a first and perhaps of some nth order ordinal nature, even where 
there is no measurable physical correlate to the item in question.  But as noted above in 
connection with simple quantifiability, conceivability here quickly outruns practicability.  
More on the upshot when we turn to distribuenda, below.     
 Proposed distribuenda that are physical or physically correlated, then, for obvious 
reasons pose no interpersonal comparability challenges.  It is as straightforward 
comparatively to quantify differing persons’ holdings of wampum or dollars as to 
quantify any one person’s such holdings.56  This does not in itself decisively recommend 
our selecting such items as ethically salient distribuenda, however, in light of fetishism 
objections to material distribuenda that I assay below, Part 3.3. 
 
  d. Formal Appendix: Group-Theoretic Representation 
 
 We can summarize the differences both among and within measurement types 
formally.  The formalization both nicely captures and precisely manifests the 
distinctions:57  First let the expression ui(x) represent the generic “attainment level” of 
person i in state x.  “Attainment” may be understood “objectively” – e.g., in terms of 
dollars or resource-allotments received, years of life-expectancy attained, etc.  Or it may 
be understood “subjectively” – e.g., as hedonic “pleasure” experienced, welfare, or 
whatever.  The expression thus designates an uninterpreted utility function, mapping 
values taken by x and i jointly onto various singulary numeric values.58   
                                                 
 56 Dollar-denominated “wealth,” of course, is a scale.  More on the distributive-ethical significance 
of that fact infra, Parts II.D, II.E.  
 57 See generally Claude d’Aspremont, Axioms for Social Welfare Orderings, in SOCIAL GOALS 
AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ELISHA PAZNER 19-76 (Leonid Hurwicz et al. eds., 
1985; A.K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); A.K. Sen, On Weights and Measures: 
Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis, 45 ECONOMETRICA 1539 (1970).  A particularly 
lucid and comprehensive treatment is JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 16f. (1996).  
 58 That the values be singulary is of course entailed by the function’s being, indeed, a function.  
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 Now suppose a transformation function Φ(χ) that maps values taken by ui(x) onto 
yet other singulary numerical values, and stipulate that it do so without loss of any 
information deemed to be ethically salient.  Hence, whenever ui(x) takes some value δ, 
say, Φ(ui(x)) takes some value Φ(δ), or ε.  Now Φ(χ) will of course specify a calculable 
relation between values of δ and ε, the transformation rule Φ converting values of the 
former to values of the latter.   
 This is all that we require to characterize the sundry forms of measurability 
discussed above as informational relations obtaining between ui(x) and Φ(χ): We simply 
define the measurability forms in terms of restrictions imposed on the transformation 
rule. 
 If attainment is absolutely quantifiable and interpersonally fully comparable, the 
only transformation rule that will not leak information in the mapping from ui(x) values 
to Φ(χ) values is the (of course highly restrictive) identity function: Φ(ui(x)) = ui(x).   
 If attainment is only cardinally, not absolutely quantifiable, and is interpersonally 
unit-comparable – so that I might say that the difference between my attainment levels 
today and yesterday is greater than that between my or your attainment levels yesterday 
and the day before, but I cannot say “how satisfied” you or I are, in a non-scale-relative 
way, on any given day – then a somewhat more permissive transformation rule will work: 
Any rule of the form Φ(χ) = αχ + βi, α > 0 will do.  The rule preserves cardinal 
information by dint of α’s being positive and invariant over i’s – our transformations are 
increasingly affine – but because it permits the intercept βi to vary with individuals i, it 
does not in any way restrict “absolute” levels of satisfaction, hence is uninformative on 
that count, providing nothing by way of absolute measure. 
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 If attainment is cardinally quantifiable but interpersonally non-comparable, the 
transformation rule will be even less restricted – i.e., preserving of even less satisfaction 
information:  Any rule of the form Φ(χ) = αiχ + βi, αi > 0 will do.  The formula Φ(χ) 
remains increasingly affine, but αi as well as βi can be assigned different values for 
different persons i, meaning that neither information as to “absolute satisfaction levels” 
nor interpersonally comparable information as to changes in satisfaction units ui(x) 
between states x is available to be preserved through transformations Φ.   
 Finally, if attainment is only ordinally “quantifiable” and interpersonally non-
comparable, our transformation rule need not even be affine; it need only be increasing.  
Hence rules of the form Φ(χ) = αiχ,  αi > 0 will suffice.  Now the only information 
preserved in transforming utility functions is that any state x1 that renders person i more 
satisfied than state x0 will be mapped onto some higher number by dint of both ui(x) and 
Φ(χ) than will state x0.  If we tighten up our last transformation rule a bit, not allowing α 
to vary over persons, so that Φ(χ) = αχ, α > 0, we shall have treated attainment as only 
ordinally “quantifiable” – the intercept β remains unspecified – but interpersonally fully 
comparable; any increasing transformation is permitted but the same one must be applied 
across individuals.   
 It is of course difficult to intuit any experienceable meaning in such so-called “co-
ordinal utility” information, which is of the form “I am more satisfied today than you 
were yesterday.”  But the fact that it can be mathematically modeled highlights the fact 
that various forms of intra- and interpersonal measurability are at least analytically 
distinct. 
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 Observations analogous to those just rehearsed hold with respect to inter-item 
commensurability.  Indeed, if we let i in the equations specified above vary over goods 
and let x vary over quantities of goods, then analogues, in terms of “value yielded” by 
goods, to all information-types just surveyed will be readily derived and formally 
characterized.  It is thus clear that my having distinguished between “commensurability” 
and “interpersonal comparability” above is dictated not by conceptual structure, so much 
as by ethical salience. 
 We’re now equipped to discuss proposed distribuenda with some modicum of 
rigor:  
  
 2. Welfare/Well-Being 
 
 A particularly venerable family of proffered distribuenda have gone by the names 
“utility,” “welfare,” “well-being,” “happiness,” “satisfaction” and cognate expressions.  
The prompting consideration runs thus:  Faring well is what matters to people, indeed is 
trivially so since “utility” and the like are defined simply as that which is in effect 
“produced” upon people’s finding their preferences (or, on some readings, interests – 
“enlightened,” “rational,” “ideally informed,” or otherwise) satisfied.  Well-faring, or 
“welfare” in consequence is that whose spread ought to inform distributive-ethical 
assessment. 
 Attending to welfare as thus counseled seems unobjectionable enough – again, 
trivially so – so far as it goes.  One might then wonder why anyone would propose 
anything other than welfare as distribuendum.  I think what’s objected to generally is not 
welfare as distributive-ethical touchstone, but (a) “welfare” as construed, by some of its 
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more eccentric or irresponsible advocates,59 or (b) welfare as literal, direct 
distribuendum.  Here’s what I mean: 
 Construal-based objections take various forms, most prompted by unduly narrow 
or bizarrely overbroad stipulations by advocates as to what counts as well-faring.  Some 
early utilitarians, Bentham and Edgeworth probably best known among them, sometimes 
(not always) notoriously suggested that all that should count as well- or ill-faring was 
hedonic experience.  It’s even been suggested, sometimes inadvertently, that both are 
reducible to endorphins and C-fiber counts, respectively, rather as “water” has come to be 
specified with definitive precision as H2O.  Such claims prompt predictable objections 
and equally predictable responsive refinements.  Best known among the latter are 
probably those of such thinkers as the later Mill, Sidgwick, and more latterly Griffin.  
These have sought to take seriously the prospect that a well-faring human life might be 
something other than an extended orgasm or itch-scratching.60   
 Latterday exponents of earlier Benthamite crudity do not banish all welfare that 
isn’t hedonic in nature.  They push to the other extreme, counting as ethically cognizable 
“welfare” the satisfaction of any preference what ever.61  And so they’ve occasioned 
                                                 
 59 Who, perhaps in owing to their eccentricities themselves, seem alas always to be the best known 
of welfare’s advocates.  
 60 See, e.g., J. GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 
(1986).  Griffin’s refinements have turned out to be so extensive that he has ultimately found himself 
compelled to abandon consequentialist ethics altogether.  See J. Griffin, The Human Good and the 
Ambitions of Consequentialism, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 18 (1992).  
 61 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, infra note 261 at 421-22 (“The idea of an analyst substituting 
his or her own conception of what individuals should value for the actual views of the individuals 
themselves conflicts with individuals’ basic autonomy and freedom.”).  The short answer is that 
imprisonment likewise “conflicts” with basic autonomy and freedom – that of convicted criminals.  Few 
people disapprove of autonomy and freedom, just as few disapprove of welfare or well-being.  But the 
question has always been how we are to demarcate individuals’ spheres of autonomy satisfactorily, and that 
question of satisfactory demarcation is of course the question of fair allocation.  See infra Part III.B.  The 
“we don’t want to judge” disclaimer, moreover, accordingly avails nothing.  Determining fair allocation is 
judging, period.  Use of the ethically loaded terms “welfare” or “well-being” rather than ethically colorless 
terms like “preference-satisfaction,” moreover, immediately registers precisely such judgment.  This all of 
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predictable objections and refinements reminiscent of Griffin’s.  These take account of 
the fact that a preference itself can be ethically problematic, either in itself – because, say, 
expressly or even recursively anti-ethical – or as the product of, hence as endogenous to, 
antecedent distributive circumstances that are ethically problematic.62   
 It is effectively to lie and corrupt, for example, to say of the thief that “he fares 
well,” or that “his well-being improves,” when he steals more goods undetected.63  Better 
and much less misleading in such case to say that “he [wrongfully] got what he wanted,” 
or “is [unjustifiably] more satisfied.”  It would seem to be likewise misleading, in most 
cases, to say of the slave who has come to accept what she’s told of her putative race-
rooted “inferiority,” that she’s “better off,” or that “her well-being is up,” relative to the 
circumstance in which she rejects the race-rooted characterization and demands respect.64  
Better and much less misleading in such case to say “she’s resigned to her [unjust] 
circumstances.” 
 “Welfare” and cognate expressions, these objections to anti-ethical satisfaction as 
distribuendum effectively recognize, are ineluctably value-suffused.  It is in consequence 
not only idiomatically irresponsible, but is ethically condemnable, to use them in 
circumstances like these as a shorthand for mere preference-satisfaction.65  Such use 
                                                                                                                                                 
it is so fundamental that it is remarkable that one should have to supply the reminder.  See next several 
paragraphs.  
 62 On recursive preferences, see infra Part III.B.  On preferences that are endogenous to unfair 
antecedent distributive circumstances, see, e.g., G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 
ETHICS 906 (1989); A. K. Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).  
 63 Or that Nazis are “better off” when they murder more “non-Aryans,” etc.  
 64 Even if the respect’s not forthcoming.  But see ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, DIE WELT ALS WILLE 
UND VORSTELLUNG (1844) (recommending, in Vol. I, Bk. 4, Vedantic resignation).  
 65 To say of the unapologetic Nazi who has boosted death chamber “productivity,” “He is more 
satisfied,” does not jar as does “His well-being has improved.”  The reason, of course, is that “satisfaction” 
carries less ethical content and connotation than does “well-being.”  And of course, once the Nazi’s 
putatively ethical claim – his demand that we consider his preference – is transparently seen as a mere 
demand rather than an ethical claim, we are more immediately prepared to ask, “why should we hear this 
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inevitably is legitimative of injustice.  Indeed it obscures the very nature of distributive-
ethical assessment itself.  For distributive claims directed toward “us,” the composite 
polity that distributes, eo ipso are ethical claims:  They are claims sounding in rights to 
collective concern.  And “we” cannot hear putatively ethical claims to have anti-ethical 
preferences satisfied, any more than we can draw round squares, or than a court can hear 
tort “claims” of nose-thumbing. 
 But the problems with construing “welfare” or “well-being” in an ethically 
unfiltered manner, it happens, extend further than corruption alone.  It turns out that one 
cannot determinately prescribe at all without filtering.  To specify a distribution formula 
or social welfare functional at all, that is to say, is perforce to delimit what’s cognizable 
as welfare.  I’ll elaborate quite fully on this below at Parts II.D and 4.2.      
 Non-construal-based objections to welfare as distribuendum are rooted in the fact 
that, as noted above in 3.2, it is not a directly measurable or distributable substance.  The 
physical distribution problem is the most immediately apparent:  Whether understood as 
endorphins, preference-satisfactions, idealized or fully-informed or ethically-laundered 
preference-satisfactions, etc., welfare just isn’t a thing that’s directly doled out.  It is, 
rather, at best “produced” by distribuees, from physical things that are doled out.  That 
opens two lines of concern flagged by theorists who do not count themselves unalloyed 
welfarists: 
 First, in order practically to be welfarist, one must operationally also be 
“something elseist” – wealthist, resourcist, etc.66  Second, since (a) welfare emerges from 
what distribuees do with what ever is literally, more directly distributed, and since (b) the 
                                                                                                                                                 
claim, why should we count it cognizable in the forum of distributive-ethical assessment?”  Ethical claims, 
to the effect that we are duty-bound, and mere demands are of entirely different types.  See supra Part I.      
 66 More on wealth, resources, etc. infra next subsection. 
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latter materials are in most cases scarce, (c) distribution both might and indeed must take 
account of distribuees’ capacities and responsibilities for producing their own welfare out 
of what they are allotted.  The fuller significance of these opened lines will emerge in 
short order. 
 The measurability concerns occasioned by welfare as proposed distribuendum 
were indicated earlier:  On most present-day construals, it does not lend itself to 
practicable quantifiability or interpersonal comparability in the holding any more than it 
does to direct distributability.  Commensurability is the one measurement task for which 
welfare does not present difficulties.  But please hold that thought, till we cover the next 
proposed distribuendum.   
 We’ll presently see that in the just mentioned respects “subjective” welfare is, 
measurability-wise, the inverse image of more “objective,” physical distribuenda.  And 
indeed it appears that the two things – welfare and the physical items from which 
distribuees derive it – must be brought together in some way for distribuendum-
measurement problems to be addressed ethically-intelligibly at all.  This too, along with 
its practical import, will emerge as we proceed. 
 
 3. Resources/Wealth 
 
 The principal competitors to welfare as distribuendum candidate historically have 
been material resources or wealth of one sort or another.  And resources’ characterization 
or construal, like welfare’s, has ranged from simple and abstract to complex and 
concretely particular.  The simplest and most abstract characterization is simply as wealth 
– some index-tied medium of exchange or scalar “stuff” that recipients can transform into 
 33 
welfare through purchase of more variegated goods and services.67  More complex and 
concretely particularized characterizations include Rawlsian “primary goods,” among 
others.68 
 As indicated at the end of the previous subsection, the advantages and 
disadvantages of resources as prospective distribuenda can be viewed as the inverse 
image of the disadvantages and advantages of welfare.  As for advantages:  First, 
resources are directly distributable.  Relatedly second, they are readily measurable, at 
least in respect of simple quantification and interpersonal comparability in the holding.  
And finally third, they provide space for the working of distribuees’ at least partial 
responsibilities69 for effecting their own well-being:  What satisfactions distribuees enjoy 
will ride partly upon what they do with their resource allotments.  That seems to many 
both ethically right and, incentives-wise, efficient.  More on that when we turn to 
distribuees, distribution formulae and distribution mechanisms below. 
 Resources’ disadvantages are straightforward functions of the degree to which, if 
any, considerations of the propriety of their spread are detached from considerations of 
welfare.  Where the severance is complete and entire, resourcism devolves into fetishism.  
In such case the stuff that is spread is best viewed as – though surprisingly not observed 
in the literature to be – not even so much as cognizable as “resource,” “wealth” or the 
                                                 
 67 Including risk-bearing services, the fuller significance of which emerges below at Part II.E.2.  
This rough characterization of wealth, incidentally, is cognate with but not identical to that offered by 
Posner in the 1980s, as discussed below at Part III.A.  A suitable synonym for my use would be 
“purchasing power.”  
 68 See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54-55, 78-81, 358-65 (rev’d ed., 1999).  I prescind 
from such complexities here, as (a) they’re not germane to present purposes, and (b) bracketing them 
causes no harm.  Fuller discussion of primary goods can be found in Robert Hockett  & Mathias Risse, 
Primary Goods Revisited (under revision for ECON. & PHIL.), available at my SSRN site.  
 69 Even if bounded responsibility – more on which supra, Part II.B and infra, Part II.D.  
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like.  They cannot be so any more than, say, Nazi preference-satisfaction is congnizable 
as “well-being.”   
 We should bear this in mind:  Resources are, trivially and yet oft-forgottenly, in 
every case resources for something.  They count as resources, as distinguished from 
uninteresting, ethically inert substances, only by reference to purposes, hence 
preferences, that users have for them.  “Wealth” for its part, derived as it is from the 
Middle English “weal” as in “common weal,” is cognate with “well-being” itself.  So 
resources or wealth, even to count as such, have to be tied in some manner to that which 
concerns the distribuees who engage our distributive-ethical concern – well-being.  The 
question thus opened is:  In what way, precisely?  The full answer emerges only once 
we’ve arrived at proposed distribution formulae and distribution mechanisms, below.70 
 Relations between resource and welfare implicate measurement matters too.  As 
noted before, resources raise no direct challenge where quantification and interpersonal 
holdings-comparison alone are concerned.  But they do raise an indirect challenge where 
the ethical relevance of quantities and holdings are concerned.  For ethical relevance 
here, as just observed, is tied partly – though critically – to welfare-yield.  And for related 
though distinct reasons, resources raise a direct challenge where commensurability is 
concerned:   
 The indirect challenge is this:  If (a) a given distribuendum yields differing 
welfare measures to differing distribuees, (b) welfare is ultimately what matters, and (c) 
welfare itself is, as observed earlier, not practicably quantifiable or interpersonally 
comparable in the holding, then (d) it is not immediately apparent what ethically 
                                                 
 70 Infra Parts II.D and II.E.  
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cognizable advantage is offered by resources’ quantifiability and interpersonal 
comparability advantages. 
 The direct challenge is this:  If (a) resources are disparate, and (b) each is not 
properly subject to its own distribution formula, then (c) some means of indexing must be 
developed for such terms as “total resources” or “wealth” to bear content.  And given 
both (d) the de facto valuation that occurs when assigning comparative weightings to 
vector components in fashioning the scalar along which “total resources” or “wealth” are 
to be quantified, and (e) the fact that ethically satisfactory such valuation must again 
involve measurement-challenging welfare, (f) indexing too will be problematic.   
 Fortunately it happens, again as we’ll see, that a well specified distribution 
mechanism allows both for unobjectionable indexing and for ethically intelligible 
coupling of readily measurable disparate resources (or wealth) and human welfare.  I 
must then again ask the reader to bear with me until we’ve completed this Part. 
 
 4. Opportunity/Access 
 
 One perceived difficulty attending resources as proposed ditribuenda – a 
counterpart, I think, to the objectionable preference problem attending certain construals 
of welfare – has occasioned a distribuendum candidate that differs in the articulation but 
at bottom amounts, I believe, to a mere fuller naming of resources.71  The idea is this:  
                                                 
 71 The difficulty was flagged just above:  It’s the danger of fetishism.  The sense in which it is 
counterpart to objectionable preferences in “welfare”-construal is this:  The danger that afflicts welfare is 
that all preferences – even admittedly antiethical ones – might illicitly be counted, in their satisfaction, as 
ethical “welfare.”  The danger that afflicts resources is that no preferences what ever will be considered 
when labeling ethically inert, unwanted substances “resources.”  “Resource,” like “welfare,” is an 
ineluctably value-laden term.  It might be worth noting that “resource” is subject to ethically objectionable 
over-inclusive construal as well, just as we observed “welfare” to be subject to ethically objectionable 
under-inclusive construal:  Just as it is ethically grotesque to suggest that welfare is only hedonic, it is 
ethically grotesque to suggest all things the possession of which might afford pleasure might be counted as 
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Because welfare, or “advantage,” is what matters to people, material stuff in itself is not 
ethically salient.  Moreover, since material resources are variegated and accordingly in 
need of commensuration if to be spread under one distribution formula, some common 
denominator is required:  And that’s again welfare, or advantage.  Accordingly, the item 
whose spread can intelligibly engage our distributive-ethical concern or assessment, even 
if material in nature, must be understood as “opportunity for welfare,” or “access to 
advantage.”72 
 For reasons that will be plain in light of II.C.3 just above, I think that “opportunity 
for welfare” and “access to advantage” as so described are best understood simply as 
alternative christenings of resources or wealth.  Their advantage over the terms 
“resources” or “wealth,” if such they carry, stems from the possibility that some folk 
appear to have grown numb over time to the fact emphasized above – that resources or 
wealth, to be resources or wealth as distinguished from unvalued hence ethically inert 
matter, just are opportunities for welfare, modes of access to advantage.73  They 
represent, one might say, “material opportunity” – opportunity to satisfy wants, to 
effectuate plans, to build lives, hence potentially to enhance welfare, well-being, etc.  
Henceforth I’ll accordingly use the terms “resource,” “wealth,” and “material 
                                                                                                                                                 
“resources.”  Slaveholders and pre-20th Century husbands seem often to have viewed human beings that 
way, for example.      
 72 See, e.g., R. J. Arneson,  Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. STUD. 77 
(1989); R. J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. (1990); Cohen, Currency, supra not 43.  An analogue in the case of welfare would be 
someone’s suggesting we use “ethically compatible preferences” instead.  Just as “welfare,” I think, already 
connotes such conditions (in contrast to “satisfaction” or “utility”), the word “resources,” I’ve argued, 
already connotes the conditions I record here.  
 73 Rather as some seem to have grown numb to the fact that well-being is not ethically unevaluated 
pleasure.  
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opportunity” by and large interchangeably, with occasional caveats registered where 
necessary.74 
 
D. Distribution Formulae 
 
 “To distribute,” like other verbs, is subject to adverbial modification.  Distributive 
claims effectively mandate conformity to one or another such modification:  They say, in 
effect, “things should be distributed thus: ...”  Such mandates are themselves in turn 
subject to feasibility constraints which figure into further adverbial modifications – 
claims of the form:  “Things can be distributed thus: …”  In sum, then, we ask both “how 
ought?” and “how can?,” with the class of possible replies to the second question 
effectively determining the domain from which to select our reply to the first.   
 In posing the first question, we are asking for specification of what I call a 
“distribution formula.”  In posing the second question, we ask for specification of what I 
call a class of “distribution mechanisms.”  I treat of the first here, the second in Part II.E. 
 Historically there have been three leading candidate-families proffered by 
practitioners of distributive-ethical assessment for distribution formulae.  I call their 
advocates “maximizers,” “maximiners,” and “egalitarians” of one stripe or another.  Each 
family is best known through one or two of its historically most influential members.  
Each also has featured one or more members argued for by appeal to hypothetical veiled 
choice scenarios.  I’ll accordingly first discuss each of the distinct families of candidates 
                                                 
 74 Such caveats as I’ll register concern the distinction that one must draw, in some cases, between 
what I’ll call “ethically exogenous” and “ethically endogenous” resources, wealth and opportunity.  Briefly, 
ethically exogenous holdings are such as one is not responsible for, while ethically endogenous holdings 
are such as one is responsible for.  The discussion of distribution formula below, at Part II.5, elaborates the 
ethical significance of the distinction.  The relevance of the distinction at present is simply that the terms 
“material opportunity” and, a bit less, “resource” probably connote ethical exogeneity quite immediately to 
most, while “wealth” probably does not, meaning that I’ll more often have to make plain that I have, say, 
“ethically exogenous wealth” in mind than that I have “ethically exogenous material opportunity” in mind.    
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by reference to its best known members, then discuss veiled choice scenarios as 
employed in respect of all three, then conclude with observations on the inter-
formulability of maximizing and equalizing formulae.    
 
 1. Naïve Maximization 
 
 The best known maximizing distribution formulae are what I call “naïve” such 
formulae.75  The operative ideal behind such formulae is disarmingly simple:  It is that 
what ever is distributed should be distributed in such manner as maximizes the quantity 
of some aggregate taken to be normatively salient.  Typically, that means somehow 
aggregated wealth or welfare, simply summed over the distribuees who hold or enjoy it.76  
If distribution D1 yields aggregate wealth or welfare W1, D2 yields W2, and W2 exceeds 
W1, then D1 ethically dominates D2 on this view.  For our goal is, quite simply:   
Max ∑ Wi, where “i” indexes by distribuee and “n” designates the number thereof in the  
        1 n               
society in question.77  
                                                 
 75 Strictly speaking, maximization of course can no more be a literal, or “direct” distribution 
formula than welfare can be a literal, or “direct” distribuendum.  It serves, rather, like welfare, as a manner 
of touchstone.  The idea is to distribute in such manner as will maximize some aggregate, rather as in the 
case of welfare as distribuendum one is to distribute something in such manner as produces welfare in or 
for some distribuee(s).  For this reason it turns out, unsurprisingly, that maximizing formulae can be 
reformulated in non-maximizing form.  See infra Part II.D.5. 
 76 Welfare aggregation and maximization are associated with utilitarian ethics.  Wealth 
maximization is associated with certain Kaldor-Hicksian legal scholars.  More infra, Parts II.E, III.A.    
 77 I am of course presenting here a particularly simple formulation of a maximization formula.  
Things typically grow rather more complicated than this.  Relatedly, I refer to “naïve maximization” in this 
context by dint each i’s “level”’s being equally weighted – “counting for the same” – in the naïve social 
welfare functional, notwithstanding the possibility that that which is equally weighted – the utility function 
– might be something for which the distribuee i is not fully responsible, hence something that’s in part 
morally arbitrary.  We could just as easily call naïve welfare-maximization something like, say, “utility-
function-egalitarianism.”  For it is always possible to depart from the aforementioned equal weighting 
condition, say on the aforementioned grounds that one is not entirely responsible for one’s utility function 
and thus that that function amounts in part to a morally arbitrary feature of the person.  Such departures will 
in effect incorporate different distributive judgments than does naïve maximization.  (Something other than 
each distribuee’s utility function alone will be summed in the functional.)  And any such formulae will of 
course “maximize” something, it just will not be welfare that’s undifferentiated as between ethically 
exogenous and ethically endogenous (responsible) welfare.  Indeed, once the social welfare functional – 
including its aggregation formula – is determined, any prescription what ever can be described as 
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 Maximization in so unalloyed a form has, unsurprisingly, provoked charges of (a) 
fetishism, (b) objectionably unequal treatment of distribuees, (c) objectionable treatment 
of distribuees as nonresponsible patients, or less often (d) some combination of these.  It 
is insufficiently widely recognized, I believe, that the combined objection would be 
analytically more satisfactory.  For the separate objections are readily demonstrated to be 
quite closely interrelated objections; one tends conceptually to entail another: 
 The fetishism charge is more typically aimed at naïve would-be wealth-
maximizers than welfare-maximizers, though this fact reflects a confusion, I’ll show.  
The idea is that maximizing wealth for its own sake, shorn of the proper ethical regard for 
wealth-makers and wealth-takers, is ethically indistinguishable from maximizing, say, the 
quantum of blue-colored area over some surface.  There seems no ethically cognizable 
reason for such pursuit if it does not somehow entail proper treatment of distribuees 
person by person.78  And what constitutes the latter treatment would seem to have to be 
understood antecedently under criteria quite independent of the substance – or space – 
maximization itself.  For ethics is by its nature concerned most immediately with the 
treatment of individual persons rather than of nonpersons, such as aggregates are.  The 
prospective ethical salience of any aggregate must in consequence be explained by 
reference to that aggregate’s relation to the persons – in fact ourselves – who are the 
subjects of our ethical regard.  No group of persons who are distributor/distribuees – no 
                                                                                                                                                 
“maximizing.”  And just as clearly, any such maximization formula can be recast as an egalitarian formula.  
The distinction between the maximization and equalization forms, that is to say, is entirely arbitrary.  When 
formulae nonarbitrarily differ it is always according to what feature of distribuees – of i’s – is to be treated 
as ethically relevant hence worthy of equal treatment, thus “equalized” in an equlization formula or 
“unweighted” and summed in a maximization formula.  One way of viewing the quest for the correct 
distribution formula, then, whether they be cast as maximization or as equalization formulae, is as the quest 
for non-morally-arbitrary – i.e., nonfetishist – features in virtue of which to view distribuees as equals.  See 
infra Part II.D.5.   
 78 More on this matter in connection with the “wealth as a value” debate of the early 1980s, infra 
Part III.A.  
 40 
“we” – will sensibly bother, under the aspect of normative ethics, with an aggregate not 
understood in those more fundamental, personal terms.   
 Though it is rather less often observed, naïve welfare-maximizing is subject to 
precisely the same charge of fetishism as is naïve wealth-maximizing.  Welfare might 
indeed be – indeed might stipulatively hence trivially be – “what matters” to people.  But 
if produced by means that are indifferent to the proper treatment of numerically distinct 
and ethically equal distribuees, it is no less ethically inert than is wealth or blue surface-
space.  For again, ethics requires attention to the deserved or earned welfare or wealth of 
each antecedently equal-rights-bearing person one by one, not to an antecedently defined 
aggregate – even a welfare aggregate – in terms of which rights are but subsequently 
defined and apportioned.  To hold otherwise, of course, is to hold that the aggregate’s 
distribution does not normatively matter.79  It is thus to eschew distributive-ethical 
assessment altogether.  And that is what’s fetishist. 
 The unequal treatment charge leveled at naïve maximization is, in view of what 
just has been said, readily seen to be deeply connected to the fetishism charge:  It stems 
from the possibility, in principle, that what ever is maximized might be maximized by 
means that effectively treat persons as being of ethically differing status even before or 
apart from their ethically endogenous choices.80  It can in theory turn out, for example, 
that aggregate welfare or wealth would be maximized simply by euthanising faultless 
                                                 
 79 Some such intuition is of course what underlies Robert Nozick’s “utility monster” objection to 
utilitarianism.  It is not accidental that he begins the treatise with an observation to the effect that 
“individuals have rights.”  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974).  
 80 In such case we might say they are treated as being “antecedently” or “exogenously,” hence 
ethically essentially unequal.  
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depressives or severely handicapped persons.81  Or it might be that maximization would 
be effected by channeling resources or wealth toward persons blessed with high 
endorphin counts or otherwise highly resource-responsive welfare functions, who 
accordingly derive disproportionate pleasure from that which they receive.82  The fact 
that naïve maximization imperatives do not prohibit such measures in principle (and 
indeed seem to welcome them), it is argued, demonstrates maximization’s unsuitability to 
the task of articulating an ethically defensible distribution formula.83   
 The patient-treatment objection to naïve maximization is the flipside of the 
unequal treatment objection, hence is, like the latter, also connected to the fetishism 
objection:84  It is, in effect, that just as distribution effected on the basis of morally 
arbitrary features of faultlessly disadvantaged persons – depressives and handicapped 
persons, say, as just countenanced – treats the latter as effectively expendable and non-
rights-bearing, so does it treat morally arbitrarily advantaged persons – “utility monsters” 
and talent-Übermenschen, say – as being of meritlessly higher ethical status quite apart 
from that which constitutes them as human persons – their responsible human agency.85   
 There’s a deep sense in which that is as it were “metaphysically” patronizing, 
disturbingly contingent, and in consequence alienating and demoralizing:  One’s birth 
into a right to larger distributive shares than those enjoyed by others is the product of a 
dubious “blessing.”  It is effectively her birth into a polity that treats her as a patient and, 
                                                 
 81 Richard Posner professed in the early 1980s to be troubled by this possible consequence in the 
case of welfare-maximization, but then puzzlingly dismissed the concern in the case of wealth-
maximization.  See infra Part III.A.    
 82 See again Nozick, supra note 75.  A deep relation, then, between unethically unequal treatment 
and fetishism.  
 83 It is of course no answer to say that this does not typically happen in practice.  Ethics concerns 
not happy accidents but principles.  More on this infra Part III.  
 84 Hence of the fetishism objection as well.  Again the offenses, we see, are all interrelated.  
 85 See again supra notes 75 and 78.  
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indeed, as an object.  For she is treated as one whose politically honored advantages are 
not really her own, not the product of her agency, but instead a gift conferred by society 
in virtue of an accident – conferred simply because she is, so to speak, “productively 
blonde.”86  In such a polity she is but contingently favored, by mere accident of birth, as a 
mere funnel into which the channeling of resources simply happens to produce a higher 
aggregate.  That, it is argued, is deeply disrespectful and ultimately harmful of the self, 
even if in some respects likewise materially benefiting, of the fortunate as well as of the 
unfortunate.87    
 A final objection to naïve maximization is rooted in measurement challenges of 
the kind surveyed above in Part 3.2.  Where welfare is held out as maximandum, the 
objection is that welfare is not sufficiently amenable to interpersonal comparison in the 
holding as to render its aggregation sufficiently effectuable as to lend “maximization” 
any workable content.  Where wealth is the proposed maximandum, the measurement-
rooted objection finds its ground ultimately in commensurability:  One objects that the 
absence of markets in many valued or potentially valued goods and services – including 
                                                 
 86 Imagine a society in which blondes were quite rare such that, in consequence, birth with blonde 
hair was viewed as a sign from the gods that the blonde was to be treated as an avatar, maintained in a 
temple and endowed with sacramental gifts.  Even were the blondes in such society permitted to come and 
go as they pleased, there is an obvious sense in which they would experience themselves to be freakish, 
radically separated from others.  The sense in which this is damaging to the putative beneficiary will be 
familiar to those who have read of the psychological harm experienced by members of royal families in 
those few modern democratic polities that maintain them.  It is also of course a staple of fiction concerning 
the longings of celebrities, royalty, avatars and even angels to lead ordinary lives.  See, e.g., MARK TWAIN, 
THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER (1882).  Also such films as Roman Holiday, The Last Emperor, Wings of 
Desire.        
 87 Because the favorable treatment is contingent on morally arbitrary – unearned – features, and is 
accordingly withdrawable immediately upon the loss, however accidental it might be, of such features.  
Some such intuition as this seems to underwrite the expressions of alienation, loneliness, anxiety and even 
humiliation sometimes heard from people found physically attractive by large numbers of others.  And 
arguments analogous to the charge sometimes are heard from opponents of affirmative action programs 
who have qualified or would qualify as beneficiaries of such programs.  There’s a link here to the notion of 
a “right to punishment” as well, per supra, note 60.  The link’s perhaps best drawn in FYODOR 
DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1866).    
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risk-bearing services – renders the “wealth” that is maximized an ethically incomplete 
index.  Or, relatedly, one points to one or another variant of the so-called “Scitovsky 
paradox” and concludes that, since two states can be Kaldor-Hicks superior to one 
another and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion accordingly does not yield an ordering, “wealth” 
is not sufficiently determinate an aggregate as to be amenable to intelligible 
maximization at all.88   
 Naïve maximizers have offered well-worn rejoinders to these objections.  To the 
fetishism charge, the rejoinder is either that welfare is what matters to people (in the case 
of welfare-maximizers) or that wealth affords opportunity to satisfy preferences hence 
welfare (in the case of wealth-maximizers).  In both cases, it is “concluded,” maximizing 
cannot, in consequence, be fetishistic.   
 This rejoinder is of course a non sequitur.  The fetishism charge is not that welfare 
and wealth do not matter:89  It is that their naïve maximization does not matter.  It is that 
naïve maximization misunderstands the ways in which welfare and wealth matter.  As 
themselves, these of course matter by definition to everyone.  But as maximized in 
aggregatum pursuant to a simple additive maximizing distribution formula, they at best 
matter only, or objectionably disproportionately, to those lucky enough to attract 
distributions in owing to such of their inherited – not earned – advantages as happen to be 
welfare- or wealth-productive for them.  Welfare or wealth will not in such case matter to 
“us,” whose collective role is that of assessing a distribution formula’s ethically 
                                                 
 88 See Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77  
(1941); also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 
(1980).  The determinacy objection also is grounded in distribution.  See infra Parts II.E, III.A.  
 89 The rhetorically rich but perhaps somewhat overstated title of a well-known article by Dworkin 
might be partly responsible for this misunderstanding.  See infra Part III.A.  The misunderstanding itself 
figures in D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 263 (1986).  
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appropriate treatment of each rights-bearing constituent member among us of the 
distributing polity that we jointly constitute.   
 Viewing welfare or wealth under the aspect of simple summation – as if a 
collection of persons were a person – or under the aspect of how they matter merely to 
some lucky patient-recipients rather than to us – each equal member of the full polity of 
individual rights-bearing agent distributors and assessors – is precisely what is fetishist 
about naïve maximization when proffered as an end in itself.  For it is to abandon the 
ethically required accounting of where welfare or wealth go and who actually has earned 
it, hence simply to treat either it as an ethically inert substance akin to blue surface space, 
or “society” as one person – the sole person – with ethical status.  Both misdirect ethical 
regard toward nonpersons – which is what’s fetishist.  The second in particular also 
happens, of course, to amount to “social organicism” or “collectivism” with a vengeance. 
 To the unequal- and patient-treatment charges, naïve maximizers also have 
offered rejoinders that amount to non sequiturs.  In the case of the unequal treatment 
charge, the rejoinder is that maximization counts each person’s utility or wealth-
production function for one in the social welfare functional – the aggregating and 
maximizing calculus.  One individual function, the claim runs, one “vote;” hence equal 
treatment. 
 This one’s a non sequitur because it mistakes distribuees for their welfare- or 
wealth-production functions.  That’s a form of misplaced fetishism in respect of 
distribuees quite counterpart to naïve maximization itself’s fetishism in respect of 
distribution formulae.  One is no more one’s wealth- or welfare-function than one is 
one’s nose.  Insofar as differing persons are both faultlessly and non-creditably born with 
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differing such functions – as would seem to be the case, say, most dramatically in respect 
of congenital depressives and handicapped persons – equal treatment of those functions 
is, eo ipso, unequal treatment of those born with them.  And it is precisely that to which 
those leveling the unequal treatment objection object.  One might just as well erect 
maximization of aggregate forehead-height as a societal goal and distribute goods 
accordingly, then reply, in response to ethical objections, “but we have counted each 
forehead once.”  It isn’t an answer. 
 To the treatment-as-patients objection the rejoinder is cognate with, but a partial 
misappropriation of, the claims about distribuees made by the objectors themselves.  The 
idea is that, since distribuees are boundedly autonomous agents who act partly to produce 
their own welfare or wealth, and since distributing so as to maximize welfare or wealth is 
to distribute disproportionately to the best, “most efficient” such welfare- or wealth-
producers, maximization effectively coincides with agent-rewarding. 
 This rejoinder is half right, half non sequitur, and so we shall find it half-echoed 
in what turns out to be the most plausible characterization of the correct distribution 
formula further below:  The problem is that it places the cart before the horse, so to 
speak, and in so doing fetishizes – attributes life, as it were, to – the cart.  If distribuees 
bear rights to equal treatment ex ante, immediately prior to commencing with action, then 
the “horse” should be correct distribution considered prior to the consequences for any 
particular aggregate.  Then the appropriate aggregate – the nonfetishist, ethically 
cognizable aggregate – will effectively take care of itself:  It will be maximized quite 
“automatically” ex post as output of the correct ex ante distribution of inputs.90 
                                                 
 90 More on this infra Parts II.D.3, II.D.5, II.E, in connection with what I’ll call “ethically 
cognizable” welfare, maximization and efficiency.  
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 If we are really to treat distribuees as responsible agents not patients, which it 
would seem we must do since “they” here are in fact “we” – we who are acting as agents 
even in positing the question – then we are obliged, if we would be coherent, to look only 
to inputs:  We must look to that which agents responsibly employ in producing their own 
welfare or wealth outcomes.  And in looking to how to distribute those inputs, once 
again, we ask what distribution treats distribuees as ethical equals – as ethically identical, 
boundedly responsible human agents.  That requires we take exogenously given 
“internal” or “personal” – physiologic – resources and deficits into account just as we 
take “external” or “impersonal – nonphysiologic – such givens into account.  For all of 
these are the product of chance not of choice.   
 The ethically equal distribution, then, will be that which works realistically to 
compensate boundedly responsible agents for shortcomings in their welfare- or wealth-
functions rooted or located not in their responsible agency but in their boundedness – 
viz., their handicaps.  This is where our ethical attention belongs in the matter of 
adequately characterizing the appropriate distribuendum and distribution formula – at 
least, again, if we’re taking agency seriously.91  It should not be directed to outputs save 
indirectly, as outputs of the appropriately characterized, equal-agency-honoring inputs.  
To do otherwise is precisely what’s fetishist.92  More on this just below at Part II.D.3. 
 Maximizers do not appear to have arrived at a canonical rejoinder to the 
measurement-rooted objections to maximization.  I think that’s no accident.  The key to 
                                                 
 91 There are of course moral hazard considerations, rooted in the aforementioned difficulty of 
drawing the “boundary” of “boundedly responsible agency,” that must be considered once discussion turns 
toward means of collectively acting pursuant to the ideal distribution formula.  More on those infra, II.E.    
 92 Cognate observations apply in respect of those maximizers who observe that maximizing will 
tend to coincide with equalizing in view of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth or what ever else is 
distributed.  Quite apart from the claim’s ignoring of agency and its reliance upon the happy accident of 
concavity, it leaves open the question:  If you’re serious about equality, why bother with naïve maximizing 
at all?  Let the horse pull the cart.  See infra Part II.D.5.  
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an answer, I believe, again lies in turning away from distributive welfare-output-
assessment altogether, in favor of distributive resource-input-assessment.  Once we do 
that, ready answers to all measurement challenges are immediately forthcoming.  I’ll 
defer elaboration to Part II.E, on distribution mechanisms. 
 I should note here before moving on that those who derive maximization 
imperatives from hypothetical veiled choice scenarios have better, though ultimately still 
problematical, answers to objections to maximization than those I’ve surveyed in the 
foregoing paragraphs.  I defer treatment of these, however, to Part II.D.4, since veiled 
choice arguments are offered to defend the remaining two distribution formula candidates 
as well, and can all of them be most economically dealt with at once. 
 
 2. Prioritarian Maximining 
 
 Maximining, most often associated with John Rawls, is like several other  
 
prescriptions oft-associated with Rawls prompted by – though as we’ll see not fully 
responsive to – some of the shortcomings of naïve maximizing.  The prime-moving idea 
is that many of the differences among persons that would tend effectively to recommend 
disparate treatment in pursuit of a naïve maximizing imperative are, as Rawls put it, 
“arbitrary from a moral point of view.”93  Such differences, it is thought, precisely 
because they are morally arbitrary, cannot ethically be permitted to be distribution-
determinative.  They must in some way be neutralized.   
 Neutralizing such differences altogether, Rawls appears to have thought, would 
result in our pursuit of an egalitarian distribution formula of one sort or another – indeed 
                                                 
 93 See RAWLS, supra note 41 at 72. 
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probably an outcome-egalitarian one, it would seem, thought this isn’t clear.94  But Rawls 
shied away from full-bore egalitarian distribution of any sort, apparently on the theory 
that some departures from equality would render even the “worst-off” among unequals 
“better-off” than they would be were all equal.  In consequence, Rawls seems to have 
concluded, departures from equal distribution are morally tolerable if, but only to the 
degree that, they tend to better the lot of “the worst-off.”95   
 Rawls labeled this Grundnorm “the difference principle.”  If naïve maximizing is 
tide-raising, we might say, and if a rising tide not only lifts all boats but lifts them so high 
that the lowest are raised higher than they would have been under an egalitarian 
distribution formula, then maximization will be distributive-ethically permissible.  But it 
will be so only on condition that – and indeed differing egalitarian distributions will be 
socially preference-orderable precisely according as – “the minimum” be maximized too:  
Max ∑ Wi, where “i” again indexes by distribuee and “n*” designates the best-off  
         1 n* 
 
member of the worst-off class, hence the cut between “worst-off class” and all others.   
 
Maximin is accordingly the formulaic upshot of Rawls’s difference principle. 
  
 Both the difference principle and maximin appear, on reflection, to be only semi-
sequitur responses to Rawls’s specific concerns about “pure” maximization.  They turn 
out in consequence to be rather crude, coarse-grained remedies, if indeed determinate 
remedies at all:   
 For one thing, of course, “the worst-off” class is quite indeterminate:  Not only is 
it unclear whether it be the worst off person, the worst off .1% of persons, the worst off 
centile or decile or quintile or what ever:  It is unclear even how we are to decide.  No 
                                                 
 94 The sense in which it’s not clear will emerge presently.       
 95 I recognize that there is a rather lengthy leap here.  But I am endeavoring to exposit or 
reconstruct, not to defend, Rawls’s chain of reasoning.       
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principles are on offer, nor does any particular rationale seem to offer itself.96  That’s a 
bit troubling given that maximin’s meant to neutralize morally arbitrary determinants of 
distributive shares and thus afford ethically satisfactory guidance to law-makers. 
 A closely related difficulty with Rawlsian maximining is that the idea of the 
“worst-off class” does not even seem to be clearly conceived or intelligibly motivated, let 
alone defined, by Rawls with any articulated view to the reasons for anyone’s being 
worst off:  Rawls draws no distinction, for example, between those who are holdings-
wise worst-off by chance and those who are effectively worst-off by choice.  Yet if any 
distinction of interest to distributive-ethical assessment is not “morally arbitrary” – and 
surely there must be some that are not if the predicate’s to do any work – one would think 
it would be that one.   
 Why, then, does Rawls not consider the question at all in characterizing the moral 
arbitrariness-prompted (a) maximin formula and (b) class of “worst off” distribuees who 
are its beneficiaries?  No answer’s forthcoming.  And that is both strange and quite 
troubling:  For insofar as there is divergence between those who are responsibly worst-off 
on the one hand, accidentally worst-off on the other, maximining looks no less morally 
arbitrary in principle than is naïve maximizing.  Both maximize morally arbitrarily; they 
differ only in maximizing different maximanda.  That means in turn that maximining 
                                                 
 96 That’s to say that Rawls’s failure to offer a basis on which to make the cut does not seem to be 
accidental.  There seems no principled basis at all.  And that, I believe, is rooted in the difference 
principle’s failure directly to address its own motivating concern – the concern with morally arbitrary 
distinctions among persons that result in their differential faring.  The only means by which to address that 
concern, in turn, turn out not only to supply a satisfactory theoretical baseline, but also to render the 
difference principle itself quite superfluous.  Rawls on this understanding emerges as an unstable resting 
point en route from naïve to ethically cognizable maximizing – or what is the same thing, as we’ll see infra, 
from ethically noncognizable to ethically cognizable equalizing.  More infra, Part II.D.3, II.D.5.  
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little or no more treats distribuees as moral equals and responsible agents than does 
maximization.97 
 Almost as if to register that he was at least obliquely aware of such problems, 
Rawls’s full theory of appropriate distribution employed two more devices that appear to 
have been meant to bring some modicum of ethically equal treatment and responsible 
agency back into the account.  The first device was the familiar “veil of ignorance” 
alluded to earlier.  Rawls’s claim here was in effect that distribuees in their roles as 
distributors choosing distribution principles with which they would subsequently have to 
live as distribuees, not knowing ex ante in that choosing who they would turn out to be 
post-choice, “would” select maximin.  
 The veiled choice scenario is of course most immediately prompted by the wish to 
impose ethical equality via anonymity and consequent impartiality:  Choosers are 
prevented from choosing to benefit themselves “rather than” others because features that 
distinguish them from others are hidden from view.  What was less explicitly recognized, 
however, was that the fact that veiled choice is the product of a choice scenario arguably 
renders maximin a responsible choice as well, to the consequences of which choosing 
agents might then accordingly be appropriately held.98  The degree to which this feature 
                                                 
 97 I perhaps slightly overstate the case – at least insofar as (a) the morally arbitrarily disadvantaged 
are disproportionately represented among the Rawlsian “worst off” class however defined, and (b) there 
really are significant numbers of “utility monsters,” talent Übermenschen or wealthily-born among us.  In 
such case the Rawlsian distribution would presumably undo more arbitrary damage than would naïve 
welfare- or (especially) wealth-maximization.  But in this case of course all boils down to a contingent, 
empirical question.  And note in that case the apparent plausibility of the suggestion, often associated with 
Lerner, that by far most of us possess similar utility functions and that these are concave in wealth such that 
wealth-equalization would maximize aggregate welfare.  If that is true, a utilitarian distribution might 
actually assist more of the morally arbitrarily deprived than would the Rawlsian.          
 98 More corroboration here, I am tempted to say, of the deep interconnectedness of ethical equality 
and responsible agency noted at various points in the foregoing subsections.  There has, incidentally, 
historically been lively debate over just how much ignorance there should be behind the veil.  Rawls at 
times spoke as if he believed distribuees should be held accountable for their lifeplans – indeed that is 
partly what prompts his selection of primary goods as distribuenda, as noted in the next paragraph.  But if 
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of the scenario overtly prompted Rawls is unclear.  But it is difficult not to suppose that it 
would have constituted part of its attraction, consciously or otherwise.  That is so 
particularly in view both of the linkages between ethical equality and responsible agency 
noted above, and of some of the language Rawls’s used in motivating the second device 
to which I’ve alluded – his selection of distribuendum: 
 The second device by which Rawls in effect partly addressed the responsible 
agency and ethical equality problems afflicting his difference principle was, as just 
suggested, his characterization of the appropriate distribuendum.  Rawls prescribed 
distribution of what he called “an index of primary goods” – in effect, a lumpy and only 
incompletely scalable vector of disparate, broadly conceived resources.99  Rawls was at 
least partly cognizant of the agency/equity value that this prescription offered.  For, first, 
his explanations made at least some overt reference to the fact that the selection of 
primary goods as distribuenda effectively held distribuees partly responsible for the 
production of their own welfare – or in his wording, the formulation and successful 
pursuit of their own “plans of life:”100  And relatedly second, Rawls made note of the fact 
that treating primary goods as distribuenda in effect required distribuees to internalize the 
costs that their lifeplan-rooted preferences (for primary goods) imposed upon others.101  
So Rawls seems, in his particular – and, as we’ll see, internally volatile – brand of 
                                                                                                                                                 
that is the case, then lifeplans are ethically endogenous, not “morally arbitrary,” and so it is puzzling why 
choosers behind the veil would not know at least those features of themselves.  Other employers of veiled 
choice justification strategies – essentially some utilitarians and Kaldor-Hicksian wealth-maximizers, as 
discussed infra, Part II.5.4, avoid such difficulties in essence by not concerning themselves with the ethical 
endogenization of anything at all apart from the choice of distribution formula (behind the veil) itself – a 
“thin” sphere of operation for responsibility, to say the least.  For reasons set out below at II.D.4, however, 
I don’t think that we need concern ourselves with whose veil is most attractive.   
 99 Rawls, THEORY, supra note 41 at 54-55, 78-81, 348, 358-65.  In light of the incomplete 
scalability, of course, the index is but incompletely an index.  See supra Part II.C.1.  Also Hockett & Risse, 
supra note 57. 
 100 Rawls, THEORY, supra note 41 at 80.  
 101 Id. at 359.  
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veiledly-chosen, primary-goods-distributive maximining, at the least to have been an 
incipient resourcist and equal responsible agency exponent. 
 The problem for Rawls lies in the “incipient” part of that just-offered 
characterization, which amounts in effect to a carrying-forward of the earlier noted 
“semi-sequitur” characterization.  Here’s what I mean:  Note, first, that primary goods as 
distribuenda bear no necessary connection to maximin as distribution formula.  Indeed, 
they appear to be none but a clumsy and indeed ultimately incoherence-producing graft-
on, rendering Rawls a responsibility-tracer in respect of his distribuendum selection, a 
moral accident-allower in his selection of distribution formula:102  Why?  Because the 
“worst off” in respect even of primary goods holding still might be so either by chance or 
by choice.103   
 The treatment of maximin as a product of veiled choice might, perhaps, at least 
partly have rectified the unstable mixture just noted, had it been a choice actually made, 
or had there been compelling reason to suppose that it “really would” have been made.104  
But it is widely observed that the choice theory by which Rawls arrived at maximin as 
distribution formula was “exotic” to say the least,105 and that the choice he imputes is in 
fact extensionally equivalent, preference-schedule-wise, to such as would be made only 
                                                 
 102 This is not altogether surprising once one notes Rawls’s unresolved ambivalence concerning 
responsibility.  On the one hand, he defends his selection of primary goods as distribuendum by reference 
to the importance of responsibility.  On the other hand, at other points he argues deterministically that 
people are not responsible unless able to choose freely, and that they are not able to choose freely because, 
he says, they do not choose their faculties for choosing.  See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 43 at 90-93, 182.          
 103 See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 NOÛS 429 (1990).  Note that if 
leisure be counted a primary good, we wouldn’t even be able to say that those poor in other primary goods 
through voluntary nonworking were poorly off at all.  See infra note 101.  
 104 Though I’ll offer skepticism about veiled choice scenarios below at II.D.4.   
 105 See John E. Roemer, Egalitarianism Against the Veil of Ignorance, 99 J. PHIL. 167, 168 (2002).  
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by such as are “infinitely” risk-averse.106  There accordingly seems little if any reason to 
suppose that the choice even “would” be made, let alone that it has been made.  And so it 
affords little if any viable element of responsible agency to Rawls’s characterization of 
the appropriate distribution formula. 
 Rawls’s, then, in sum seems an ultimately unstable admixture of agent/patient, 
responsibility-tracing/accident-permitting distributive-ethical prescription.  And 
maximining – the distribution formula that gives partial expression to that mixture – for 
its part appears little if any more free of objectionable ethical arbitrariness than is the 
naïve maximizing it was meant to supplant. 
 
 3. Equalizing: Naïve and Sophisticated Varieties 
 
 Several, though we’ll see far from all, proposed egalitarian distribution formulae 
can be viewed as “purifications” of original Rawlsian insights.  These same, we shall see 
in the next subsection, also are characterizable – like Rawls’s was meant to be – as more 
ethically sophisticated forms of maximization.  The guiding intuition underwriting these 
proposals can be articulated thus:  If some differences among persons are both partly 
causative of their differential faring and yet “arbitrary from a moral point of view,” then 
the most immediately satisfactory distribution formula is that which simply partitions 
each person’s holdings into portions Ri traceable to moral arbitrariness and 1 – Ri 
traceable to responsible agency, then equalizes the former while facilitating agents’ own 
maximization of the latter.   
                                                 
 106 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 
70 J. PHIL. 245, 254 (1973); L. Hurwicz, Optimality Criteria for Decision Making Under Ignorance, 370 
STATISTICS 1 (1951); GEOFFREY A. JEHLE & PHILIP J. REMY, ADVANCED MICROECONOMIC THEORY 260 
(2d ed. 2001).    
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 The morally arbitrary portion of any one person’s holdings, Ri, would be 
invariantly valued across all persons i.  The nonarbitrary portion, call it Ei, would for its 
part be permitted – indeed required – to vary across persons according as they expended 
varying degrees of responsible effort in “productive” activities varyingly valued by 
themselves and others.107  The correct distribution formula accordingly would be most 
straightforwardly characterized thus:  ∀i: Hi = Ei + Ri = Ei + R/n, where “Hi” designates 
each person i’s holdings, “Ei” and “Ri” designate what they were said just above to 
designate, n is the number of persons i and “R/n” designates the constant which is each 
i’s pro rata share of the full exogenously given residuum R.108   
 R can be called “luck,” “exogenously given resources,” “ethically exogenous 
opportunity,” “the exogenous endowment,” “the residuum,” and so on.  Those who would 
equalize Ri across persons can accordingly be labeled “luck-egalitarians,” “resource-
egalitarians,” “responsibility-tracing egalitarians,” “opportunity-egalitarians,” and so on.  
I’ll call them the latter, for reasons counterpart to those offered above at 3.4.3 for treating 
“resources,” “opportunity for welfare” and “access to advantage” all as variants of 
“material opportunity.”   
 Most adherents to the opportunity-egalitarian view tend to regard Rawls as having 
been an incipient such egalitarian.  On this view, Rawls simply had not managed to purge 
                                                 
 107 Leisure in such case would of course not count as part of one’s “holdings.”  But it could be so 
counted – hence the scare-quotes around “productive,” and the “themselves and” placed before “others” in 
the characterization.  Were we to count leisure as part of one’s holdings, we then would say that Ei’s 
composition, rather than Ei itself, varies across persons i.  (A consequence, of course, would be that 
maximization of the full vector of goods one enjoys “takes care of itself,” as a straightforward consequence 
of responsible choices made by distribuees as to the disposition of their resource endowments – Ri.  
Implications of “varying degrees of responsible effort in activities varyingly valued by themselves and 
others” are traced and treated below.  The basic idea is that any surplus that you end up with over your 
mandatorily equalized ethically exogenous endowment is properly a matter of what others give to you in 
exchange for what you give to them.  
 108 R would be the sum of each person i’s Ri.  That is, R = ∑  Ri.  Summing here of course requires 
commensuration and interpersonal comparability.                          1 n   
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his views fully of the naïve aggregative utilitarian maximization imperative that he had 
sought to displace with an individualist distributive-ethical ideal.  The full purge, it 
accordingly seems in effect to be thought, is that which consistently treats distribuees as 
boundedly responsible agents, distribuenda as fully indexed goods and services rather 
than lumpy Rawlsian “primary goods,” and the correct distribution formula as that which 
distributes goods and services in a manner that is systematically responsive to the cut 
between chance and choice.  
 Opportunity-egalitarians are of course not without challenges.  The 
aforementioned cut, for example, between chance and choice – “Ri” and “Ei” above – is 
in practice of course notoriously difficult to draw, and for a plurality of reasons.109  There 
also are problems of commensuration such as plague any distributive mode that takes 
heterogeneous material goods and services as distribuenda.  Finally and quite relatedly, 
by dint (a) of its confronting all morally arbitrary determinants of wellbeing head-on, and 
(b) of personal traits such as innate talents’ and handicaps’ being among such 
determinants, (c) the position in order to be thoroughgoing requires some means of 
commensurating “personal” or “internal” – physiologic – resources and deficits along 
with “impersonal” or “external” – non-physiologic – such inputs to welfare functions.110  
That isn’t easy. 
 These challenges, however, amount simply to partial discounts that must be 
applied to, or obstacles to full enjoyment of, the advantages that the opportunity-
egalitarian position affords.  For competing positions – naïve maximizing and 
                                                 
 109 See generally Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 74-
75 (2005); Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005).  
 110 This is of course a challenge, not a fault.  The fault lies, on this view, with views that do not 
even so much as notice that such “resources” are among those that clearly are morally arbitrary.   
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maximining – refrain from so much as even attempting to reap those advantages.  They 
remain in consequence not only practically, but indeed foundationally short of the ideal.   
 Failure by critics to see this, I think, stems from one remaining piece of the naïve 
aggregationist worldview that some opportunity-egalitarians seem at times inadvertently 
or unreflectively to have retained:  This is the idea that the most familiar traditional early 
20th Century formulations of welfare-economic efficiency are distributive-ethically 
cognizable.  Once it is seen that they are not, it is readily seen that that the challenges just 
mentioned are nothing but limitations on the degree to which the opportunity-egalitarian 
ideal can be fully realized as a matter of practice, not on the fact that it strictly dominates, 
and indeed fully consummates the ambitions of, naïve maximizing and maximining as a 
matter of theory.  It also, relatedly, is readily seen in such case that any movement 
forward along either of two market-attribute dimensions that I discuss below at Part II.E 
yields unambiguously forward movement in the direction of fuller realization of the 
opportunity-egalitarian ideal, hence again in the direction of advance over naïve 
maximizing and maximining.111  More on this, again, below at Part II.E on distribution 
mechanisms.   
 Two final points should be made in connection with equalization as proposed 
distribution formula:  First, as perhaps has been noticed, the opportunity-egalitarian 
principle straightforwardly coheres with the view of distribuees as ethically equal, 
boundedly responsible agents.  It likewise coheres with the view of appropriate 
distribuenda as material inputs to individual welfare that distribuees themselves are in 
significant measure responsible for producing – i.e., as material opportunity.  The same 
                                                 
 111 The latter ideal along with the two mentioned market-dimensions, that is to say, are ordinally 
equivalent.  More on this in connection with distribution mechanisms infra, Part II.E.2.   
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cannot be said, clearly, for many other historically proposed – indeed “naïve” – 
egalitarian distribution formulae: 
 Some utilitarians, for example, historically have argued for wealth-equalization 
apart from any consideration of distribuees’ ethical equality or responsibility for wealth- 
or welfare-production.  They have so advocated simply on grounds that the conjecturally 
similar utility functions of, and in particular the diminishing marginal utility of wealth 
among, most persons would entail that rough equalization of holdings would maximize 
aggregate welfare.  That view of course treats distribuees effectively as patients – as 
ethically inert, “automatically” operating welfare manufactories into which wealth is fed 
rather like worms into chicks’ beaks.  It also of course treats them as ethically unequal:   
They are treated as “equals” only in respect of a contingently identical feature (again, 
their utility functions); and the responsibly diligent among them, at least so long as they 
continue to act diligently, are expropriated on behalf of and conscripted for the purposes 
of the intentionally non-diligent.  Finally, the view of course treats aggregate welfare, not 
wealth, as distributive focal point.112  In short, then, it remains, as per Part II.D.1 above, a 
version of naïve maximization, just a contingently (by dint of a posited accidental feature 
of utility functions) income-equalizing one. 
 Non-utilitarian welfare-egalitarians are another group of equalizers who 
historically construed distribuees effectively as patients and ethical non-equals.  
Advocates of such welfare-output-equality, in (a) acknowledging differing welfare 
functions across persons, and (b) advocating differential wealth-inputs in contemplation 
of that fact so as to equalize individual welfare-outputs, (c) effectively held distribuees 
                                                 
  112 It is also, of course and in consequence, another case of cart’s being placed before horse.  If 
wealth-equalizing is sought only by dint of its putative aggregate welfare-maximizing, it is sought in 
pursuit of a fetish.  
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unaccountable for their own welfare even in part, and in so doing (d) like utilitarian 
wealth-egalitarians conscripted the diligent to subsidize the non-diligent.  But most such 
advocates also, it happens, at least were laudably upfront about why:  They were 
determinists, pursuant to which view all persons are in effect patients – patients of God or 
of fate or of “nature” – through and through.113 
 There is of course a sense in which the last position just mentioned can be 
reconciled with – or, better, said to amount to a degenerate case of – the opportunity-
egalitarian position:  Were it somehow possible, for example, both intelligibly to 
maintain and empirically to establish that nobody “really” is responsible for anything, 
then welfare-egalitarianism would extensionally coincide with opportunity-
egalitarianism:  One would simply set Ei trivially at zero for all values of i in the formula 
set out above in this subsection in recognition of no one’s “actually” being responsible 
for anything, including for any portion of her holdings.  There would be no ethical point 
in distinguishing between opportunity-input and welfare-output.  I don’t see how the 
mentioned antecedent conditions, however, could ever be practically satisfied.   
 Counterpart remarks would presumably hold of welfare-maximizing 
utilitarianism:  Were it plausible to hold persons responsible for everything rather than 
nothing – even the entireties of their utility functions114 – then we might set Ri trivially at 
zero for all values of i in the above-stated opportunity-egalitarian formula in recognition 
of that “fact.”  Persons i would be treated as equals by dint of their each counting for one 
                                                 
 113 I can’t claim fully to understand this position, of course.  By its own criteria it would seem to 
be prompted in the saying by metaphysical necessity rather than by the proponent’s seeing of the truth.  
And we who hear the claim likewise will do what ever we do pursuant to the same occult metaphysical 
causes rather than to offered reasons.  But I must leave this curious matter to one side with a shrug.  
 114 Demanding a Panglossian happy attitude, say, or Schopenauerian resignation or Neitzschean 
amor fati.  
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and there being no ethically exogenous residuum, for which they were not responsible, to 
be spread objectionably unequally.  Again there would be no more point in distinguishing 
between opportunity-input and welfare-output.  Once again, however, the antecedent 
condition here – distribuees’ being responsible for everything – looks impossible 
plausibly to maintain.115  We seem to be stuck with the cut – between chance and choice 
– the explicit recognizing of which is opportunity-egalitarianism’s theoretic blessing and 
(partly surmountable, we’ll see at II.E) pragmatic curse.       
 The final point to make in connection with equalization has to do with its relation 
to fairness.  “Fairness,” on all semantically informed understandings of the word, 
connotes impartiality or even-handedness:116  Commonly proffered synonyms of “fair” 
include “equitable,” “just,” “impartial,” “unbiased,” “even-handed,” “treating like cases 
alike” and the like.117  To treat parties fairly is to treat them as equals for purposes of the 
treatment.  It is, that is to say, to eliminate or neutralize inequities that are exogenous to 
the purposes of the treatment, and to retain or vindicate inequities that are endogenous to 
the purposes of the treatment – precisely in proportion to their endogeneity.   
 If the purpose of the treatment in a particular context, then, is to distribute in 
accordance with responsible human agency and nothing else – i.e., no morally arbitrary 
feature of the distribuees – then fair treatment will be that which allocates value to 
distribuees in proportion to the latter’s creditability for value-production.118  It will also, 
then, a fortiori be treatment that equally allocates value for the production of which no 
                                                 
 115 Neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche managed sustainedly to pull it off, for example.  And 
Pangloss of course was the fictitious butt of a widely appreciated joke.  
 116 It bears virtually no recognizable relation, incidentally, to Kaplow & Shavell’s proffered 
definition, more on which below at Part III.B.  
 117 See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 595 (6th ed. 1990). 
 118 “In proportion to … creditability for value-production” of course requires, if it is not to be 
devoid of content, commensuration of disparate items produced and services rendered, then cardinal 
valuation of agents’ inputs along the resultant index.  We’ll get to that infra, Part II.E.  
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one is responsible, since everyone is in effect equally responsible for that residuum.  
(Zero equals zero.)  Fair allocations in short will be those which equalize holdings of 
such stuff as no one is responsible for, and both allow and indeed require holdings for 
which persons are in fact responsible to vary in proportion to their responsibility.  If that 
is so, then the class of fair allocations would seem to be precisely the class of 
opportunity-egalitarian allocations.   
 
 4. Note on Veiled Choice Scenarios as Justification Strategies 
 
 Members of all three principal families of distribution formula candidate have 
been advocated by some on the basis of counterfactual choice scenarios involving 
identity uncertainty.  Harsanyi, for example, once argued that average, then later that 
aggregate, utility-maximization would be selected as distributive touchstone from behind 
the veil.119  Richard Posner once argued for wealth-maximization along similar lines.120  
Rawls, we have noted, argued that primary goods maximin would be chosen.  And 
Dworkin has in effect argued that physiological resource deficiencies should be 
compensated pursuant to “talent insurance” purchases hypothetically made in a 
contingent claims market purged of such asymmetrical information-apportionment as 
would generate market-destructive adverse selection or moral hazard.121   
 The attraction of veiled choice strategies is not difficult to grasp:  As noted before 
in connection with Rawls, the veil itself – an imposed informational symmetry – is 
                                                 
 119 See John Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 
61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); John Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).  Harsanyi (along with many others) misinterpreted 
the significance of his proofs, which turn out to be nothing more than representation theorems concerning 
the cardinalizability of ordinal measures.  See generally ROEMER, THEORIES, supra note 41 at 141-50. 
 120 More on Posner’s argument infra, Part III.A. 
 121 See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
283 (1981). 
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intended to screen out what’s thought to be morally arbitrary knowledge of self, hence 
prevent ethico-objectionably unequal treatment in the selection of distribution formulae.  
The choice made from behind the veil, for its part, can be thought ethically to endogenize 
the resultant formula precisely by dint of it apparently rendering the resultant formula 
responsibly – even if distantly or attenuatedly – chosen by agent-distribuees.122   
 Such problems as might inhere in hypothetical veiled choice scenarios, then, arise 
in the main – though we’ll see not exclusively – from their “hypothetical” status.  And 
that there are problems so rooted ought probably to be clear if for no other reason than 
that such contrary distribution formulae as those just discussed all have been claimed to 
be derivable from them. 
 The problematicity of arguments from hypothetical veiled choice have not, I 
believe, received adequate systematic attention in the literature.  Because I have treated 
them elsewhere,123 however, and because in the next subsection I show means of by and 
large sidestepping them through a distribution mechanism that both affords and simulates 
much more actual choice than has hitherto been afforded, I shall be summary:   
 The first and most obvious difficulty facing veiled choice scenarios stems from 
the question of how one is actually to determine what actual agents “would” do or 
choose.  There seem many bases upon which one might, armchair fashion, attribute 
multiple contrary choices.  And consensus on the matter of a satisfactory theory of choice 
– rational or otherwise, and relatedly even as to whether such theories ought be conceived 
as descriptive or prescriptive – has been unsurprisingly elusive.   
                                                 
 122 More on what I take for the significance of that attenuation just below.  
 123 See Robert Hockett, Responsibility, Preference Under Identity Uncertainty, and Counterfactual 
Choice (under revision for J. PHIL., 2006). 
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 A second and related difficulty is rooted in the question:  If we are not actually 
ascertaining, but in effect stipulating, what rational agents would do – in effect thereby 
defining “rational agency” – what is the ethical status of the stipulation, and how is it to 
be justified?  Should people not be thought ethically free to be “irrational” by such lights?  
And if we believe that they should be though free in this way, is it not incoherent to hold 
them responsible for choices that we think that they “would” have made on grounds of 
such species of rationality?  The stakes are of course high, involving as they do the 
justification of holdings or the prescription of redistributions, so a particularly convincing 
justification would seem to be required.   
 A third and again related difficulty stems from the role that would have to be 
played by risk-taste in any veiled choice scenario.  Because choice under uncertainty 
inherently imports risk-taste into choice-making via the shape and gradient of each 
chooser’s preference schedule, and since risk-taste in turn is thought not to be subject to 
rational critique – it’s simply a taste – it is difficult to see how a stipulative definition of 
rational choice could ever not be inherently contestable.  And all the while the alternative 
– likely actual choice – is both empirically investigable and yet left uninvestigated.   
 A fourth, yet again related difficulty faced by hypothetical veiled choice scenarios 
has to do with the truth-valuation of counterfactual claims.  Many if not most 
philosophical logicians believe counterfactuals to be of indeterminate truth value – 
neither true nor false.124  If that’s appropriate, then again it is particularly troubling, in 
view of the stakes, to hinge prescriptive distribution formulae upon them.  They’re at 
least as contestable as are rational choice stipulations.     
                                                 
 124 See Robert Hockett, Primary Goods, Interpersonal Comparisons & Nonstandard Logics (under 
revision for ECON. & PHIL, 2006).  
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 A fifth difficulty facing hypothetical choice stems from the question whether 
hypothetical choice-imputations, even if possessed of determinate truth value and 
determined with reasonable confidence, constitute adequate grounds for attributing actual 
responsibility.  The choices, after all, have not actually been made.  And we do not tend 
in other settings to reward or punish people for what we (even reasonably) suspect that 
they “would” do under circumstances that do not actually obtain.125   
 Finally sixth, even were there not the previous five cognate difficulties, there 
seems something troubling, or at any rate needlessly suboptimal, about letting all 
distribution lifelong ride entirely upon one macro-choice made as it were before life 
commences, leaving no further space for later, more micro-like choices to affect 
distribution.  This seems particularly so if the principles thought likely or properly to 
animate the macro-choice – principles that give expression to ethical equality and 
boundedly responsible agency – are themselves more directly, more proximately, more 
fine-grainedly implicated and ultimately therefore more fully vindicable at the “micro 
level,” on a transaction-by-transaction basis.   
 Call this a “principle of proximity,” “regret-avoidance” or, perhaps, “formula-
choice subsidiarity”:  If distribution is to ride upon ethical equality and bounded 
responsibility, it is tempting to stipulate that the latter should be permitted to operate as 
immediately responsively to the transaction at hand as is practicable and not subversive 
of the principle of equal boundedly responsible agency itself.  Even if choice behind the 
veil is choice as to something as basic as Rawlsian “basic structure,” then, let the basic 
                                                 
 125 Objections to “entrapment” in the criminal law context seem to be rooted in some such 
intuition as this.  Indeed, possibly there are quite many people who might now be imprisoned were we to 
try persons on the basis of criminal actions that we believe with reasonable confidence that they “would” 
take if presented with opportune circumstances.  And there are others whom we might award prizes on such 
grounds.  
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structure itself (or rebuttably presume that choosers would let that structure) afford 
ongoing micro-linkage between diachronically extended distribution-affecting action on 
the one hand, dynamic and ever-fluxum resultant distribution on the other.126  That, 
surely, is at least where the presumption should lie.     
 I see no easy way to address such objections to veiled choice scenarios as these.  
The best we can do, I suspect, is (a) to afford as much scope for ongoing actual choice as 
possible, which scope we shall find at Part II.E to be far broader in potential than in 
realization thus far, so as to sidestep the problems; and (b) in so far as resort to 
hypothetical choice must be had in order to afford space to responsibility, to ground 
imputations as closely as possible in actual discreet choice, by extrapolating from far 
more empirical evidence and simulated choice than theorists thus far have bothered to 
look for.  I’ll sketch how this might be done at Part II.E below, on distribution 
mechanisms.  Not incidentally, that sketch will show not only how hypothetical choice 
might be systematically supplanted by more actual choice:  I also will show how, in 
consequence, the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula that supplants naïve 
maximizing and maximining themselves can be gradually operationalized.  
 
 5. Note on the Interformulability of Maximizing and Equalizing Formulae 
 
 It will prove salutary, particularly in connection with the discussion below at Parts 
II.E and 4, to draw out a bit more an ideographical fact implicit in our treatment of 
distribution formulae in the foregoing subsections:  It is that any distribution formula that 
                                                 
 126 There seems a deep link between violation of this principle on the one hand, naïve 
maximizing’s and maximining’s decoupling from ethical equality and responsibility as discussed above on 
the other.  It is not accidental that the veiled choice scenario that is least decoupled from thorough-going 
ethical equality and responsibility is Dworkin’s, supra note 115, which involves hypothetical insurance 
purchases in contemplation of specific risks.      
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is formulated as a maximization norm can be reformulated as an equalization norm, and 
vice versa.  This was perhaps most obvious in connection with classical utilitarianism – 
naïve welfare-maximization – as elaborated above.  For the injunction to “maximize 
utilities summed over persons” is readily re-renderable as “count each person’s 
unweighted utility function equally – i.e., precisely once – in deriving the sum that’s to be 
maximized.”  Indeed it’s precisely that fact that has misleadingly underwritten the 
ultimately spurious claim made by some utilitarians to be egalitarians. 
 It is the rejoinder to that just-mentioned spurious claim, of course, that indicates 
the means by which to convert egalitarian distribution formulae into maximization 
formulae:  Simply redefine the summand that’s summed into the maximized aggregate.  
For the objection to utilitarians’ claim to be ethical egalitarians, recall, is that the 
summand which they treat equally by not weighting – viz., distribuees’ at least partly 
genetically determined utility functions – is at least partly morally arbitrary, a gift of 
chance, hence at least partly fetishist.  Kaldor-Hicksian wealth-maximizers, we saw, lay 
themselves open to similar objections on ground of the moral arbitrariness of the innate 
talent and birth-into-wealth components of personal wealth- functions.   
 Those observations point to the obvious method by which to derive a more 
ethically satisfactory – i.e., non-naïve, non-fetishist – maximization formula:  First, 
define the nonfetishist summand – the characteristic with which it is not ethically 
objectionable to identify a distribuee in the way that it is to identify her with her utility 
function, her nose or her forehead:  Delimit, that is, the characteristic in virtue of which it 
is not ethically-unequally-treating to treat the distribuee, in summing, unweightedly “for 
one.”  Then by all means do count each person for one – ethically for one – as 
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represented by that ethically satisfactory summand, and “maximize” the now ethically 
cognizable sum.   
 What is that summand?  Well, in view of the observations made in the preceding 
subsections, the ethically satisfactory, boundedly-responsible-agency-respecting 
summand would seem to be what we’ve called “ethically cognizable,” i.e., “non-morally-
arbitrary,” welfare.  It is the welfare that agents – including ourselves, who are acting as 
agents even in deliberating over the appropriate distribution formula – play a critical role 
in producing, out of the exogenous opportunities they – we – are given.  That welfare-
output is maximized, as might be preliminarily gleaned from the foregoing and as is more 
painstakingly shown below at Part II.E, precisely by equalizing exogenous welfare-inputs 
– material opportunity – over distribuees.   
 Formulaically, then, we would convert the opportunity-egalitarian formula 
supplied at II.D.3 into a maximization formula of the form supplied at II.D.1 simply by 
more carefully specifying  what the subscript “i” in the latter formula indexes by.  Rather 
than indexing by distribuee – or, what is the same thing, by each distriubee’s 
undifferentiated (as between morally arbitrary and non-morally-arbitrary) welfare – “i” 
would index by each distribuee’s ethically cognizable welfare.  In effect, “i” in the newly 
interpreted II.D.1 maximization formula would designate what “Ei” in the II.D.3 
opportunity-equalization formula was said to designate.  We might indeed even simply 
combine formulae, yielding:  Max ∑ WEi & ∀i: Eq Ri.127  But strictly speaking this would     
                    1 n  
be redundant, since by virtue of the definitions of “ethically cognizable welfare,” “Ei”   
 
and “Ri,” each conjunct entails the other.  That is:  Max ∑ WEi ≡ ∀i: Eq Ri.  Ethically  
             1 n  
                                                 
 127 Here read “Eq” to mandate equalizing as “Max” mandates maximizing.  
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cognizable welfare just is that which is maximized when ethically exogenous material 
opportunity is equalized over individual welfare-producers – boundedly responsible 
agents.128  That raises an important ideographical-cum-operational point, having to do 
with the optimal mode by which to formulate distribution formulae:  
 Because the left-hand side of each formulae just above “takes care of itself” just 
so long as the right hand side is satisfied, there is, operationally speaking, seldom any 
reason – apart, perhaps, from theoretic perspicuity – to bother with the former side – the 
maximization component of these formulae – at all.  If, for example, we are simply 
instructing an administrator charged with implementing distribution policy as to what she 
is to do, it suffices to instruct her simply to follow the rule stated in the right-hand side of 
the formulae – the equalization side.  Then the left-hand side, which no administrator can 
directly satisfy in any event but rather can satisfy only indirectly, through satisfaction of 
the right-hand side, will quite “automatically” be satisfied.  Ethically cognizable 
maximization, that is to say, will occur simply as a matter of course so long as ethically 
exogenous material opportunity endowments are equalized.  And this of course is so even 
though – indeed because – the equalization rendition and the maximization rendition of 
the distribution formula set out above are extensionally equivalent, mandating precisely 
the same distributive consequences.   
 This latter point dovetails into yet another point, this one now more theoretical 
than operational:  There is much avoidable confusion in the theoretical literature over a 
supposed opposition between the “consequentialist” nature of maximizing mandates on 
the one hand, the “deontological” nature of “fairness” – i.e., equalizing – mandates on the 
                                                 
 128 This presumably is apparent already, but will become yet more so in the next several 
paragraphs, and when we turn to elaboration of the optimal opportunity-egalitarian distribution mechanism 
below at Part II.E.2.  
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other.129  That this is in fact a confusion can be readily shown, and its source now readily 
diagnosed, by reference to the aforementioned extensional equivalence of always-
interformulable maximizing and equalizing formulae on the one hand, the operational or 
“pragmatic” difference found nevertheless between them on the other: 
 First note that the “ethically cognizable maximization” or, equivalently, 
exogenous-opportunity-equalization to which I’ve referred in the foregoing paragraphs 
differs from naïve forms of maximizing, maximining and indeed equalizing only in 
respect of the shape of the distribution formula – or equivalently, the shape of the 
maximizing social welfare functional – that it prescribes.130  It does not, of itself, entail 
anything different than do those other formulae from a “how to” point of view.  All 
prescribed distribution formulae or social welfare functionals – i.e., maximization 
formulae – as an operational matter must in effect prescribe allocations of resources, 
wealth, or what I am calling “material opportunity,” as inputs, with a view to resultant 
welfare-outputs.131  The latter, that is, are the only literal, or “direct” distribuenda.  For of 
course welfare, as noted above at 3.2 and 3.3, cannot be directly or “literally” distributed 
at all.132  It can only result from distribution of something more material in nature.  The 
latter – what can be literally or “directly” distributed – for its part, typically will be 
                                                 
 129 A particularly egregious case is discussed infra, Part III.B.  
 130 Of course it differs in respect of the considerations that have gone into the determination of that 
shape as well, but that should go without saying.  Any difference of shape is presumably the result of 
differing considerations – differing judgments of value – even if in some cases, such as utilitarianism and 
Kaldor-Hicksian “wealth-maximization,” for example, the “consideration” involved is better described as 
inconsideration or insufficient attention. 
 131 It would thus be no more that a case of confusion to suggest that opportunity-equalizers were 
“unconcerned with welfare,” or were “nonconsequentialist,” in any intelligible way that welfare-
maximizers are not.  More on this infra, Part III.B.  
 132 Nor, as we noted above at Part II.C, does it seem directly measurable.  But that is a different 
matter from that which I’m presently considering, though it too, like the present matter, will prove pertinent 
when we turn to mechanisms at Part II.E below.  
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distributed only insofar as it is wanted, hence is welfare-producing, hence is cognizable 
as a veritable “resource.”   
 Where distribution formulae or social welfare functionals actually differ, then, 
apart from the ethical considerations or inconsideration that prompt or underwrite their 
shapes, is only in respect of the patterns pursuant to which they prescribe distribution of 
the resource inputs that they do, and, in consequence, in respect of resultant patterns of 
distributed welfare output.133  And by parity, all such formulae or functionals, because 
indeed they do in fact mandate patterns whether foreseen and intended or not – it there’s 
distribution, there’s a pattern of distribution, just as where there are objects there are 
contours of objects – to prescribe distributive action pursuant to a formula or functional is 
eo ipso to commit oneself to a pattern.  It is to commit oneself to the proposition that that 
pattern is the right one.  
 Lest it be wondered why I bother to emphasize this point, as noted above we shall 
see at Part 4.2 in particular that some authors appear erroneously to have thought that 
egalitarian formulae are “non-consequentialist.”  What is more and relatedly, some of the 
same authors appear in effect to suppose, while not recognizing the fact or the 
incoherence to which it commits them, that it is possible analytically to distinguish 
between prescribing satisfaction of a social welfare functional on the one hand, and 
prescribing conformity to a distribution principle – a pattern according to which benefits 
and/or burdens are meted out – on the other.   
                                                 
 133 This point require emphasis because, as we’ll see at Part III.B in particular, some authors 
appear erroneously to have thought, perhaps owing to egalitarian distribution formulae’s having been 
formulated more along II.D.3 lines addressed directly to inputs rather than along II.D.1 lines, which address 
inputs less directly via reference to outputs, that egalitarian formulae are “non-consequentialist.”     
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 This is of course an altogether hapless misunderstanding, as is clear once we see, 
as just emphasized, both:  First, that equalization and maximization formulae are 
interformulable.  And second, that the only real difference – apart, per our operationally 
oriented observations above, from perspicuity to the administrator charged with their 
execution – between the more familiar nominally equalizing and nominally maximizing 
formulae historically on offer is one of recommended pattern – and hence, of course quite 
trivially, of the particular value commitments that determine and thus are implicated by 
the patterns as well.   
 All distribution formulae and, what is the same thing, social welfare functionals 
recommend particular patterns of inputs – hence of inputting action – in contemplation of 
distributive output consequences.  And hence all are both “consequentialist” in their 
mandating distributive outputs, and “deontological” in their prescribing – consciously or 
otherwise – that we or our agents do so pursuant to patterns.  For the latter, of course, 
must be justified:  Reasons must be given for why we are to conform to these patterns in 
producing distributive consequences.  And those reasons accordingly will have to appeal 
to something anterior to the consequences themselves, something that tells us which 
consequences to produce.  
 
 6. Distributive Ethics as Isoquants 
 
 There is a sense in which the observations just made as to the interformulability of 
distribution formulae might be generalized:  We can generalize the intersubstitutability of 
extensionally equivalent output-maximization and input-equalization formulae just 
described to multiple possible vectors of “inputs” to our invariant-output, multivariate 
“distributive-input-function” – our distributive ethic.  For it happens that we can readily 
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fill our grammar-opened variables with differing sets of valuations and still yield 
distribution maxims that, though differently articulated, are nonetheless extensionally 
equivalent – just like interformulable equalization and maximization formulae.  That fact 
shows both (a) how deeply interconnected all of what I have been calling the distributive 
grammar-opened variables are, and (b) how it might be that we most of us share a single 
distributive ethic “deep down” even while sometimes appearing to disagree owing to 
differences of articulation.   
 I think the most straightforward way to make the point will be to limit ourselves 
to variable interplay between two of the variables already discussed – say distribuenda 
and distribution formulae, the last two we have treated – while holding others – in 
particular, the distribuee variable which we’ve also discussed – constant.134  We’ll 
assume, then, a hypothetical distribution scenario and our likely shared intuition as to 
what distribution would be proper.  Then we’ll observe how readily we can formulate a 
mandate prescribing that correct distribution in varying ways.  Each such “way” involves 
a different characterization of the distribuendum, accompanied in turn by a 
“compensatingly varying” characterization of the distribution formula.  The combined 
terms in each case yield the same distributive output. 
  Suppose, then, two distribuees.  Vital Hamilton’s born vigorous and robust.  
Sickly Jefferson’s born weak and infirm.  Our world is such that Hamilton will fare well 
if but left on his own.135  In the same world Jefferson will fare poorly unless aided along.  
That’s the case even though both men intend to – and let us say do – labor hard.  They 
                                                 
 134 Concentrating on the interplay between these to variables in particular will prove helpful below 
at Part III.B, when we turn to the fairness “versus” welfare “dispute.”  
 135 “Our world” here accordingly includes a particular valuation of the distribution mechanism 
variable to be discussed more fully infra, Part II.E – the rough-hewn, composite mechanism by which 
distribution is effected in most modern political-economies.  
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labor to the best of their abilities, in fact.  Now we, the polity of which Jefferson and 
Hamilton are members, have some decisions to make.  Among those decisions is who 
should receive what, according to what principles and what resultant distribution formula 
that gives precise expression to those principles.136  In deciding such matters, what should 
we do about Jefferson and Hamilton? 
 Say that we respect our citizenry – including ourselves – as life-planning agents 
who formulate systems of interconnecting aims, and pursue these in constructing 
successful and meaningful lives.  We respect them, that is, pursuant to the now-dominant 
view of distribuees discussed above at Part 3.4, a view to which our American polity in 
particular appears to have committed itself from its earliest days:  We view our fellows as 
“pursuing happiness,” as they define it and as they see fit.  And we are committed to 
honoring and vindicating that humanity-defining feature of them, hence to honoring and 
vindicating the sphere of autonomy and access to resources which realization of that 
feature entails.   
 We also recognize, however, that the aforementioned happiness-pursuits can often 
require employment of the same, scarce, resources:  Spheres of autonomy can collide.  
We accordingly require means of determining the appropriate boundaries of “spheres” – 
means of demarcating between “internality” and “externality” in an ethically satisfactory 
way.  What means are at hand?  Well, we also have committed ourselves from the very 
birth of our political community to the proposition that “all citizens are created equal.”  
We didn’t mean that physically, of course:  We’re not deluded; and besides, just look at 
Jefferson and Hamilton.  What did we mean, then?  We meant ethically equal: Our 
                                                 
 136 I could say “and mechanisms,” but do not because discussion of mechanisms is sufficiently 
complex as to require deferment to fuller, rather more elaborate discussion in the subsequent subsection.   
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fellows are equally deserving, equally entitled, equally rights-endowed.  At least they are 
so prior to acting, prior to acting in ways for which they are at least partly responsible – 
acting in such ways, that is, as give rise to differential desert.   
 These commitments of course amount to constraints upon how we value the 
variables that all jointly constitute our distributive norms.  Indeed as we saw above at Part 
II.D.3, abandoning our commitment to the responsible agency construal of distribuees as 
just elaborated would amount to setting Ei in the opportunity-egalitarian distribution 
formula trivially at 0, such that opportunity-egalitarianism would collapse into welfare-
egalitarianism.  But we’re not abandoning such commitments here, recall; we are holding 
them constant, in order to fix attention on the interplay between but two variables at a 
time.  In that light, then, how might the considerations just run-through now contour the 
way that we address our question – the question as to what Hamilton and Jefferson ought 
to receive (distribuenda), and pursuant to what pattern (distribution formula), as they plan 
and live their lives?137 
 It seems pretty clear that the considerations I’ve mentioned recommend we 
distribute to Hamilton and Jefferson in an opportunity-egalitarian manner.  But now note 
how easy it is to prescribe this through varying characterizations of the distribuendum on 
the one hand, compensatingly varying formulations of the distribution formula on the 
other:138   
 One way to formulate the distributive prescription would be to say, “let dollars be 
distributed to each according to his marginal product, but redistribute dollars from 
                                                 
 137 I don’t mean to suggest that we plan all at once, then live out our plans.  Planning and living, of 
course, interact over time.  
 138 That means that the “the opportunity-egalitarian manner,” like other manners as it happens, 
amounts to an isoquant whose vector components inter-vary. 
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Hamilton to Jefferson in half of the amount necessary to remedy the latter’s infirmity.”139  
But another way roughly to formulate essentially the same prescription would be to say, 
“distribute so as to equalize Hamilton’s and Jefferson’s exogenously given physical 
capabilities.”140   
 The first formulation names money as noncomplex distribuendum, and a more 
complex, two-part rule requiring two calculations as operational-step-specifying 
distribution formula: first distribute per marginal product, then redistribute to compensate 
handicap.141  The formula’s opportunity-egalitarian credentials are left latent in the words 
“half” – equal shouldering by two distribuees – and “remedy” – remedying opportunity’s 
contrary, infirmity.  The second formulation renders its opportunity-egalitarian character 
more patent by recharacterizing the distribuendum – as internally complex “capability,” a 
form of material opportunity which, like the distribution formula in the previous 
formulation, will require two calculations to determine – and then, via a noncomplex 
distribution formula, straightforwardly mandating “equalization” of that.  Both 
formulations, of course, via their differently placed complexities – the first in the 
distribution formula, the second in the distribuendum – implicate measurement 
requirements (in particular, commensuration requirements) of the sort discussed above at 
                                                 
 139 I assume for simplicity’s sake that the handicap is fully remediable.  Hamilton pays half of the 
cost, of course, because that is the compensation that renders the handicap equally borne.  I also assume, of 
course, in saying “let dollars be distributed …according to … marginal product,” that we have either means 
of doing this, or reason to be confident that our economy itself “automatically” does this.  More on that 
matter again infra, as we turn to distribution mechanisms at Part II.E.  
 140 I make the same assumption here as recorded in the previous footnote.  The term “capability” 
here is commonly associated with Sen.  See, e.g., Sen, supra note 43. 
 141 Of course the “steps” needn’t be temporally separated.  The point is merely that there are two 
calculations to be made.  
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3.2.  But they do so in the same way, so we needn’t fret over them for present 
purposes.142   
 Now slightly alter the story:  Jefferson and Hamilton are as previously described, 
but Jefferson has exacerbated his infirmity by contracting syphilis while in Paris.  He has 
managed to do the latter by engaging in behavior he knew would expose him to the risk.  
We for our part are still just as opportunity-egalitarian as I have described.  That means 
we recognize that Jefferson still is entitled to assistance in respect of that portion of the 
dollar-consequences of his infirmity traceable to his genetic endowment.  But the same 
commitment also means we recognize that Jefferson is not entitled to our assistance – the 
mandated assistance of all of us, the polity – in respect of the portion traceable to his 
syphilis.  For to mandate his compensation for that would be to treat his fellow citizens as 
ethically less than his equals, by conscripting them into the project of subsidizing his 
voluntarily undertaken risk.143 
 How to describe the distribution we’ll favor in this circumstance?  At least two 
means quite immediately present themselves:144  We can do so, for example, either by 
slightly varying the first formulation proposed above, or by simply repeating the second 
such formulation.  We say, that is, either:  “Let dollars be distributed to each according to 
his marginal product, but redistribute dollars from Hamilton to Jefferson in half of the 
amount necessary to remedy such of the latter’s infirmity as is not accounted for by his 
syphilis.”  Or, as before:  “Distribute so as to equalize Hamilton’s and Jefferson’s 
exogenously given physical capabilities,” perhaps emphasizing the “exogenously given” 
                                                 
 142 We return to them, however, below at Part II.E. 
 143 It should go without saying that this is not say that Jefferson’s plight cannot or should not elicit 
voluntarily provided charitable assistance.  I speak here only to what is distributive-ethically required of all 
of us at a minimum.   
 144 There are of course others – many others.  
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qualifier in this case.  The first formulation again specifies dollars as simple 
distribuendum, but now mandates their spread pursuant to a slightly more complex 
formula requiring the performance of three calculations rather than two as before.  The 
second formulation again specifies simple equalization of a more internally complex, 
non-dollar distribuendum as before, which in this case will, like the distribution formula 
in the alternative formulation, require performance of three calculations.  But again both 
mandates mandate the same distribution.      
 The message is plain even if curiously oft-overlooked:  Just as equalization 
formulae and maximization formulae are interformulable simply through variable 
definings of summands and equalisands, so is a given distributive prescription varyingly 
formulable simply by variable formulations respectively designating distribuenda and 
distribution formula.  And those variations in turn, as we saw, were themselves 
constrained by the way we construe our distribuees – a construal I held constant – viz., as 
boundedly responsible agents.145  Had the “boundedness” qualifier been dropped, we’d 
have held Hamilton and Jefferson equally responsible for all aspects of their own faring, 
and our wording in designating ditribuenda and distribution formula alike would have 
changed accordingly.  Had the “responsible agency” portion of the distribuee 
characterization been dropped, there’d have been parallel changes.   
 All of this tends to corroborate something that has been suggested throughout the 
presentation to now:  Namely, that we cannot know what actually to make of a particular 
distributive prescription until all of its distributive valence-grammar-opened variables 
have been specified.  It also entails a corollary:  Namely, that there is inevitably some 
degree of arbitrariness in the specification of any one feature of a distributive 
                                                 
 145 Jefferson, of course, is here bounded relative to Hamilton by his sickly birth.   
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prescription, until others of its features are specified.  They must all of them be ethically 
assessed, then, by reference to one another.  And full sets of them – full output vectors – 
must in turn by assessed by reference to their distributive consequences and the full set of 
values by reference to which we adjudge such consequences.  I think that failure to bear 
this in mind accounts both for the erroneous perception by ethical theorists sometimes 
that they differ form one another in respect of distributive ethics simply by dint of their 
differing as to how a particular variable-filling value should be construed, and for 
confusions in WE and LE of the sort I’ll consider below at Part 4.                             
 
E. Distribution Mechanisms 
 
 I noted at the outset of Part II.D that “to distribute” is subject to two forms of 
adverbial modification – by “ought” adverbs, which implicate distribution formulae, and  
by “ought”-limiting “can” adverbs, which implicate feasible distribution mechanisms.  I 
now turn to the latter. 
 One can of course imagine multiple means by which to effect distributions.  These 
can in turn be specified at varying “levels” of abstraction and generality, running from 
concretely detailed description of actually instantiated institutions, to formally abstract 
and variably instantiable axiomatic mechanism theory.  Yet most normative theorists 
whose prescriptions either forthrightly amount to or simply implicate distributive 
assessment have been by and large quiet about the subject.  That’s somewhat regrettable.  
For not only does “can” limit “ought,” as is commonly recognized:  On a perhaps happier 
or “more positive” note, some “can”s render some “ought”s particularly – indeed 
affirmatively – attractive.   
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 I think that’s the case here.  One distribution mechanism appears to fit certain 
more or less independently plausible fillings of our distributor, distribuendum, distribuee 
and distribution formula variables quite gracefully and, what is more, uniquely.  That 
renders those fillings more attractive on feasibility grounds, of course.  But it seems to do 
more than that:  The process of actually schematizing and justifying this mechanism 
appears further to illuminate even those fillings’ independent attractiveness.  So, I 
believe, we shall see. 
 I’ll begin, then, by first briefly characterizing the rough-hewn, composite 
mechanism-type that looks to be taken for granted as background condition in most cases 
of distributive advocacy and assessment.  That mechanism amounts to a vaguely 
specified mélange of decentralized market allocation, partly centralized private law 
rights-vindication by courts, and more fully centralized ad hoc legislative intervention.  
Following brief discussion of the prescriptive gaps lying between this composite and 
most of the distributive theories that appear to assume it, I then seek to specify, in a bit 
more detail, the one mechanism that seems truly to cohere with particular closeness to a 
particular vector of distribution-variable-filling values.   
 The mechanism I’ll schematize is readily seen to be a refinement of the less fully 
specified mechanism implicitly advocated in the past by theorists writing before full 
articulation of the opportunity-egalitarian ideal discussed above.  I’ll argue that this is no 
accident.  For opportunity-egalitarianism itself seems a refinement of the earlier views.  It 
thus stands to reason that its institutional expression amounts in its specification to a 
refinement of the earlier assumed composite.   
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 The opportunity-egalitarian resonance and embodiment, moreover, I suspect is 
why we in the industrial democracies have arranged our distribution regimes in a way 
that seems implicitly meant to approximate the mechanism I’ll specify:  Once again, as in 
the foregoing subsections, it rather looks as though all of us, fully consciously and 
articulately or otherwise, are opportunity-egalitarians “deep down.”  
 
 1. Mechanisms, Laws, Governments 
 
 First, then, the rough-hewn composite to which I’ve referred:  Most who speak 
normatively in respect of effectively distributive questions appear to take the following 
for granted:  First, that most of the material things that matter to people are distributed by 
sundry forms of private bequest and exchange.  Second, that the latter are predicated 
upon antecedently defined private law rights sounding in civil obligation – property, 
contract and tort – which are vindicable in courts.  And third, that these rights in turn are 
subject to occasional piecemeal or in some cases wholesale amendment or alteration by 
centralized legislative action.  But things seldom are more fine-grained than this.     
 What ever the causes of that lack of detail,146 the consequences of mechanism-
nonspecification are often quite vitiating, as I’ll indicate presently.  And not simply 
implementation-wise vitiating, but indeed fully thought- and theory-vitiating as well.  For 
distributive-theory-building just is, in its actuating ambition, institution-designing.  
Without imagining in some degree of detail what the “outward expression” of theory 
would look like – how the right world would operate – our theorizing itself is stopped-up, 
so to speak.  Critical particulars go unspecified, intelligibility-despoiling gaps are left 
open, and prescriptions accordingly are left indeterminate – not just pragmatically so, but 
                                                 
 146 I hazard some speculative explanations in Hockett, supra note 12.  
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indeed cognitively so.  It isn’t just a matter of the engine’s running warmly and the 
clutch’s not being engaged; it’s more like attempting to think without language:  Thought 
itself is left lumpy, ill-formed, inchoate.  The full content’s not there.147   
 We find this, I think, in quite nearly all of the leading distributive-ethical theories 
currently on offer.  What’s missing in these theories is brought to light most starkly 
precisely when we ask what it would be to instantiate them.  We can see this quite readily 
by briefly considering the best known such theories. 
 
  a. All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Utilitarianism  
 
 Consider first aggregative utilitarianism – naïve welfare maximization – perhaps 
the most venerable post-18th century political-ethical tradition:  Collecting the 
information assembled in the previous several subsections, we know that a utilitarian 
polity will wish to sum its patient-distribuees’ welfare outputs and maximize the resultant 
sum.  It will, moreover, aim to do so “by any means necessary.”  For the utility aggregate 
is the sole normative touchstone guiding utilitarian policy, both as a matter of personal 
and of political morality.148   
 But then in light of (a) the earlier noted difficulties that afflict direct welfare-
measurement, it is (b) generally quite indeterminate what means would suffice or be 
necessary.  This in turn is the case while nonetheless (c) a high degree of centralized 
government action will be viewed as ethically warranted in principle, indeed even 
required.  For it will be thought both (i) necessary for the regular collection of utility data 
                                                 
 147 Cognate concerns animate Joseph Carens’s and Robert Goodin’s interesting work on 
institutional design.  See, e.g., JOSEPH CARENS, EQUALITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE MARKET (1990); ROBERT 
GOODIN, THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (1998).  
 148 There are of course various subspecies of “constrained” utilitarianism.  But the constraints in 
such cases are simply ad hoc and arbitrary unless rooted in a theory of antecedently held rights which itself 
receives simpler, fuller and more direct expression in opportunity-egalitarianism, as discussed above.  
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and the regular redistribution of holdings in order to maintain a maximal height on the 
utility index; and (ii) unconstrained by any antecedently defined rights held by ethically 
equal agent-citizens.149   
 What is one to make of so disjointed and indeed incoherent a picture?  A 
government highly – indeed intrusively – empowered in principle, that for theory- 
grounded reasons nonetheless literally never could actually perform the function upon 
which that surprising degree of power is predicated:  All dressed up with no place to go.   
 In view of such difficulties as these, which are not merely implementary but 
foundational, utilitarianism looks to be a nonstarter as complete and determinate 
distributive-ethical prescriptions go.  Its uninstitutability does not direct us to a “second 
best.”  Rather, the reasons for its uninstitutability reveal a sense in which it is not itself 
even a merely accidentally unimplementable “first best” – or even so much as a specified 
“good”:  It is prescriptively sterile or stillborn au fond, while its advocates’ leaving the 
mechanism variable unvalued has served to conceal the fact.150   
 
  b. More Tastefully Dressed, Yet Still No Destination: Rawlsian Justice 
  
 Observations reminiscent of those made in connection with utilitarianism, I think, 
hold of Rawlsian justice theory as well.  Rawls for his part was refreshingly candid about 
it:  He admitted that his concern was solely with what he called “the basic structure” of a 
just society.  The problem, I fear, is that the structure he appears to have had in mind is so 
                                                 
 149 And this is of course not even the mention the problems likely to be occasioned by 
redistribution’s effects to effort-expense hence goods and services production hence ultimately the size of 
the utility aggregate itself.  In view of utility’s functioning as a fetishized maximandum, incidentally, the 
likely need of centralized government action should not be surprising.  In effect, the utility aggregate here 
amounts to a contemporary analogue to the pyramids of Egypt and the ziggurats of Mesopotamia and 
Mesoamerica.  Societies organized around such monistic and inhuman pursuits have historically quite 
typically been both theocratic and autocratic.     
 150 And of course that is not even to mention the unsatisfactoriness of the values that it does supply 
for some of the variables, as discussed in the previous portions of Part II.  
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basic that it’s left quite unclear what Rawlsian principles have to say about matters as 
“basic” as the society’s constitutional order itself, let alone subsequent legislation and 
private law doctrine.   
 Rawls left such matters as these for what he called “later stages” of polity-
constituting, with which his work was said not to be immediately concerned.  There 
seems to have been a rough expectation that there would be property rights and market 
exchange.151  But Rawls averred that his principles would be realizable in market- and 
non-market socialist societies as well.152  It is accordingly undetermined how Rawls’s 
principles are so much as even to begin to be operationalized.  That raises a worry, of 
course, that the principles as articulated impart no determinate prescriptive information – 
a worry that already arose earlier in connection with the indeterminacy of “the worst off” 
in Rawls’s specification of what he took for the correct distribution formula.   
 So again we find the lack of attention paid questions of mechanism not simply 
leaving implementary and “second best” questions unanswered, but allowing even the 
matter of “first bests” to remain undetectedly underspecified.  One is left wondering 
whether there’s any “here” here.  The theory so underdetermines its own implementation 
that we don’t know quite what to make of the theory itself.  What is it telling us if it is 
equally realizable in any number of polities with radically divergent arrangements of 
property and other entitlements?   
 Rawls’s implicit “structural” metaphor of tree and branches, or skeleton and 
organs is ultimately unsuited, I think, to distributive-ethical theory – which is a theory, 
after all, governing day-to-day material relations among compatriots.  If for no other 
                                                 
 151 See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 43 at 52.  
 152 Id. at 55.  
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reason than that those relations are effectively altered by countless transactions conducted 
each hour, we want something more like fractal geometry than plate tectonics.153  Absent 
some view of what counts as instantiation, we don’t really know what is being prescribed. 
 
  c. Locally Determinate but Globally Indeterminate Prescription:  
   “Normative Law & Economics” 
  
 Apart from the mechanism I schematize in the following subsection, the only 
serious mechanism-grappling that seems to be found in the normative distribution-
implicative literature is that done by LE, and a very few WE, practitioners.  WE 
practitioners of course have familiarly concerned themselves with the aggregate or quasi-
aggregate welfare or wealth effects likely to be wrought by various market, regulatory 
and tax arrangements.154  I’ll have more to say about them – in particular, about the 
consequences and ethical intelligibility of their attenuated Paretian version of aggregation 
in evaluating alternative mechanism-options – below at II.E.2.   
 Economists of law, for their parts, often if not indeed generally Kaldor-Hicksian 
wealth-maximizers in orientation, typically attend carefully to micro-institutional detail.  
Indeed their bailiwick is precisely the wealth-aggregate effects likely to be wrought by 
alternative choices available at what probably is the simplest unit of institutional structure 
there is – the rule.155  Yet by what might at first seem a quite curious irony, this is 
precisely their undoing from a distributive mechanism point of view.156  It turns out 
                                                 
 153 See supra Part II.D.4, on what I called the principle of “proximity.”  
 154 More on “quasi-aggregation” infra, Part II.E.2.  
 155 One might credit the transaction as simplest institutional unit, but I think that this would come 
down to crediting rules.  Because transactions are rule-structured – rules functioning in effect as their 
patterning “software” – and because institutions in turn are best viewed as the patterns that contour 
practices such as transactions, pattern-prescribing rules seem more appropriately regarded as the simplest 
institution-constitutive units.  
 156 The previous subsection on maximizing distribution formulae of course highlighted additional 
downfalls from the point of view of the formula variable.  
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actually to be less ironic than at first it appears, however.  For it ultimately stems from a 
gap between macro-objective and micro-detail akin to that noted in Rawls.157     
 The foundational mechanism problem for mainstream LE takes root in a fallacy of 
composition:  From the fact that each of n rules Ra/1 … Ra/n tends, in the confines of its 
particular domain 1, 2, … or n and in comparison to its envisaged competitors a, b, … 
and m in that domain to be wealth-maximizing, it does not follow that the full vector of 
rules Ra/1 … Ra/n will be wealth-maximizing as compared, say, to some other vector Rb/1 
… Rb/n which might be envisaged only against a fuller institutional backdrop that is 
neither in view nor considered when all that is being asked is which of Ra/1, Rb/1, …Rm/1 is 
wealth-maximizing in domain 1 considered in isolation.  Relatedly, choices in the 
domains 1 … n are of course unlikely to be linearly independent, as any student of 
general equilibrium theory – or indeed of “the seamless web” that is “the law” – will 
recognize.158  It will accordingly again be illicit to conclude from Ra/1’s dominating Rb/1 
in domain 1 that the full vector Ra/1 … Ra/n dominates Rb/1 … Rb/n, let alone any other 
available vectors Rm/n.    
 There is, then, a foundational gap in mainline LE between normative ideal – 
wealth-maximization – in macro, and mechanism-evaluative practice – rule-evaluation – 
in micro.  And that gap, quite critically, is inherently unbridgeable, not merely 
accidentally unbridged.  For LE’s guiding ideal itself – “wealth-maximization” – as 
recognized now for at least 25 years, is, via “wealth” itself, ineluctably law-prescriptively 
indeterminate in macro:  “Wealth” as the name of a putative mechanism-maximizable 
                                                 
 157 Rawls ignored micro for macro, at macro’s expense.  LE attends too uncritically to macro, 
we’ll see, at micro’s expense.  
 158 Indeed LE, like much of the Marshallian/Pigouvian (as distinguished from Walrasian) WE 
from which it descends, appears largely confined to but partial equilibrium modes of thinking.  
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maximandum, that is, cannot be so much as defined until after an antecedent assignment 
of legal entitlements has already been carried out.  For the macro-distribution of 
entitlements is itself determinative of the wealth aggregate, via the definition of “wealth” 
and the operation of “wealth effects” themselves.159  And so it cannot prescribe anything 
in respect of that initial macro-allocation of legal entitlements.160  Yet some such 
allocation-prescription would seem to have to be made for any plenary distribution 
mechanism to be prescribed, hence for LE to succeed in coherently prescribing anything 
at all of real interest to “us” – to the polity at large.   
 Yet again, then, insufficient attention paid the unseverable coupling of 
distribution mechanism to others of distribution’s grammar-opened variables results in 
obscuring of distributive prescriptions’ being not merely difficult to implement, but 
indeed not even determinately prescriptive of anything.  We get nowhere – we don’t even 
point anywhere – until we work to fill all of the distributive infinitives’ argument places. 
 
 2. The One Satisfactory Mechanism 
 
 The previous subsection might appear to counsel or underwrite pessimism.  That 
would be premature.  For there is one mechanism that does appear determinately to 
instantiate a specific vector of canonically proffered valuations of the distributive case- 
variables.  Moreover, this mechanism instantiates what have been coming to appear, in 
light of the discussion thus far, already to be the most plausible such valuations.  Further 
still, this fact itself does not seem to be mere happy accident:  The “how”s of this 
                                                 
 159 More on this infra, Part III.A.    
 160 Posner, to his credit, recognized this early on, see infra Part III.A, yet then went blithely 
forward to point out that the problem did not afflict what I am here calling the “micro” choice problem of 
choosing between possible rules within a single, more limited domain.  But that is precisely what I am 
claiming here to be the problem for normative LE from a mechanism-prescriptive point of view:  It does 
not succeed in so much as prescribing at all (let alone prescribing with ethical intelligibility), save for those 
who wish to do no more than tinker.        
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mechanism’s instantiation of the recommended case-variable-valuations seem to show 
more about the independent attractiveness of those valuations themselves, in addition to 
the attractiveness of the mechanism that realizes them.   
  
  a. One Fully Specifiable Mechanism 
 Here, first in idealized form, is the mechanism that I have in mind:  To begin 
with, assume for heuristic purposes a “complete” market – a forum in which all and only 
desired, voluntary trading occurs.161  Assume that this trading is in, first, all goods and 
services that can practically be made available and that anyone values – hence, that are 
politically cognizable as ethically interesting distribuenda.162  Assume that the trading is 
in, second, “Arrow securities” – contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence 
of any eventuality that anyone disvalues, payable by anyone willing to take the opposite 
sides of these de facto “bets,” on the disvalued contingencies.   
 Assume next and further that the market I describe here is “neutral.”  It is neutral 
in the sense, first, that each participant enters it with an initial endowment of ethically 
exogenous desired assets equal in value to that with which everyone else enters it:  Call 
                                                 
 161 Market “completeness” in this sense of course includes trading in contingent claims, more on 
which over the course of the next several paragraphs.  I’ll also argue that completeness in this sense is a 
function, in part, of neutrality itself, a fact which appears to go largely ignored.  The classic sources on the 
role of contingent claims in completing markets are JOHN R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (1940); Maurice 
Allais, Généralisation des Théories de L’Equilibre Economique Général et du Rendement Social au Cas du 
Risque 11 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE 
SCIENTIFIQUE 81(1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières par la Répartition la Meilleure 
des Risques, 11 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE 
SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); and GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1954).  Completeness is, 
unsurprisingly, more precisely characterized by formal means.  Its presence bears many ramifications, only 
some of which can be treated here.  For fuller treatment, see Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through 
Global Macro-Hedging, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 107 (2004).  For state of the art plenary treatment, see 
MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS I (1996).  
 162 Assume also, for obvious reasons, that valued “goods” and “services” do not include among 
them the nonconsensual expropriation of others’ entitlements, which would violate the neutrality conditions 
I next describe.  (We’ll also see, of course, explain over the course of this sketch how to apportion and 
determine entitlements, hence what counts as expropriation.)      
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this “entry neutrality.”  Assume that the market also is neutral in the sense, second, that 
regulatory norms effectively prevent such collusively, strategically or expropriatively 
opportunistic behaviors as would effectively result in some participants’ coming to 
possess greater or lesser holdings, or price-affecting effective demand powers, than 
would be traceable to such ethically exogenous initial endowments and participants’ 
ethically endogenous transaction histories alone:  Call this “process neutrality.”163   
 This mechanism, I believe, strait-forwardly instantiates in broad outline a 
particular vector of valuations of the other case-grammar-opened variables discussed 
above at 3.1 and 3.3 through II.D.6.  It also, simultaneously, fully disposes of the three 
critical measurement concerns discussed above at 3.2 in a manner that no other 
mechanism on offer so much as even begins to attempt:   
 First those valuations:  Note to begin with that the mechanism honors distribuees 
as boundedly responsible agents.  Distribuees transact voluntarily pursuant to their own 
autonomous relative valuations of material goods and contingencies that they prefer and 
disprefer; and what they hold or enjoy at any pint is decisively a product in part of those 
autonomous valuational and transacting decisions.   
 Note next that the mechanism treats as distribuenda what ever (non-neutrality-
violative164) goods or services – including risk-bearing services – those agents themselves 
value or disvalue.  These goods and services are the resources or material opportunities 
from which, in conjunction with their choices, distribuees’ welfares derive.   
                                                 
 163 Please set aside, just for the moment, first the questions of means by which endowments would 
be measured and endowment-equalization effected, and second the “problem of future generations.”  We’ll 
get to that. 
 164 Please see supra note 156.  
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 Note finally that the mechanism, via the neutrality imposed upon it at the outset 
and retained throughout, equalizes what is ethically exogenous – that which is not 
traceable in the holding directly to a responsible choice – while allowing holdings over 
time nonetheless to vary with ethically endogenous responsible transactional and other 
decisions:165  The distribution formula to which the mechanism gives expression, that is, 
is opportunity-egalitarian. 
 Now the measurement challenges:  Note first that the mechanism sidesteps, in an 
ethically satisfactory way, the problem of cardinal welfare measurement.  It does so by 
allowing agent-distribuees, via their voluntary trading activity, presumptively – by dint of 
the “first fundamental theorem of welfare economics”166 – to “maximize” utility in a 
manner consistent with (a) ethically exogenous endowment equality among market 
participants, and (b) consequently equally shared scarcity of the exogenously given 
resources from which agents “produce” their own welfare.167   
                                                 
 165  It should be borne in mind, per observations made supra Part II.D.3,  that those latter include 
labor-expending decisions.  It should also be borne in mind, again per the discussion at II.D.3, that the 
temporal language here – “tn,” “after,” etc. – is partly heuristic in nature.  “Before” means “ethically 
exogenously,” “after” means “ethically endogenously, because consequent on responsible choice,” etc.  
There are, as noted earlier, as it were multiple “t0”’s in each trader’s life.  See supra notes 86, 101, 131, and 
associated text. 
 166  See, classically, Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare 
Economics, PROC. SECOND BERKELEY SYMP 507 (1951). 
 167  In essence, we are describing an economy characterized by a so-called “equal division 
Walrasian equilibrium,” or “EDWE.”  The technical literature on the theory of EDWEs and fair allocation 
more generally is vast, though curiously, it seems, ignored by most economically oriented legal academics.  
Here is a canonical sampling: See, e.g., T.E. Daniel, A Revised Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. 
ECON. THEORY 94 (1975); Duncan Foley, Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, YALE ECON. ESSAYS 
7, at 45-98 (1967); E.A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept 
of Economic Equity, 92 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1978); Elisha Pazner & David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in the 
Concept of Fairness, 41 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 441, 441-43 (1974); H.R. Varian, Equity, Envy and 
Efficiency, 9 J. ECON. THEORY, 63, 63-91 (1974); H.R. Varian, Two Problems in the Theory of Fairness, 5 
J. PUB. ECON. 249 (1976).  Good surveys of the literature include WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: 
APPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1986); W. Thomson & Hal Varian, Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry, in 
SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 140.  A useful recent synthesis of results is HERVÉ 
MOULIN, FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE (2003). The work from which these studies take their 
departure is of course LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffé trans., 1954) (1844).  
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 Similarly, the mechanism unobjectionably sidesteps the problem of interpersonal 
welfare comparison.  For, so long as the material opportunity components – i.e., the 
ethically exogenous components – of “welfare-manufacture” itself (including 
physiological determinants) are themselves counted (in the form of drugs, prostheses, or 
contingent claims to those and other forms of compensation) among the exogenous 
endowments that must be equalized over participants, then again, what ever the absolute 
or comparative quanta of welfare enjoyed by distribuees, we shall know that these are the 
“highest” that they can be consistent with the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula 
and the consequently equally shouldered constraints posed by the exogenously given 
environment.   
 Finally, the mechanism “automatically,” as it were, commensurates distribuenda 
in the only way that ethically matters – via the autonomous implicit comparative 
valuations of voluntarily transacting distribuees.168  We need not, that is to say, worry 
ourselves over how much of some good G2 “would” or will compensate person P1 for a 
deficit of good G1, let alone seek to construct a “perfectionist” index of all goods and 
ills.169  Our distribuee-participants themselves will, in effect, autonomously and with 
equal voice construct the only ethically salient index – a spontaneously emergent price 
                                                                                                                                                 
Walras appears to have anticipated, indeed even inchoately to have intended, precisely such developments 
as these.  See WILLAM JAFFÉ’S ESSAYS ON WALRAS 17-52, 326-42 (Donald A. Walker ed., 1983). 
 168 See Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited (under revision and 
disaggregation for ECON. & PHIL., 2006, available at Hockett’s and Risse’s Cornell and Kennedy School 
websites, respectively ).  
 169 Id.  The claim that the need to index disparate resources commits one to perfectionism – i.e., 
the position that some goods simply are inherently more worthy of collective pursuit than others – figures 
into a prominent criticism of Rawlsian primary goods leveled by Richard Arneson.  See Richard Arneson, 
Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 NOÛS 429 (1990).  The criticism is addressed in Hockett & Risse, id.  
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index.  This latter amounts to an aggregated comparative “social” valuation of goods and 
ills in the construction of which each participant has exercised an equal “vote.”170   
  
  b. Instantiability-Challenges & Ordered “Nth Bests” 
 The opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism, then, in so far as it can be 
realized, simultaneously assists in realizing what looks to be the most plausible vector of 
distributive gap-filling valuations, and either meets or neutralizes each of the principal 
measurement challenges. 
  Three obstacles, however, might appear to stand in the way of its 
realization.  Dispatching them will be necessary, if we’re (a) to work toward that 
realization, or (b) even to make use of the mechanism as an evaluative metric against 
which simply to effectively distributive prescriptions.  But the process of addressing the 
challenges yields more than that:  In dealing with them we also (a) see how the 
mechanism amounts to a refinement of the mechanisms unsatisfactorily designed and 
prescribed in effect by mainstream WE and LE, (b) see that the mechanism is variably 
instantiable in a manner that’s ordinally equivalent to a scale of 1st through nth bests, (c) 
are enabled to envisage means by which more fully to realize the mechanism, and (d) see 
how much, though as yet arguably not enough, of our familiar private law seems to be 
prompted by implicit recognition of these facts.171 
 The first challenge arises in connection with market-neutrality, in particular with 
entry neutrality:  If we’re to equalize holdings of the material opportunity endowments 
                                                 
 170 Again, provided that there exist market completeness and neutrality in the senses explicated 
above.  Trading here is voting, and voting rights are equally spread in the sense that ethically matters – 
conferring equal bargaining power involving the right kind of equality, viz., equality of all and only 
ethically exogenous endowments. 
 171 Hence we’ll see reason to displace even “positive” LE with a more convincing picture. 
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with which participants enter the market, we must presumably commensurate them.  But 
how are we to do that prior to the operation of the equal-endowment grounded market 
mechanism, when it is that mechanism itself that affords ethically satisfactory 
commensuration?  Is there not a pragmatic indeterminacy here ultimately just as vitiating 
as the foundational indeterminacies said above to afflict utilitarianism, Rawlsian justice 
theory and normative LE?  
 The answer is no.  To show why not we proceed in three steps:  First we 
demarcate certain classes of material opportunity endowment that are unambiguously 
ethically exogenous in the holding; call these “core endowments.”  Second we indicate 
means by which holdings of those are readily equalized.  Finally third we show that any 
forward movement in these directions is unambiguous movement toward the ethically 
optimal distribution.  The upshot is that the ideal mechanism is straightforwardly 
approached in continuous upward-sloped fashion. 
 First, core endowments:  At least four classes of endowment are uncontroversially 
ethically exogenous in the holding:  First, the genetic determinants and obstacles, so far 
as we are able to determine them at any given time, of and to successful life-planning, 
wealth-making and welfare-pursuit:  Many handicaps are obvious and incontestably 
unearned; some talents are likewise.172  With the advance of empirical science we grow 
ever more able to sort out, at least probabilistically, what’s predisposed and what’s not. 
                                                 
 172 Those simply born with handicaps would accordingly have claims to compensation.  Those 
simply born with certain inordinate talents would effectively owe, at least were they to profit by those 
talents.  The latter claim is of course more contestable, partly because innate talents often are less easily 
shown to be simply innate than are handicaps, and partly because when clearly innate they will by dint of 
their unamenability to being shed be transformed into handicaps – balls and chains, so to speak – if their 
possessors are forced to work and profit in order to “compensate” others not born with such talents; their 
leisure will have been transformed into a very expensive resource that they are made to purchase.  It is for 
such reasons as these that the profiting by, not the possession alone, of such “resources” as unambiguously 
innate talents would be what would be taxed.    
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 Second, childhood healthcare and education:  Children do not earn or deserve 
greater or lesser access to such assets, particularly when very young.  Their degrees of 
responsibility gradually grow as they move toward adulthood.  Third, inherited 
nonhuman capital, i.e. money-valued wealth:  Again, like other forms of inheritance this 
one is morally arbitrary.  Moreover, it doesn’t grow less so with time and maturation.   
Finally fourth, opportunity to shed or share unforeseeable risk through trade or collective 
risk-pooling action.  This is best seen as non- or pre-confiscatory compensation for 
deficits in other resources or material opportunity.173    
 Now note that these core endowment classes are not only limited in number, but 
also are more or less – and with the advance of empirical science, increasingly – 
straightforwardly quantified, directly allocable, and allocable equitably.  They are also in 
little if any need of commensuration inter se.  If we distinguish between “beneficial” and 
“burdensome” endowments, we see that this is particularly so of the beneficial ones – 
early education, healthcare, and inherited non-human capital.  The burdensome 
endowments, by contrast, are a bit more difficult, since they disproportionately include 
“physiologic resources,” but still far from impossible.174   
 The hardest of the latter is genetically poor health or handicap.  Some such 
deficiencies can themselves be valued by reference to current prices affixed to their 
mitigation – prostheses, medicines, etc.  There seems no harm in beginning to address 
such deficits with compensation equal to the going rates.  Other such deficits are not so 
                                                 
 173 Some are inclined to include the presence of counter-traders in the opportunity set here.  See, 
e.g., COLIN M. MACCLEOD, LIBERALISM, JUSTICE, AND MARKETS: A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL EQUALITY 
(1998); Markovits, supra note 81.  I’m inclined to think that a mistake – in effect a retreat from the position 
from which one treats distribuees as responsible agents – by dint of its treating co-citizens and their 
responsible tastes as resources.  So I count only infrastructure. 
 174 I’ve left physiological out of “beneficial” endowments for present purposes.  
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readily mitigated.  There the best that we can do is estimate the compensation afforded by 
insurance policies that typically are, or, perhaps, “would” be purchased against such 
contingencies if available.175   
 Clearly there’s more guesswork here, but it needn’t be anything near an arbitrary 
whistling in the dark.  With the growth of empirical knowledge, moreover, we grow 
better at estimating with greater reliability.  We do what we can to repair the ship at sea, 
if one might yet again borrow Neurath’s old simile.  And the more such repairing we do, 
the better able the mechanism grows to improve itself.  I’ll show this below in connection 
with “nth bests,” thus completing the challenge to neutrality’s attainability, after 
preliminarily addressing the second prima facie challenge to the mechanism’s 
instantiability.  For the treatment of “nth bests” completes the addressing of that one as 
well. 
 The second challenge to mechanism-instantiability is rooted in “completeness” as 
the first was in “neutrality.”  It runs thus:  Is it reasonable to require that “all and only 
desired trading” occur?  Is that possible, and should we even wish it?  Wouldn’t we have 
to abandon our market-inalienability norms and “commodify” everything?176  And if we 
don’t do that, can the opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism that I have described do 
what I’ve charged to it?   
                                                 
 175 See Hockett, Whose Ownership, supra note 101 at 217-37; DWORKIN, supra note 115 at 307-
50.  Real, rather than “hypothetical” such insurance is proposed in Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra 
note 151; and in Alexander Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 CONTINGENCIES 20 (1997).  See 
also J.H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J. POL. ECON. 445 (1995).   
 176 The classic contemporary objection to “commodification” is of course Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.  1849 (1987).  See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).  Also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1997).  
Contemporary protests of commodification revive concerns raised repeatedly in the past.  Two classic 
Victorian-era objections are THOMAS CARLYLE, PAST AND PRESENT (Robert Thorne ed., 1890); and JOHN 
RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER WRITINGS 155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985). 
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 This challenge is more easily addressed than that directed to neutrality.  First 
divide it into its desirability and feasibility halves.  I dispatch the first of these first:  To 
begin with, consider the core opportunity endowments again:  All of these are subject, in 
principle, to unobjectionable market-valuability already.  We’ve already “commodified” 
what most needs commodifying here.   
 Next consider what else might be traded – in the earlier idiom, “all that enters into 
responsible agents’ welfare-pursuit.”  It is easy enough simply to bracket out of market 
transactions such things as “we” might believe ought not be commodified – babies, blood 
or organs, for example – and still approximate to distributing goods and services as 
“best” as we thereby permit ourselves to do.  For again, as we’ll see, there are “second” 
clear down to “nth bests” that are ordered equivalently to ordered degrees of neutrality 
and completeness.177   
 That’s the desirability side of the “completeness” challenge.  The feasibility side 
comes in the transaction- and information-cost barriers to market-completion in the 
technical sense.  It runs thus:  Is it reasonable to suppose that all parcelings of ownable 
and tradable goods, and that payment-claims defined in terms of all specifiable 
contingencies, might be made tradable?  Here the problem, the guise of which is more 
technical than the alienability guise, can be handled in three ways.   
                                                 
 177 The baby allusion is of course to Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), one of the bugbears that prompted Radin, id.  The blood 
and human organ allusion is of course to Titmuss.  See, classically, RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT 
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1970).  There will of course be disagreement as 
to some of the afore-envisaged bracketings.  It will appear to some to be an affront to liberty, for example, 
to prohibit autonomous agents’ trading in what ever they wish to trade (apart, of course, from in other 
agents).  At least that will be so when the trading really is consensual, is uninfected by objectionable 
inequities in comparative bargaining power, and does not itself impinge upon any third party’s equal 
responsible agency.  Such bracketing might especially seem liberty-offensive if advocated against a more 
equitably spread opportunity backdrop, before which such implicit exploitation fears as I suspect ultimately 
motivate much of the market inalienability discourse are less likely to be operative.  But the real point here 
is that we need not worry over these disputes at the margins of commodifiability.  The mechanism does its 
work well through trade of those many more goods and services that all agree should be tradable. 
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 The first way is to note that it is by now a well established theorem of general 
equilibrium- and stochastic calculus-rooted financial theory that complete markets can be 
simulated through a comparatively small number of hedging strategies.178  Moreover, 
many more contingent claims markets are providable than currently provided, and the 
number of such claims that can be made tradable is only likely to grow in the immediate 
future.  I exploit those facts elsewhere.179  So we can do a lot more completing than thus 
far we’ve done.   
 The second and third ways of addressing the completeness challenge are more 
immediately satisfying.  Note for one thing that more entry-neutrality will itself tend 
toward more completeness:  Since (a) the latter rides in part on all desired trading’s being 
available, and since (b) more trades per unit of wealth occur at lower levels along 
personal wealth curves, and finally since (c) entry neutrality ensures larger numbers of 
market participants who enter at the low end, (d) greater entry neutrality results in more 
trade.   
 Note for another thing that the completeness-feasibility problem has no real “bite” 
here.  For as the answer to the third, final challenge will show, more complete and more 
neutral always means more consistent with an opportunity-egalitarian allocation:  There 
is an ordered set of “nth bests” that is ordinally equivalent to the set of “more” complete 
and “more” neutral markets. 
                                                 
 178 See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time 
Case, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 247 (1969); Robert C. Merton, Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules 
in a Continuous-Time Model, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 373 (1971); Robert C. Merton, Continuous-Time 
Portfolio Theory and the Pricing of Contingent Claims, Working Paper No. 881-76, A.P. Sloan School of 
Management, MIT (1976). 
 179 See Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra note 151. 
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 The third challenge, just presaged, is this:  If you cannot achieve full 
completeness and neutrality of the sort that characterizes the ideal mechanism sketched 
above, might you not in seeking merely more completeness and neutrality than you 
presently have, ironically, end up farther from your ideal goal?  For has not Hart, for 
example, proved at least that the move from less to more complete markets (short of fully 
complete) can incur Pareto-losses?180   
 I’ll reply here intuitively, as I’ve provided more technical treatment and formal 
proof elsewhere.181  The intuitive reply is that the claim that an ordered set of nth bests is 
not ordinally equivalent to the set of more complete, more neutral markets turns crucially 
upon an ethically uninteresting conception of efficiency.  Indeed it turns on a conception 
of efficiency that we’ve already shown, in effect, noncognizable above at II.D.1.   
 “Efficiency,” in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the maximization of 
output given a stipulated input, or the minimization of input given a stipulated output.  It 
means roughly “more” or “the same,” respectively, for “the same” or for “less.”  The 
more technical understandings of “efficiency” familiar to WE and LE amount to 
variations on that theme:   
 Pareto-efficient distributions of goods or ills to persons are best understood, 
intuitively, as distributions the quasi-aggregated welfare deriving from which cannot be 
raised without lowering the individual welfare of at least one person.182  That is the sense 
                                                 
 180 See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is Incomplete, 
11 J. ECON. THEORY 418 (1975). 
 181 See Robert Hockett, Conditional-Existence Proof of Well-Ordered Set of ‘Nth Best’ Equal 
Division Walrasian Equilibria (2006) (working paper, posted at my Cornell website). 
 182 By “quasi-aggregated” I mean that “aggregate” which is one person’s varying welfare when all 
other persons’ welfares are held constant.  Of course the Pareto principle is intended to afford technical 
means of sidestepping interpersonal utility comparison and with it, therefore – so the standard argument 
runs – aggregation.  But leaving aside for present purposes the standard argument’s running aggregation 
and comparison together, the Pareto criterion trades for its ethical salience upon an intuition which 
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in which it amounts to a form of “efficiency,” the one sense in which it can warrant the 
use of that word:  We’ve maximized scalar-aggregated welfare output for this given class 
of permitted distributive input vectors – the input vectors that do not “take” from anyone 
(any vector component) in the status quo ante.  Pareto efficiency is welfare-maximization 
as constrained by the effectively distributor-conferred “veto” wielded by any distribuee 
(any input vector component) who stands to suffer a welfare loss in the event of some 
departure from some antecedent distributive input vector.     
 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is yet closer to the workaday understanding of 
“efficiency,” because unapologetically aggregative rather than quasi-aggregative:  
Distributions are efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if there is no departure from them 
that would render some parties’ aggregated gains greater than other parties’ aggregated 
losses.183  The guiding intuition, then, again – and now more forthrightly – is that the 
scalar welfare output of a given wealth-distributive input vector is, given the individual 
welfare functions (input vector components) that we have to work with, the “highest” it 
can be.184   
 But now note an entailment of the straightforward arguments elaborated above at 
Part II.D.1:  Efficiency on either of these understandings, the Paretian or Kaldor-
Hicksian, is entirely devoid of ethical relevance hence normatively inert, unless 
                                                                                                                                                 
implicitly imports aggregation.  There is no reason for “society” to be interested in a Pareto-efficient social 
choice rule dictating increases in the utilities of some so long as no one else’s utilities are diminished 
thereby, unless “society” itself is seen as thereby benefiting in some sense.  That sense, if such there be, is 
the only sense in which the principle can be ethically interesting, and it is of course an aggregative (a quasi-
aggregative) sense – as indeed the terms “society” and “social choice” should indicate right from the start.  
On the analytic distinction between interpersonal comparison and aggregation, see supra Part II.C.1.  For 
more on the conditions under which Paretianism can be sensibly viewed as socially attractive, see infra Part 
III.A.  
 183 The aggregation – and assumed interpersonal comparability imported thereby – enter via the 
“compensation principle.”  Note the shared root – “com,” i.e., “with” – shared by both “comparison” and 
“compensation.”  
 184 One “produces” welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by distribution operations.  
Those are the variable inputs, so to speak, while persons’ utility functions are the fixed inputs.  
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understood by ineluctable reference to exogenous material opportunity endowment 
equality – i.e., fairness.185  There are as it were “negative” and “positive” sides of the 
argument fleshing this out:   
 From the “negative” side, as we saw above at II.D.1, the mere maximization of an 
aggregate shorn of attention paid the boundedly responsible agency and ethical equality 
of those through whom the aggregate is produced is, quite literally, fetishist.  Kaldor-
Hicksian wealth and Paretian welfare, then, must be understood by unexpurgable 
reference to principles of equal material opportunity to engage in wealth- or welfare-
production before they can be ethically intelligible as wealth or welfare at all.  They are 
“wealth” or “welfare,” as distinguished from something like high aggregate forehead 
height or vast blue-colored surface space, only in so far as such is the case.186 
 Now from the “positive” side, recall that the opportunity-egalitarian distribution 
formula laid out at II.D.3 above requires not only that ethically exogenous holdings of 
that from which ethically endogenous wealth and welfare are derived – material 
opportunity, as represented by “Ri” – be equalized:  It also requires that ethically 
endogenous such holdings – “Ei” – be permitted to vary with the responsible choices and 
effort that produce them.  But this means that welfare and wealth will be maximized, in 
the only ethically intelligible sense of those words, both “automatically” and precisely in 
proportion as the inputs to individual welfare and wealth functions are distributed in 
accordance with the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula.   
                                                 
 185 See supra Part II.D.3.  
 186 The usual rationalization offered, when something like this is pointed out, is that it’s more 
efficient – occasioning of less deadweight loss – to handle distribution through tax policy.  I’ll speak to that 
infra, Parts II.E.3, III.A.  
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 The crux of the (“positive” side of the) claim here, then, is that agent-distribuees 
face all incentive necessary to producing and indeed maximizing such of their 
satisfactions as are of legitimate interest to the polity – to “us” – under the opportunity-
egalitarian distribution formula.  For again, that formula requires that distribuees not be 
despoiled of that which they produce by their own efforts from exogenously given and 
fairly spread resources.  So “aggregate” welfare and wealth are “maximized” in the only 
sense in which such aggregation and maximization normatively matter.  Ethically 
intelligible efficiency just is what results from a distribution of individual wealth-inputs 
that accords with the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula.  Now it happens that 
ethically intelligibly efficient allocations also are Pareto efficient ones – the former set is 
a proper subset of the latter.187  But the complement of the former within the latter is, 
from a normative point of view, entirely devoid of interest.  It is aggregate forehead 
height, so to speak; there is no reason what ever to take collective political interest in it, 
and indeed there is every reason to ignore it. 
 Once we grasp this, we see that the third challenge facing the above-schematized 
opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism is entirely dispelled.  Proofs that sets of 
markets rank-ordered in terms of degrees of completeness falling short of full 
completeness might not be ordinally equivalent to sets of markets rank-ordered in terms 
of their welfare-optimality trade on a conception of welfare-optimality that is normatively 
inert.  The only welfare that matters – indeed, that can be viewed as well-faring by 
responsible agents capable of faring well rather than fetishized substance- or space-
growing – is that produced by equally exogenously endowed agents who consume or 
trade that with which they are endowed and/or that which they receive through trading 
                                                 
 187 See sources cited supra, note 161.  
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when so endowed.  Incentives-wise, such allocations are as cognizable-welfare- and 
wealth-maximizing as, quite literally, it is so much as possible to conceive and to wish.188   
 These observations do more than complete the reply to skeptical concerns about 
the instantiability of the opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism I have schematically 
described.  They also indicate the sense in which this mechanism amounts to an ethical 
refinement and consummation of a mechanism toward which WE might be said long to 
have groped:  For one way of viewing the mechanism I’ve sketched is as a particular 
instance of an equal division Walrasian market.  It is obvious (a) that equilibria in such 
markets – so-called “EDWEs” – fall within the class of Pareto-efficient equilibria by dint 
of their being Walrasian, and (b) that they are “fair” in a resource-egalitarian sense.189  
It’s also well established (a) that EDWEs are “fair” in a variety of welfarist, “envy-
freeness” senses, (b) that under various circumstances all such fair allocations are 
EDWEs, and (c) that fair allocations which are EDWEs and thus efficient always exist, 
even in dynamic economies with production, under certain plausible assumptions and 
understandings of “envy-freeness.”190   
 Moreover, one corollary to what I’ve just argued is that the non-Pareto efficient 
equilibria, so long as they’re fair in the appropriate sense, cannot intelligibly occasion 
“our” ethical concern.  For the Pareto criterion itself, like all naïve maximizing and quasi-
maximizing pseudo-norms, is distributive-ethically superfluous; it is quite literally 
                                                 
 188 One cannot wish what one cannot conceive.  One cannot wish, for example, “that Harriet draw 
the round square.”  None of this, incidentally, is to say that the mentioned trading itself is incapable of 
bearing third-party effects such that over time ethically exogenous resources come to be centralized 
unjustifiably in overendowed hands.  But that is in part why market-neutrality above is defined not only in 
initial endowment terms, but in ongoing regulatory terms as well. 
 189 See, again, sources cited supra note 161.  
 190 Id.  In the interest of brevity I have compressed here into one sentence results that occur in a 
number of the papers cited in note 161. 
 101 
nothing to us.191  It is no more than another instance of cart’s being placed before horse, 
in the idiom of II.D.1 above.  The horse – distributive-ethical allocation – always pulls 
the only cart that’s got anything in it that “we” wish to pull – ethically intelligible 
efficiency. 
 That ethically intelligibly efficient allocations also happen in the presence of 
certain conditions to qualify as Pareto-efficient is of little more than historico-
sociological interest:  It possibly helps to explain, at any rate in part, why even ethically 
conscientious people sometimes have thought – as it happens mistakenly – that they were 
Paretians, even while possibly feeling uneasy about it.192  Next we shall see that 
something similar holds of LE:  We shall see how it could be thought that legal doctrine 
was, positively speaking, subconsciously Kaldor-Hicksian in motive. 
 
  c. Law’s Proper Role 
 
 It is worth taking notice of how the law in advanced political-economies appears 
meant in large part to foster and buttress some such mechanism as that I’ve just sketched 
and defended.193  That will amount to a sketch of a refinement and completion of LE 
quite counterpart to the way in which II.D.6.2.2.3 just now described a refinement and 
completion of WE.  In effect, it’s the map of a new normative and positive research 
agenda.  It will also, not incidentally, suggest means of further improving the mechanism 
we have already in place. 
                                                 
 191 I explain its appeal notwithstanding that fact infra, Part III.A.  The short answer is that insofar 
as it appeals to us, this is due to an inchoate assumption that “things balance out over time.”  We 
subconsciously assume, that is, a diachronically extended Paretianism or Kaldor-Hicksianism pursuant to 
which she who does not gain in today’s transaction will gain in tomorrow’s.  
 192 The other explanation is that alluded to in the previous footnote.  
 193 We might say, then, that early LE was positively incorrect in a manner precisely analogous to 
that in which it was normatively incorrect.  
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 The best interpretation of most market-regulatory norms (and indeed many other 
laws) in advanced political-economies, I think, is as attempts to afford something like 
greater neutrality and completeness of the sorts I’ve assayed just above.  Laws 
prohibiting invidious discrimination on the basis of racial, gender, and other ineluctable 
or morally arbitrary traits, for example, look to be straightforward cases of process-
neutrality-promotion.  Public education and sundry forms of government-facilitated 
social insurance for their parts are readily viewed as attempts at promoting entry-
neutrality.  They work to equalize ethically exogenous material opportunity endowments 
– the “Ri” of Part II.D.3.  Such neutrality-boosting measures, moreover, for reasons noted 
earlier tend to enhance market completeness as well.194   
 There are other completeness-enhancing measures that advanced political 
economies have steadily taken over the past two or three centuries.  The trend in respect 
of “commodification,” for example, seems by and large to have been to permit, and 
indeed in many cases even to foster, the trading of more and more goods and services, 
including contingent claims.  It’s also been to “unbundle” more and more once-conjoined 
items into separately traded items.  Conspicuous cases of such market-fostering include 
government regulatory and start-up support for securities, derivatives and more recently 
pollution rights trading, for example.  Conspicuous cases of mandated unbundling – 
which incidentally show again the linkage between neutrality and completeness – include 
antitrust action against large telecommunications concerns in the 1980s and against 
software manufacturers in the 1990s. 
                                                 
 194 There are arguments out there, of course, to the effect that these changes are “efficient.”  That 
is not, in light of the foregoing, surprising: We’ve seen that there is much overlap between uninteresting 
and interesting efficiency.  But there’s also divergence, and in any event to place the horse before the cart is 
to attend to opportunity inputs alone, which we’ve seen results in ethically interesting efficiency’s quite 
taking care of itself. 
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 The fact that such measures as those mentioned can often be argued to enhance 
aggregated social welfare, wealth or consumer surplus should not surprise us.  Nor should 
it be taken for unambiguous indication that legislatures or common law judges do, let 
alone ought, to craft law, doctrine or policy with a view to such goals.  All the less should 
it be taken for encouragement to conceive “improvements” we think likely all the more 
fully to effect aims of that sort.  For we’ve just seen both (a) that equal-opportunity-
indifferent aggregate-maximizing is ethically irrelevant, and (b) that equal-opportunity-
consistent maximizing is nonetheless in many cases coextensive with other forms of 
maximizing.195  (That fact itself explains how “positive” LE exponents of the past were 
able to suppose that common law judges might be subconsciously actuated by wealth-
maximizing aims.196)  It is better, then, to interpret our legal arrangements as actuated by 
the aim of taking us closer to the equal agency, equal opportunity ideal, and framing our 
own efforts at improvement as similarly actuated. 
 If I am correct in what I suggest here, then a substantial new research agenda in 
what might be called “ethically intelligible LE” is opened.  Some rules found to be likely 
wealth-maximizing in ethically uninteresting, fetishist ways, for example, might well 
prove to be suboptimal on ethical grounds.  And amendments to such rules might in many 
cases be found likely to move us further along in the direction of realizing the ethically 
optimal mechanism schematized just above.  Of course this isn’t the place to map out a 
fulsome such research agenda.  But an illustrative example or two might prove helpfully 
suggestive of what we might envisage: 
                                                 
 195 Recall that EDWEs typically are Pareto-efficient, for example, as noted just above.  
 196 More on that history infra, Part III.A.  
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 Consider, then, by way of but one example, the venerable case of “property” 
versus “liability” rules.197  Much ink has been spilt by practitioners of LE on behalf of the 
supposed normative superiority of the latter over the former in various contexts.  But 
suppose that the grounds for that professed superiority – the ethically uninteresting 
grounds of fair-distribution-indifferent wealth-maximization – were forthrightly seen, as 
ought now to be clear that they ought, to be otiose from a normative point of view.  
Suppose moreover that the autonomy aspect of responsible agency – each agent’s ability 
untrammeledly to control the disposition of assets to which she was ethically entitled 
pursuant to the opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula, and not to part with it at a 
price not of her naming – was seen to be more fully vindicated by property rather than 
liability rules.198  Would it not be found natural, in that circumstance, for ethically-salient 
LE itself, in its normative aspect, to explore the prospects for developing property-like or 
–simulating rules in such contexts? 
 Begin with the case of contract, for example, in which transacting is voluntary 
and only the subsequent history of the transaction might possibly turn out to be 
involuntary in some respect.  Suppose that all of the generally required predicates of 
fairness (i.e., equal opportunity) – competence on the part of both parties, rough 
transparency and rough parity of bargaining power – attend the initial agreement.  In such 
case there seems no reason not to view the parties’ joint – i.e., bargained – valuation of 
the transaction and the cost of breach as the ethically salient one, hence as the appropriate 
                                                 
 197 See, of course, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  
 198 That seems a plausible suggestion, does it not?  To have found the opportunity-egalitarian 
distribution is to have found the proper, or “natural” – the ethically determinate – line of demarcation 
between internality and externality, between any one person’s ethically permitted and indeed protected 
sphere of autonomy and rights on the one hand, that person’s outward-looking responsibility and duties on 
the other.    
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answer to the counterfactual “would have charged” question.  For the charge has in fact 
been agreed, ex ante.  Boundedly responsible agency and equal material opportunity 
among citizens are not implicated, let alone offended, by what ever valuation the parties 
jointly place upon the terms of their autonomous transaction – again, provided that the 
aforementioned predicates obtain.  There seems no reason, then, not to afford responsible 
autonomy maximal vindication through propertization of the contractual entitlement.  
Arguably specific performance, therefore, and certainly stipulated damages, should be 
enforceable.  That is the appropriate legal expression given the opportunity-egalitarian 
polity’s constitutive value of responsible agency in the context of contracting.   
 The case of tort is somewhat more difficult, but not very much as a matter of 
theory.  The added difficulty is simply an empirical/informational one bearing upon 
administrability, not a principled one bearing upon conceivability or appropriate guiding 
ideals.  The question is, how do we know, or determine, what the wronged party in a tort 
suit “would” have charged or paid in order to relinquish or insure her entitlement to 
immunity from harm?  And, given the difficulty of satisfactorily answering that question 
– a difficulty of which the tort victim herself is aware – might there not be a danger that 
the victim will exaggerate ex post what she claims would have been her ex ante 
reservation price or guaranteed insurance payout?199   
 In view of such difficulties, there is a practical problem afflicting the 
administration of any “propertized” system of tort remedies, at least if the latter be taken 
                                                 
 199 An analogous difficulty, of course, arises in the eminent domain and benefit-tax contexts of 
contemporary American property law – viz., the “holdout” problem presented by owners’ capacity to 
overstate what their condemned property “really” is worth to them, and the “free-rider” problem presented 
by their capacity to understate what their shares in some tax-financed appurtenant public good, e.g. a 
school, a park, a sewer system or police force, are worth to them.  See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 
190 at 883. 
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to mean a system wherein victims literally stipulate their own damages.  So while in 
principle the tort system is on the same footing as the contract system and thus ideally 
would be propertized in respect of remedies (again especially, e.g., for such torts as 
conversion and nuisance), in practice the implementation of the principle requires 
limitation.200  The appropriate response of the opportunity-egalitarian polity, then, would 
seem to be to select the most plausible proxy for actual reservation price or insurance 
policy.  The question becomes, what is it most likely that the victim actually would have 
charged, or would have insured for?   
 Addressing this question might involve the gathering of statistical data from 
which average – hence most likely – amounts are derived, which latter then can be 
suitably adjusted in view of special features of the victim that we should think reasonably 
would have led to a reservation price or insured value greater than or lower than that 
average – e.g., a particular sentimental attachment to the house in which one was born or 
the heirloom handed down to her, or a particular physical or psychical weakness or 
vulnerability suffered by the victim.  To some degree, the law of tort appears already to 
do this, as, e.g., in such doctrines as that “the tortfeasor takes the victim as he finds him,” 
colorfully operationalized in the so-called “thin skull rule”.201 
 It might be objected that “propertization” as here counseled gives rise to a tension 
between values embedded in the construal of distribuees as boundedly responsible agents.  
The objection would run thus:  The opportunity-egalitarian polity values not merely 
agency, but responsible agency, as noted at 3.4 above.  And responsible agency, as we 
                                                 
 200 Again, analogous contexts arise, now in contract, where transaction costs are thought to render 
actual contracting infeasible.  
 201 See, e.g., Poole v. Copland, 348 N.C. 260 (1998).  
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saw, entails equal agency, at least in the sense that it requires that responsible agency’s 
material correlate – access and exposure respectively to ethically exogenous resource and 
risk – be equitably spread, as suggested at II.D.3 above.  But we also noted, at 3.2 and 
II.E.2 above, that the only way to render intelligible the notion of “equal spread” of 
heterogeneous goods and ills that are not separately equalized (ad seriatim, good by good 
and ill by ill) over agents is by indexing through the operation of complete and neutral 
markets, which amount to democratic determinations of the relative worths of 
heterogeneous goods and ills, by citizens endowed with equal “votes” in those markets.   
 These observations might then seem – erroneously, we’ll see – to suggest that the 
appropriate remedy for violation of a legal right is the (complete and neutral) market – 
i.e., the social, or “true” – valuation of that right, not the right-holder’s possibly 
idiosyncratic or deliberately exaggerated  valuation.  And that, in turn, would seem to 
suggest vindication of the right by liability rules of a particular kind, rather than by 
property rules: Victims would be limited to court-determined recoveries, and courts in 
turn would be limited to market-determined amounts.  All remedies, in effect, would be 
like “takings” remedies, requiring “just” compensation defined as (complete and neutral) 
market value compensation.   
 Notwithstanding the initial “bite” of this objection, the preferred opportunity-
egalitarian path, it is difficult not to conclude, is to favor practicable propertization – at 
least in respect of some contract rights, and, in a sense to be explained, in respect of some 
tort immunities as well.  The reason is rooted in the crucial distinction, implicit in Parts 
II.C.4 and II.D.3 on material opportunity and opportunity-egalitarian distribution, 
respectively, between ethically exogenous and ethically endogenous holdings.  That 
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distinction in the present context is isomorphic to the ex ante / ex post divide vis a vis the 
operation of complete and neutral markets.  If (or to the degree that) holdings of ethically 
exogenous resource have been equalized over citizens prior to their entering complete 
and neutral markets, and if (or to the degree that) their holdings after entry into those 
markets are traceable to those equalized initial holdings and their trading activity in those 
markets, then (or to that degree) their holdings are consistent with the requirement of 
equal, boundedly responsible agency.  They hold what they ought to hold, by definition, 
and the social valuation – i.e. the market value – of those holdings is in such case of no 
further ethical interest to us.   
 The social valuation of agents’ assets, that is to say, is ethically interesting only 
prior to their entry into the market, when we are seeking to determine what everyone 
ought to start out with – hence how much they are to be compensated when victimized by 
hard luck, by the workings of blind fate.  After we have done that, post-market-entry 
holdings have been ethically endogenized.  People have what they deserve, and are 
viewed as being ethically entitled to it.  There is no further public salience to what it is 
that what they have is “worth,” at least not so long as it is held, any more than there is 
any public salience to their individual welfare- or wealth-outputs.202     
 Given that posture, the question then becomes, how should legally vindicated 
ethical entitlements be valued and compensated if and when they are subsequently 
violated or taken (rather than denied at the outset, ex ante), not by hard luck – by blind 
fate – but by voluntary entitlement-violative behavior on the part of a transgressor.  The 
first part of the question seems readily answered:  Since legitimate transfers of title take 
place by voluntary exchange at prices mutually agreed by transferors and transferees paid 
                                                 
 202 Recall Parts II.D.3, II.D.5, and II.E.2 on this – ethically cognizable “efficiency.” 
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by the latter, the legitimizing – correcting – of an involuntary “exchange” likewise should 
involve exaction of a price from the transferee.  In effect the taker has performed one part 
of an involuntary transaction, and she owes back her part of the “bargain.”203  Her part of 
the bargain, in turn, is what the wronged party “would” have charged – at a minimum, 
her reservation price prior to transacting – in exchange for what was taken.   
 I should emphasize that this is but the answer to an anticipated theoretic objection, 
hence is couched in theoretic terms.  It is simply to say that there is no tension, in 
advocating property-like vindication of private law rights in contract or tort, between the 
ideals of (a) complete and neutral market-valuation of goods and ills for purposes of 
determining opportunity-egalitarian endowments on the one hand, and (b) wronged-
party-valuation of what she is wrongfully stripped of on the other, for valuation in the 
first case is carried out to determine appropriate ethically exogenous (“initial”) 
endowments, while in the second case it is carried out to determine what subsequently 
endogenized holdings actually are worth to the autonomously valuing agent who now 
rightfully holds and is entitled to them.   
 All of that said, the matter of how best to approximate this ideal in view of the 
information difficulties and perverse “hold-out” incentives acknowledged several 
paragraphs up remains an open question – a question for ethically relevant LE.  It is 
presumably helpful in addressing the question in an ethically intelligible manner, 
nonetheless, to be clear as to the ideal that we ought to be seeking to approximate.  That 
                                                 
 203 Where she has taken more than she can pay, even out of what she has taken, the overage in 
effect becomes a case of hard luck – ethically exogenous – so society is the appropriate compensator.  The 
overage is as it were an “act of God”.    
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of course implicates a more general point with which we might best conclude this 
subsection:  
 
  d. Note on Institutional Competencies 
 None of the foregoing, I should emphasize, is intended to suggest that courts 
should attempt to make general determinations of litigants’ overall material opportunity 
allotments in deciding cases, and then allow such determinations to enter-in to the 
making of decisions as to who ought to prevail in litigated cases – as if courts were 
engines of non-case-specific compensation or distribution more generally.  Nor do I 
intend here to recommend that legislators, policy-makers or political ethicists more 
broadly amalgamate spheres of human activity in their thinking in such wise as might 
lead them ultimately to prescribe that citizens who fare unjustifiably poorly in one sphere 
of activity be held to different standards in other spheres of activity, that they might be 
“compensated overall.”   
 My gut intuition, indeed, is that the integrity and longterm stability of institutions 
that operate in the many different “spheres” of activity that all jointly constitute a 
complex polity and pluralist society requires we not generally determine individuals’ 
outcomes in one sphere by reference to their outcomes in other spheres.204  And thus my 
intuition also is that full opportunity-equality among all citizens requires our working 
serially toward opportunity-equality sphere by sphere.  But this is not the place either to 
                                                 
 204 Others who seem to think so include, e.g., JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE (1993); ALISTAIR 
MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1979); DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999); MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); AND H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1996).  
I don’t wish to endorse their particular claims, and both Miller and Walzer in particular I think are rather 
more pluralist than can ultimately be sustained.  
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commit to or argue for that provisional judgment.  Much more is required, to think-
through the question effectively, than can be done here.       
 My claim here is accordingly more modest.  It is simply that, where rules or 
programs or policies are crafted or drafted – such as in appellate courts incrementally 
developing legal doctrine with a view to future applications, or as in legislatures 
prescribing in yet more forward-looking and wholesale fashion – the crafting and drafting 
ought to be done with equal regard for all citizens conceived as boundedly responsible 
agents, and that doing that in turn requires that our judges and legislatures view their role 
as that of in effect (a) equalizing such benefits and burdens as both (i) they are 
institutionally authorized to be effectively bestowing and (ii) are ethically exogenous in 
the holding by the citizens in regard to whom they are acting, while (b) apportioning in 
proportion to differential responsibility such (i) ethically endogenous benefits and 
burdens as they are (ii) institutionally authorized to be effectively bestowing.  And one 
entailment of this latter claim, in turn and in light of the foregoing subsections, is that 
legal doctrine and legislative programs generally ought to be elaborated with a view to 
broadening the reach of and buttressing that distribution mechanism schematized through 
II.E.2 above.   
 These observations appear likely to bear implications for the thus far broad-brush 
and inconclusive discussion on institutional roles taking place in the WE and LE 
literatures.  An identifiable strand of this discussion, for example, has it that courts are 
better suited to maximizing aggregated wealth in the incremental crafting of legal 
doctrine, while distributional concerns are more efficiently (more deadweight-loss-
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avoidingly) handled through tax policy.205  I’ll defer discussion of such matters to the 
next two Parts, save to note here:   
 First, that in light of the foregoing discussion in Parts II.E.2 and II.D.1, the 
“efficiency” appealed to in such arguments will, again, not be of interest to “us” if 
decoupled from distributive propriety.  And second, that in light of the observations on 
institutional integrity and stability several paragraphs up (proper distribution in each 
sphere, not across spheres), on Rawls at II.D.2 (the incoherence of his mix of distribution 
formula and distribuendum), and on distribution formula / transactional proximity at 
II.D.4 (greater ethical satisfactoriness and longterm stability the closer we find 
responsible choices and resultant distribution), there would seem to be considerable 
threats both to ethical rectitude and to longterm institutional stability posed by assigning 
decoupled distributional concern and naïve maximizing concern to separate institutional 
spheres.  Such observations, recall, and their prescribed antidote – tying principle-
conforming distributions as closely as possible to the agent-taken actions that 
immediately produce them – were indeed part of what recommended the distribution 
mechanism that has been this Part’s principal preoccupation.      
  
III. APPLICATIONS: “DECONSTRUCTING” FOUNDATIONAL DISPUTES IN THE LIGHT OF 
DISTRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE   
 
 Our results in the foregoing sections enable us quite easily, I think, to take hold of 
familiar foundational controversies in WE and LE, and to resolve them quite easily as 
                                                 
 205 For recent discussion of this long-contested claim, see, e.g., Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes versus 
Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 797 (2000); Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 821(2000).  This is of course a minimal sampling, and 
fuller consideration would, again of course, require discussion of the sizeable WE literature concerning 
optimal taxation, particularly the contributions to that literature of Hammond, Mirrlees, and Vickrey.  
Regrettably I must of course pass all of this over in relative silence here.   
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well.  I’ll begin here with the first great foundational debate in normative LE.  In the next 
Part I’ll handle the most recent. 
 
A. A Value, or Just Value? “Wealth” and Its “Maximization” 
 The 1980s saw protracted controversy over the foundations of LE that has 
continued sporadically since.  The question, roughly stated, was whether the “wealth” in 
which LE took interest might be “a value,” and if so, what its relation might be to other 
values.   
 The position taken at one end of the “yes”/“no” divide – that wealth is not even a 
value among values – would, if correct, have deprived LE of any normative interest what 
ever.  The position taken at the other end of the divide – that wealth is not only a value, 
but is the principal value with which courts in particular and perhaps policy more 
generally should concern itself with advancing – ironically tended toward the same result.  
It did so by rendering wealth, as the position construed it, unintelligible even as a, let 
alone the, value of interest to law.   
 An apparently intermediate position took wealth for a value that society indeed 
should take interest in “maximizing,” but whose maximization was in all cases to be 
considered subordinate to the lexicographically prior value of fairness.  Fairness, that is, 
on the intermediate view operated as a “veto” or “side constraint” upon otherwise 
worthwhile wealth-maximization. 
  
 1. A False Start: Early Posner 
 The second position just mentioned – the “yes” vote – was of course most 
conspicuously associated with Richard Posner, and lay at the basis of much normative LE 
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of the day.206  Posner’s original aim seems to have been to supplant one legal-
theoretically influential teleological ethic – utilitarianism – with another that avoided 
both the latter’s ethical pitfalls and those of what Posner viewed as its principal 
competitor – something he called “Kantianism.”   
 Posner rehearsed several of the more familiar problems of utilitarianism 
(hereinafter “U”):  There were the uncertain domain of its beneficiaries (distribuees), the 
total versus aggregate utility problem,207 and the interpersonal comparability problem (as 
per Part II.C.1 above).  He also took due note of what might in view of Part II.D.1 be 
called the contingency problem – U’s rendering even such seemingly fundamental rights 
as those to labor autonomy, or against unprovoked homicide, merely contingent upon 
their vindication’s happening to maximize the utility aggregate.  And Posner added a 
concern, cognate with observations made above at II.E, that U might seem to warrant 
virtually unlimited government intervention into otherwise private ordering. 
 Against the potential “monstrousness” of U opened by such prospects as these 
mentioned, Posner contrasted what he labeled “Kantian” “squeamishness” and 
“fanaticism.”  Taken to its logical endpoint, Posner apparently thought, “Kantianism” 
(hereinafter “K”) would prohibit my killing one innocent in order to save one hundred 
innocents, even if the first innocent would be among the one hundred.208  To avoid such 
prudishness, Posner claimed, “most Kantians . . . carv[e] exceptions to the categorical 
                                                 
 206 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 103 
(1979); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).  Both articles are reprinted in revised form in RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983).  Pin-cites herein are to pages in the latter.  
 207 See supra note 92.   
 208 That story, of course, originates with Bernard Williams, no Kantian.  See Bernard Williams, A 
Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 
(1973).  
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duties they impose.”209  But the exceptions, he then objected, are ad hoc and accordingly 
subject to slippery slope problems – “there is no logical stopping point.”210  
   Since neither U nor K were satisfactory to Posner’s thinking, there was, 
curiously, “interest in trying to combine [them] in some fashion.”211  That was curious in 
part because one does not ordinarily expect conjoined ills to add up to goods.  But it was 
particularly curious, in Posner’s particular case, because Posner had argued that one of 
K’s defects was precisely “its resemblance to [U itself].”212  And finally it was curious 
because no meta-ethical considerations what ever were adduced that might have afforded 
guidance as to in what way, if any, U and K should be combined.  Be those puzzles what 
they may, Posner proceeded to read-off the sundry respects in which he took what he 
called “wealth-maximization” (hereinafter “WM”) to avoid the weaknesses of U and K, 
hence (?) to constitute a compelling social aim:213 
 First, of course, Posner defined a few terms.  Social wealth, he reported, 
comprised total “market value in the sense of price times quantity of all goods and 
services,” and also “the total consumer and producer surplus generated by those goods 
and services.”214  “The most important thing” about the concept of value upon which this 
definition of “wealth” turned, Posner reported, was that it was “based on what people are 
willing to pay for something rather than on the happiness they would derive from having 
it.”215  Those matters laid out, Posner suggested that commonlaw judges both should, and 
                                                 
 209 POSNER, supra note 199 at 58.  
 210 Id.  
 211 Id. at 65.  
 212 Id. at 63.  
 213 I insert the parenthetical question mark because there is of course a leap here.  A proposed 
aim’s avoiding the failings of another proposed aim is not ordinarily thought to constitute so much as an 
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in fact commonly – if “subconsciously” – did, craft private law rules as to maximize 
aggregate wealth so defined.   
 Now while value, hence wealth, of course correlated in part with satisfaction 
hence some form of welfare on Posner’s understanding as just described – since people 
presumably would not be willing to pay for what did not afford them some satisfaction – 
they also of course rode upon rather more than just satisfaction or welfare.  For 
willingness to pay for a good is a function not only of the anticipated satisfaction-yield of 
that good, but also of (a) the comparative prices of all individually desired goods and 
services, and (b) the broader distribution of purchasing power itself (ultimately a legal 
entitlement) over the community as well.  The questions thus were left open both (a) what 
normative import wealth and its maximization have could insofar as they diverged from 
welfare and its (or wealth’s) proper distribution, per concerns noted above at 3.3.1 and 
II.D.1; and (b) given the functional dependence of aggregative wealth’s determination 
upon the “wealth effects” of wealth’s distribution itself, how wealth-maximization could 
be of any use in determining an appropriate initial distribution of entitlements, per 
concerns noted above at II.E.2? 
 Notwithstanding such foundational problems afflicting erection of Posnerian WM 
as a proposed social aim, Posner proceeded buoyantly to elaborate how the pursuit would 
avoid the problems of U and K he’d run-through.  Thus, the “boundary” problem 
concerning whose utilities should count would be solved through determination, not of 
elusive comparative capacities to experience utility, but by “the intersection of marginal 
product and marginal cost of keeping” the utility-experiencers.216  WM also avoided U’s 
measurement problems, Posner suggested, since we have reasonably satisfactory means 
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already to hand by which to measure wealth.217  Further, because wealth is maximized 
through voluntary exchange, wealth-maximization would tend to favor a broad sphere of 
autonomy among citizens, along with a concomitant limiting of government.218   
 WM also would avoid much of the moral monstrousness of U, said Posner, 
because those who derive utility through the suffering of others would have to purchase 
the right to inflict that suffering from them.219  Indeed, to generalize that point, even very 
self-centered people would be able to promote their interests in general only by 
benefiting others, through exchange.  Relatedly, many “conventional virtues – keeping 
promises, telling the truth, and the like – [could] also be derived from [WM].  Adherence 
to those virtues facilitate[d] transactions and so promote[d] trade and hence wealth by 
reducing the costs of policing markets.”220 
 There were, of course, multiple cracks in this happy edifice from the conceptual 
and ethical points of view – the latter ironically being, recall, that from which Posner was 
seeking to promote WM.  The grounding error was simply that noted above – that the 
view offered no attempt what ever to explain what particular mix of U’s and K’s 
advantages, if any, an adequate ethic should capture, or why.  Proceeding from that 
foundational void were multiple individual confusions.   
 One was, as flagged just above, what normative interest wealth should have 
insofar as it was severed from welfare – a concern of the sort noted above at 3.3.  If the 
answer to that one was that, say, “WM, not wealth itself, is what solves the problems of 
U,” then another problem was simply that, just as grotesquely as Posner noted of U, WM 
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rendered rights as basic as that against involuntary servitude contingent upon the fact that 
people tend thus far to be more productive when not enslaved.221  That’s troubling, of 
course, as noted above at II.D.1 in connection with all forms of naïve maximization.   
 Another problem, deeply connected to those just rehearsed, was WM’s complete 
indifference to the morally arbitrary distributions of ethically exogenous endowment that 
WM was committed to leaving untouched – again clearly vitiating in view of II.D.1’s 
observations above.  “If [one] happens to be born feeble-minded and his net social 
product is negative,” Posner admitted, “he would have no right to the means of support 
even though there was nothing blameworthy in his inability to support himself.”222  That 
consequence Posner strangely described, not as repugnant and ethically disqualifying, but 
merely as “grat[ing] on modern sensibilities” – as though on a par with bear-baiting and 
petticoats.  More strangely still, he professed nonetheless to “see no escape from [the 
conclusion] consistent with any of the major ethical systems.”223 
 But there is of course a perfectly obvious “escape” recommended by the perfectly 
familiar value of equal opportunity as elaborated above through Part 3, pursuant to which 
faultless handicaps are to be compensated.  Posner obscurely professed to find that ideal 
“inconsistent with the Kantian notions of individuality from which the view [that genetic 
endowments are morally accidental] purports to derive.”224  He darkly hinted, that is, that 
there is some manner of internal inconsistency in the view that faultless handicaps 
deserve help:  “To treat the inventor and the idiot equally concerning their moral claim 
over valuable resources,” he quipped in an unfortunate echo both (a) of his apparently 
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much admired Holmes (“three generations of imbeciles are enough”) and (b) of an oft-
quoted Rawlsian locution, “does not take seriously the differences between persons.”225  
 But this observation simply failed to take seriously the difference between 
contraries.  The problem that Rawls had singled-out with “the distinction between 
persons” remark was U’s failure to treat persons as discrete individuals – as numerically 
distinct – not as characteristically differing:  The problem was naïve aggregation itself, 
which was problematic precisely because it allowed morally arbitrary distinctions 
between persons – in this case, individuals’ exogenously given utility functions – to 
determine the distribution of resources employed by persons in producing their utilities.  
(Utility functions as foreheads or noses, per II.D.1 above.)  WM, of course, suffered 
precisely the same problem, as indeed noted at II.D.1, simply replacing utility-
productivity with wealth-productivity.  And so, by effectively treating as morally decisive 
the accidental differences between persons in advocating naïve maximization of an 
ethically inert aggregate, WM failed to take seriously the ethically relevant – indeed 
properly decisive – numerical distinction between equal-rights-bearing agent-distribuees. 
  
 2. A Helpful & Entertaining Corrective, But a Bit Overstated: Dworkin 
 Conceptual sloppiness and ethical repugnance of this sort were surely what lay 
behind the sometimes perhaps overstated – or over-subtly stated – but nonetheless 
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decisive demolition of Posnerian would-be normative WM conducted by Dworkin.226  
Dworkin’s stated concern was with whether “the claim that social wealth is a component 
of value . . . is a defensible idea.”227  Dworkin’s ultimate verdict was that “it is plain it is 
not.”228   
 Dworkin’s argument rode, to what might at first have seemed a surprisingly 
unique degree, upon a single hypothetical story:  In the story one person possesses a book 
desired by another.  The first person’s reservation price, or measure of willingness to 
accept (WTA), is $2.  The second person’s willingness to pay (WTP) is $3.  Dworkin 
observed that a benevolent tyrant actuated by normative WM would see reason simply to 
strip the first person of the book and deliver it to the second, without any compensation at 
all paid the first.  For the transfer, of course, would increase social wealth as defined by 
Posner, and moreover would economize on the haggling costs that the parities would 
incur in a market transaction.  Dworkin then asked whether there is any respect at all in 
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which the post-transfer society, reached after the tyrant had taken and given, would be 
better than the pre-transfer society.  His answer, to which he averred that he thought most 
would agree, was that it would “not [be] better in any respect.”229   
 It seems safe to say that Dworkin was right at least in the sense that most if not all 
would say the forced transfer described in his story is ethically wrong.  What is perhaps 
less clear is the basis on which they would say so.  For there are, at least superficially, 
multiple bases on which to object:  It might be the involuntary nature of the transfer, for 
example.  Or it might be the uncompensated nature of the taking.  Or it might be the 
suspicion that the original owner, since he’d take less than the “new” owner would have 
paid, is (undeservedly) poorer, hence not only taken from but unjustly taken from (simply 
in order to render an undeservedly richer person undeservingly richer still by a yet greater 
margin).  Or finally it might be, relatedly though not immediately obviously so, the 
recognition that, in light of willingness-to-pay’s dependence in part upon antecedent 
wealth, the new owner might derive much less utility from the transfer than the original 
owner derives prior to it.   
 Because any of these reasons might individually underwrite one’s revulsion to the 
transfer described in Dworkin’s story, and because at least some of them might be 
thought consistent with finding the post-transfer situation better at least in some 
ultimately “outweighed” respect, the revulsion alone cannot be immediately taken, it 
seems, for evidence of our not finding the post-transfer situation better “in any respect.”  
And so Dworkin might appear to have overstated his conclusion.  At least it might seem 
so unless and until we can show all of the just proffered facially distinct grounds for 
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objecting to the hypothetical transfer to be deeply connected – in effect one reason, which 
itself entails the post-transfer world’s not being better in any respect. 
 I think that the facially distinct reasons for objecting to the transfer in Dworkin’s 
story can indeed be reduced to one, and that this reason itself entails the post-transfer 
world’s not being better in any respect.  We simply have not been equipped, thus far, to 
articulate clearly and comprehensively how this can be so, until we have viewed the 
matter from the valence-grammatical point of view elaborated through Part 3.  The post-
transfer situation in Dworkin’s story fails to be better in any respect, I think, simply 
because it is a situation the only prima facie improvement represented by which is its 
larger naïvely summed aggregate.  And a larger such aggregate, we have seen at Part 
II.D.1 and elsewhere above, considered apart from the ethical propriety of its distribution 
and the means by which it is obtained, is as an ethical matter entirely without interest.   
 The latter fact is obscured, at least in some confused eyes – such as Posner’s, 
apparently, in the early 1980s230 – most immediately by failure to track what above we 
have called the “distributor” variable and its adequate filling – the “we” who are 
addressed by de facto distributive prescription.  As soon as we attend to it, we are 
reminded that “we” refers to all of us, since ethical prescriptions by their very nature 
claim universality.231  And then upon recognizing that there is no reason for “us” to take 
interest in an aggregate whose maximization does not treat us all as of equal ethical 
standing, we see that there is nothing prescriptive for “us” to hear in the recommendation 
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of a transfer such as that in Dworkin’s story – a prospect to which, as Dworkin well 
shows, WM commits itself. 
 General failure to view the matter in conformity with valence grammar is 
manifest, incidentally, not only in failure till now to articulate both comprehensively and 
clearly just why and how the Dworkinian transfer story results in no improvement in any 
respect.  It also is manifest to some extent in how the questions of value and betterness 
typically are framed:  When Dworkin asks whether the post-transfer situation is “better,” 
simpliciter, in any respect than its temporal antecedent, there is, strictly speaking, a gap in 
the question.  Situations, objects, and so on are “better,” typically, not only in one or 
another respect – i.e., relative to some value- or purpose-determined metric – but also to 
one or more valuing, purpose-holding agents.   
 Dworkin’s post-transfer situation might indeed be (unjustly and thus ultimately 
incorrectly, per II.D.1 above) judged “better” by the beneficiary of the forced giving.  
And so that person might, superficially and in effect weak-jokingly, answer Dworkin’s 
question in the affirmative:  He might say, “yes, it is better in respect of its enhancing my 
wealth-holdings, with which in turn I can satisfy more of my wants and fulfill more of 
my plans, hence indeed boost my welfare.”  And it is presumably some such prospect as 
that which underwrites the early Posner’s and, more recently, Hanoch Sheinman’s 
inclination to answer Dworkin’s question in the affirmative as well.232   
 But of course these are actually non-answers at bottom.  Or perhaps more 
precisely, they are answers to a different question.  For Dworkin’s real question is not 
whether the post-transfer situation is preferable to the ethically unreflective thief, or 
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whether the latter “values” – i.e., desires – wealth.  It is, rather, whether “we,” as a polity 
of ethical equals, jointly take ethical interest in the growing of a naïvely summed 
aggregate unmoored in (hence grown in offense to) our ethical equality.  And both the 
fact that this is Dworkin’s actual question, and the obvious reply to it – “No” – are kept 
much more clearly in view when the case grammar of distribution is kept clearly in view.  
Obscurity about this, by parity, is the product of grammar-blind thinking. 
 My proposed way of framing the controversy shows not only why Posner’s (and 
Sheinman’s) attempts to rebut Dworkin’s polemic fall as flat as they do, but also both 
why and how the various facially distinct grounds for objecting to the transfer in 
Dworkin’s story briefly enumerated above ultimately reduce to one:  Those who object to 
the transfer by dint of its being an uncompensated taking, for example, implicitly assume 
that the prior owner of the book was a rightful owner, and then object to the transfer-in-
name-of-the-aggregate’s indifference to distribution – in this case, to the person from 
whom the book is taken.  Similarly, of course, in the case of those who object out of 
suspicion that we have taken from the worse-off to the better-off in the story.  And 
ultimately similarly in the case of those who worry that the transfer need not actually 
bring increased utility, since those with that worry are then concerned with the fetishism 
of WM, a concern which commits them, for reasons discussed at II.D above, to reject any 
form of naïve maximization, U included.  Finally, for reasons adduced at the end of Part 
II.E on distribution mechanisms, the same opportunity-egalitarian commitments as 
underwrite the other grounds for objection underwrite objection to involuntary 
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redistribution for any reason other than that of bona fide exogenous opportunity-
equalizing, which seems to be subtly assumed not to be happening in Dworkin’s story.233 
 
 3. A Quasi-Posnerian Reformulation, But What Does It Mean?: Sheinman 
  
 As for the more detailed putative rejoinders to Dworkin found in the literature, 
again, failure to attend to the case grammar of distribution leads critics to miss the actual 
force of Dworkin’s argument, I believe, hence to offer what amount to non sequiturs as 
answers.  Posner says in his then-contemporary rejoinder, for example, that were 
Dworkin simply to have changed the numbers in his story, so that the original owner still 
maintained a reservation price of $2 but the “new” owner now was willing to pay $3,000, 
we would likely answer Dworkin’s question in the affirmative.  That’s simply facetious.  
The quantities are entirely irrelevant – because, again, naïvely maximized aggregates are 
irrelevant.  There is no more reason for “us” to favor the “new” owner’s seeing his wealth 
illegitimately increased by $2,998 at the original owner’s illegitimate expense than there 
is to favor his wealth’s illegitimate increased by $1 at the original owner’s illegitimate 
expense.234     
 Similar observations hold in respect of Sheinman’s more recent, and rather more 
painstaking, attempt to engage Dworkin.235  Sheinman considers three variations on 
Dworkin’s original story.  In the first, the two parties actually engage in voluntary 
exchange:  The second person purchases the book from the first, for two dollars, hence 
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retaining the whole of the one dollar surplus that is the WTP/WTA spread.  Sheinman’s 
reported intuition is that the post-transfer situation is “on balance better.”  That’s not a 
surprising intuition, of course:  Something very much like it underwrites the program and 
principal results of WE from Edgeworth through Pareto to Arrow and beyond.  And 
probably most people share Sheinman’s intuition, at least preliminarily.  But it’s worth 
asking why:      
 Why?  I think it’s this:  Because at first pass in Sheinman’s story both parties 
involved, who per the story exhaust the universe of distribuees, presumptively prefer 
it.236  After all, they trade voluntarily.  So “everyone’s happy,” we figure, what’s not to 
like?  Indeed, distributive-assessment and thus the ethical objection it might underwrite 
aren’t even implicated absent potential conflict between agents over something that’s 
scarce.  Since everyone’s happy here, no conflict, so no assessment or, therefore, 
objection.  But let’s probe a bit longer:   
 There are at least three further questions worth asking about the shared intuition 
that’s countenanced here.  The first and easiest one is whether it’s improved welfare or 
increased “wealth” that accounts for the intuition:  For recall that Dworkin’s target was 
Posnerian wealth-maximization, not welfare as distribuendum or welfare-maximization 
as a distributive ethic.  Sheinman forthrightly recognizes, correctly I think, that it’s 
improved welfare that accounts for our approving the transfer.  For reasons stated two 
paragraphs up, this isn’t surprising.  But now we might wonder, was Posner then right 
after all, save that he should have promoted welfare- rather than wealth-maximizing?  Or 
was he, say, partly right, in that we must in some sense “balance” our interests in 
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distributive fairness on the one hand, aggregate welfare or wealth on the other, hence 
implicating the familiar apparatus of indifference curves?  I think clearly not, for reasons 
that emerge as we turn to the two remaining questions I alluded to just above:    
 The second two questions that I think worth asking in connection with 
Sheinman’s intuition in reaction to his story are more interesting than the first.  And in 
light of Part 3 we can see that they’re intimately connected.  The first question is whether 
the welfare improvement we discern in Sheinman’s story has anything to do with our 
perceiving a welfare aggregate’s having been raised.  The second is whether that aspect 
of the story which renders the post-transfer situation an improvement has anything to do 
with a value that really can come into conflict with, hence sometimes conceivably have to 
be “traded-off” against, a correct distribution.  I think the answer to both questions is no, 
for reasons discussed throughout Part 3 – Parts II.D and II.E in particular.  And I think 
that those answers are entirely consistent with Sheiman’s intuition that the trade brings an 
improvement.  This is best shown by grappling directly with the principal – indeed I think 
the only – potential challenge the story might seem to pose: namely, the fact of the 
purchasing party’s pocketing the whole of the surplus:     
 Note first that it might be the case in Sheinman’s story that neither party has any 
way of knowing the WTP/WTA spread, hence the surplus.  We’re simply not told 
anything about the epistemic characteristics of the bargaining situation, and we probably 
assume informational symmetry as the default.  In this case, that’s joint ignorance.  My 
bet is that most non-theorists, moreover, insofar as they think of such things at all, 
probably likewise assume some such informational unavailability as implicit backdrop.   
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 Now given that backdrop, the reader likely assumes herself into being one or the 
other of Sheinman’s parties – hence, either of two (unquantifiably) satisfied parties.  To 
the degree that she does, the bargaining situation naturally seems quite unobjectionable.  
For in such case there is, as an informational and pragmatic matter, simply no scarce item 
over which any two parties might dispute.  And recall from Part 2 that that’s a critical 
predicate to distributive-assessment’s, hence potential objectionability’s, being so much 
as implicated.  There is nothing in the story, that is to say, that might be cardinally 
quantified per Part II.B, then divided and doled out fairly or unfairly per Part II.D.  So 
there is no occasion for the improvement that the trade in the story effects to come into an 
apparent conflict with distributive norms.   
 Now turn to the other epistemic possibility in Sheinman’s story:  Suppose that 
either or both parties is indeed able to ascertain the WTP/WTA spread.  In such case it is 
quite likely, given the institutional backdrop that most of us now likely find most familiar 
and thus also assume into the story, that at least one of the parties is unable to do 
anything to ensure a more equitable spread of the (now known) surplus.  We’ve long 
since arranged our world (the world into which we read Sheinman’s story), indeed to the 
point where most of us don’t even notice let alone bother to question it any longer, in 
such a way as ensures that most sellers are price-takers. 
 Now a price-taking party, of course, is “held up.”  He gets the bare minimum that 
he prefers to the status quo ante, allowing his counterparty much more; or he gets nothing 
at all.  So of course he takes that minimum.  It’s the best that his counterparty allows him.  
And that’s at least preliminarily ethically troubling, I think most would agree on 
 129 
reflection.237  So perhaps there indeed is potential for our distributive-ethical 
commitments to come into conflict with our “welfare-improvement” intuitions invoked 
by the story, at least on reflection, such that we must choose between them sometimes, or 
“trade them off” against one another? 
 I don’t believe so.  Note first that most people upon reading the story likely do not 
notice or reflect upon the significance of the hold up.  For again, we’ve grown 
accustomed to thinking inchoately both of “ourselves” as consumers, and of the hold up 
of price-takers and its upshot – the consumers’ surplus – as inevitable if indeed even any 
longer noticed features of the institutional backdrop against which we typically transact.  
Our initial acceptance of the story as involving a welfare improvement, then, does not of 
itself signal a judgment that such improvements can come at the expense of some 
“traded-off” “increment of” fairness.     
 Note next that even upon growing a bit more reflective in considering the story 
and accordingly noticing that there’s hold up and unfair division, we’re likely not 
thinking that either of the parties in the story actually knows what we know or is thinking 
as we think in consequence.  That’s because, for one thing, we’re not told anything about 
their knowledge in the story, and it’s natural to assume that they themselves do not think 
about such things as WTP/WTA spreads and consequent surpluses and those surpluses’ 
division.  And it’s because, for another thing, the parties actually trade in the story, and 
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that itself tends to suggest that the selling party does not know what we know, hence does 
not think as we’re thinking.  For we know from the experimental economics literature 
that parties eschew even potentially Pareto-improving transactions when perceiving that 
they’re being treated unfairly, or being held-up or otherwise dictated to.238   
 Note finally that, even if we do, upon reflecting a bit more carefully and thus 
noticing that there are hold up and unfairness in the story, attribute such reflections to the 
transacting parties themselves, we still need perceive not real “conflict” between the 
Pareto gain and the interests of fairness.  For if we think about the matter at all we 
probably remind ourselves that over time and across commodity space hold-up gains “all 
balance out” when we arrange things as we have done.  For we’re all of us consumers in 
most of our transactional contexts.  The price-taker in one transaction is a holder-up of 
price-takers in countless other transactions, sharing in the spatially and temporally 
extended aggregate consumer surplus with everyone else.  And that’s, unsurprisingly, no 
doubt thought simpler and easier and more time-saving than dividing surplus more evenly 
transaction-by-transaction through dickering.239  So even when we don’t assume that 
there’s ignorance about WTP/WTA, and even when we don’t assume that there’s in 
                                                 
 238 A serviceable overview of the large literature here is Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, 
in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).  Some very 
interesting recent results are reported in Raymond Fisman et al., Pareto Damaging Behaviors (May 15, 
2005), available at Mr. Fisman’s and his co-authors’ SSRN sites.  
 239 I recognize that this judgment will be seen to sit in some potential tension with my earlier 
proposed proposition, at II.D.4, that distributive fairness generally be maintained as nearly as possible on a 
“direct, transaction by transaction” basis.  But please recall, first, that I do not postulate that as an 
exceptionless axiom, but only as desirable so far as is practicable; and, second, that I am not here defending 
department stores over trade fairs, only stating how the former mode of surplus-distribution – to consumers 
– can be viewed in macro as being just as fair as the latter mode of surplus-distribution – more evenly over 
buyers and seller alike – is likely to have been in micro, particularly given the unlikelihood within a fair or 
bazaar economy that counterparties possess equal bargaining power in every transaction.  So again our 
intuition that the Pareto gain in the story really is an improvement entails no judgment what ever to the 
effect that it is a gain notwithstanding some perceived “fairness sacrifice.”    
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consequence no measurable item – no surplus – over the distribution of which parties 
might bear conflicting interests, we still assume away unfairness in Sheinman’s story.    
 Now to the second question I raised in connection with Sheinman’s first story:  
Does one’s intuition that the story involves a welfare improvement have anything to do 
with a perception that some aggregate – even a welfare not wealth aggregate – has been 
increased?  I see no reason to think so.240  And indeed, if it’s apt to appeal to Occam’s 
Razor here, there being no reason to think so itself constitutes a reason to assume to the 
contrary.   
 The simplest explanation for our intuition in response to the story is, of course, 
this:  The post-transfer situation is better simply because quite literally all in the story 
prefer it.  Now of course it can be said that a by-product of the latter fact, at least given 
the backdrop as described in which the possibility of measuring and dividing the surplus 
has in effect been bracketed, is that arguably ethically cognizable welfare (as indeed 
wealth) has increased.241  But the very definition of “ethically cognizable welfare” (or “-
wealth”) is such as to indicate the sense in which this “growth” is, indeed, a by-product – 
the “cart,” so to speak, not the horse:  It’s the sense in which ethically cognizable 
maximization was seen at Parts II.D5 and II.E.2 to “take care of itself” when the 
opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula is satisfied:  What matters in Sheinman’s 
story is only that both parties presumptively prefer the trade’s outcome and “gain” in that 
sense, while, insofar as we unreflectively ignore the possibility of measuring and splitting 
surplus, we in effect think of the gains as being “equal” by default, as it were.  And so to 
                                                 
 240 Neither, it should be noted, does Sheinman.  See Sheinman, supra note 225 at 278.  
 241 I say only “arguably” in this case because we do not know here how the surplus, if any, has 
been distributed.  We know only that all prefer, without knowing (a) the reasons, (b) whether there are 
fairness grounds for preferring the same transfer on somewhat different terms so as to distribute the surplus 
properly, etc.  More on these matters in the ensuing several paragraphs.  
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speak of an aggregate’s growth here is none but another way of saying – quite elliptically, 
by reference to a post hoc constructed “output” – that all prefer it. 
 Note moreover that even in our unreflective versions of the response to 
Sheinman’s story, we have not judged that ethically cognizable welfare or wealth have 
been maximized in macro – hence that the post-transfer situation is even pre-reflectively 
optimal, unobjectionable, or proper.  Indeed we are not equipped to do so, for we do not 
know whether the full distribution of material opportunity in the pre-transfer situation is 
proper.  (Nor can we know in macro, then, even on a reflective reading of the story 
pursuant to which we recognize that the surplus might have been divided, whether the 
macro-distribution of surplus wrought by this trade is fair by those lights.)  Such 
information has not been supplied in the story.  But the valence-grammatical mode of 
viewing such stories at least tells us precisely what to ask for in determining how the 
surplus in the trade here should be divided.  If the two parties prior to trading enter the 
trade with initial endowments that conform to the opportunity-egalitarian distribution 
formula, for example, it is quite tempting to hold that the book should sell for $2.50, with 
the parties quite evenly dividing the surplus.242 
 Sheinman’s second variation on Dworkin’s story seems to me to speak more 
directly to the prospective value of aggregate-growing – though still not, as we’ll see, to 
the prospective value of doing that apart from the equal treatment of agents.243  Rather 
than a voluntary or involuntary redistribution, this second story involves an initial 
distribution:  Neither party holds the book initially. Now the benevolent tyrant somehow 
gleans the comparative valuations of the book.  Then he simply gives the book to the 
                                                 
 242 See supra note 230.  
 243 Sheinman, supra note 225 at 278.  
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party who “would” have paid most, rather than to the party who “would” have paid least.  
Of course either such situation ex post represents a Pareto improvement over the status 
quo ante, while neither of the former two Pareto dominates the other.   
 Sheinman’s intuition is nonetheless that the outcome he posits “is on the whole 
better” than its alternative – the book’s being given the party who values it less.  I for my 
part am at least partly inclined to agree, at least in the sense that I commonly give things, 
when I cull through my holdings, to those whom I think will most appreciate them.  And 
this intuition of Sheiman’s and proclivity of my own might appear to be justifiable only 
by reference to some shared perception that aggregate-growing is cognizable as good 
even apart from distributional considerations.  Is it?       
 Again I incline to think not.  I speculate first on the tendency that I have just 
autobiographically reported, then on Sheinman’s story and reported intuition:  The 
tendency I’ve reported dovetails with other, seemingly cognate tendencies:  When 
approaching a crosswalk on foot that is simultaneously approached rectilinearly by a 
cyclist, for example, I’ll often wave the latter through rather than avail myself of my right 
to walk first.  I do this even when quite sure the cyclist will happily stop if I do claim my 
right.  When cycling, in turn, I often assume that the pedestrian will do likewise for me.  
And typically that is precisely what happens.  I’m fairly sure that what’s happening in 
these cases is that the pedestrian is in effect thinking, “it’ll take more effort for him to 
stop his bicycle, then recommence pedaling, than it takes me to slow my walking pace 
slightly.”  And that’s aggregate-cost-saving thinking, hence aggregate-maximizing 
thinking.   
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 But now note another critical aspect of this speculation, an aspect that’s not stated 
but seems nonetheless to be taken implicitly for granted:  As with the observations 
concerning consumer surplus above, here there’s presumptive “evening out” over time.  
Sometimes I’m walking, other times I’m riding.  I assume that it’s likewise with others.  
I’m not counting, for I’m not Pickwickian, but it is my rough perception nonetheless.  
And were it otherwise I’m quite sure I’d act differently.  Indeed were I never to travel any 
way but by walking, I might very well begin to feel exploited by non-stopping cyclists, 
and in consequence start asserting my right in the crosswalks.  My conjecture’s that 
considerations of this sort are operative in others as well.   
 There seems a strong sense, then, as with the considerations in respect of 
consumers’ surplus above, in which here too our intuitions are not grounded in aggregate-
growing considered apart from equal treatment at all.  Rather, the intuition’s embedded 
in an assumed context involving shared gain.  It’s only against that backdrop that the 
aggregate-growing is seen as being so much as cognizable as good.  Absent that 
backdrop, we’d see no good in it at all, no matter by how much the aggregate grew.  That 
take’s me to Sheinman’s reported intuition in respect of his story, and what I think’s 
illicit in the conclusion he draws from it.  It also leads on to his third tale:             
 Absent some assumed backdrop such as that I’ve described in the immediately 
preceding paragraphs, the problem with Sheinman’s second story and reported intuition 
in reaction thereto is that there seems nothing actually to ground the intuition.  Or rather, 
there seems no reason to expect to experience an intuition, as opposed to a premature 
ethical “gun-jumping,” here without first requesting additional information.  The 
hypothetical is incomplete once we give it some thought – indeed dramatically so.  For 
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the two parties in his story must surely have pasts, and must surely have futures, and the 
scare goods they hold over time will inevitably be fairly or unfairly distributed, such that 
the sudden gratuitous bequest of a book to one of them inevitably will render things fairer 
or unfairer.  Not referring to any of that, it is nearly as if Sheinman has said, “T gives a 
book to S.  Is the world now better?”  Would anyone know how to answer that?  If not, 
how can things be decisively different when add but another detail, as in: “T gives a book 
to S who wants it more than R.  Is the world now better than it would have been had T 
given it to R?”  One still ought to shrug.   
 As soon as we view the matter valence-grammatically, we see precisely the sense 
in which both questions are incomplete, and we know precisely what additional 
information to request in order to be able to arrive at a judgment:  We ask whether the 
two possible recipients are antecedently equal-material-opportunity-endowed.  If they 
are, then simply giving the book to one of them actually worsens things:  The distribution 
of goods now’s unfair.   
 The tyrant must then instead, if he is to improve the world as he finds it prior to 
giving, evenly divide the book’s possession into temporally equal leaseholds, for 
example, or convey a joint tenancy or tenancy in common.  Or if for some reason the 
book’s not in such wise divisible, he should give the book to one party, then give the next 
item, once available, to the other party.  Or if that isn’t possible, he should flip a coin, so 
to speak, affording each party an equal chance of receiving the book.  That way he at 
least equalizes ex ante opportunity to benefit.   
 If the winner of the flip is the party who values it least, the party who values it 
more can then purchase it, leaving both parties in consequence better off.  Likewise, of 
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course, if the parties prefer one another’s gifts if and when both have received gifts 
successively.  Cognate remarks hold in respect of temporally divided or joint ownership 
too.  And variations on the 50/50 split – say 10/90, 20/80, etc. – are readily devised to 
make of any one gift an opportunity to equalize total ethically exogenous holdings 
between parties if such holdings are antecedently unfair.  This leads quite nicely into 
Sheiman’s third story, which is quite easily dispatched.244 
 The third story returns us to Dworkin’s, save with two small alterations:  First, the 
differential between WTA and WTP is now that between $2 and $300, rather than $2 and 
$3.  And second, it is a poor and sickly person who would be willing to pay the higher 
price, while it is a wealthy and healthy person who possesses the book and would part 
with it for $2.245  As in Dworkin’s story, a benevolent tyrant now simply takes the book 
from the rich healthy party who values it little, and gratuitously bestows it upon the poor 
sickly party who values it greatly.   
 It might seem a bit odd, of course, that after taking such care to separate out 
distinct features of Dworkin’s original story in his first two stories, precisely in order to 
isolate just what it is that accounts for our reaction to that original story, Sheinman now 
runs things together again.  Both alterations, after all, appear meant to carry us the same 
way.  But Sheiman’s ultimate intention accounts for this:  This story, like it’s 
predecessors, is meant to establish that aggregate welfare maximization is cognizable as a 
good even apart from the fairness of the aggregate’s distribution, so that conflicts 
between spread and size might be possible, such that in turn we might countenance 
                                                 
 244 See Sheinman, supra note 225 at 281.  
 245 The health and wealth distribution in the story effective reverses that in Dworkin’s, which latter 
is a revised version, in Dworkin’s article, of the original story.  (The first rendition did not speak to the 
antecedent distribution of health and wealth.)   
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“tradeoffs” once size grows “really, really” large.  Once again, though, I think that the 
effort falls flat, and we can show why quite quickly by serial reference to the two 
alterations that Sheinman makes to Dworkin’s story.       
 The first alteration, of course, we have in effect treated already:  It was essentially 
Posner’s, recall – which we found to make no ethical difference what ever.246  And in 
light of both (a) the foregoing paragraphs on Sheinman’s first two stories, and (b) the 
discussion in Parts II.D and II.E, it ought to be very clear why.  Assuming for the 
moment that the original owner holds fairly, the taking’s a theft.  And theft by a “really, 
really” desirous thief is still theft.  The theft might seem (illusorily) to be “a good thing” 
by the thief,247 and might even seem more good to him than the same theft would seem to 
the thief who was only “a wee bit” desirous of the stolen good.  But “we” aren’t the thief.  
“We” are a polity devoted among other things to equal treatment of all of us.  And that 
commitment we have seen to entail, in light of our responsible agency and indeed of the 
fuller discussion of Part 3, our equally spreading such resources as none of us is 
responsible for the existence of.  To the degree that we’ve fulfilled that commitment, 
we’ve defined entitlements – hence what counts as thievery – accordingly.  And so 
thievery, no matter how (unjustly) pleased it might render the justice- and us-indifferent 
thief, will just not be cognizable as good to us.  It’s simply stealing from us.  That 
observation feeds into dispatch of Sheinman’s second alteration to Dworkin’s story:       
                                                 
 246 Posner’s spread was yet larger – that between $2 and $3000.  If that one was ethically 
irrelevant, of course, so is the smaller one.  
 247 I say “(illusorily)” for reasons that will be familiar in light of Part II.3 above.  It is that “good” 
must be contrasted with “desirable.”  “Good” means that “we” find it desirable.  It means universally 
desirable in the eyes of a relevant population.  And since we’re speaking here of the ethics of distribution 
over all of us with a right to be considered in policy-making, the relevant population’s the polity.  Compare 
remarks on “welfare” and “well-being” as distinguished from mere “satisfaction” supra, Part II.3.  
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 As with the first alteration, we’ve seen the problem that’s raised by the second 
alteration already.  It is that, without more information, its relevance – and with that its 
ethical force – is entirely indeterminate.  There’s just not enough here to underwrite an 
intuition.  We can see this in Sheinman’s reported intuition itself:  Sheinman says he’s 
conflicted.  On the one hand, he says, there’s a sense in which things are better after the 
taking:  Aggregate welfare is boosted.  We’ve just seen why that can’t be thought good 
yet, to “us.”  But neither can anything be said yet in respect of Sheinman’s other reaction:  
Notwithstanding the sense in which things are better post-taking, he says, things might 
still be thought better, “all things considered,” pre-taking  Why?  Because the taking 
involves a justice-loss, he says.   
 But of course, without more we don’t know that.  For note:  We don’t know why 
the beneficiary of the taking is poor and sickly in this story.  (Perhaps he is responsible 
for his illness, perhaps he is not.)  Nor do we know why the victim of the taking is 
wealthy.  Indeed we do not even know whether the original holder in the story holds 
legally or legitimately.  Absent such information, we know nothing about the justice of 
the transfer.  All we know is that an aggregate has been grown – and that, for reasons 
now many times rehearsed, until we know the justice of holdings in the status quo ante, 
the ethical significance of that aggregate-growth is entirely indeterminate.              
  
 4. “Just Right” & Here’s How: Calabresi 
 I think that something along the lines rehearsed over the foregoing paragraphs – 
more specifically, a variation of the sort I’ll momentarily explain – was and is the 
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position of Calabresi.248  It is a position that Dworkin appears, regrettably if nevertheless 
understandably in view of Calabresi’s occasional idiosyncrasy of expression,249 to have 
misunderstood in assimilating it to Posner’s.  It might also be described as a sort of via 
media, somewhere between (one extreme and ultimately unsustainable interpretation of) 
Dworkin’s and Posner’s positions, if nonetheless closer in fact to (the actual) 
Dworkin’s:250   
 Posner, recall, seems in the 1980s to have taken wealth for the proper collective 
aim.  That’s at least so in the sense that he seems to have considered the singular pursuit 
of WM to afford an appropriate “mix” of other attained values.251  Dworkin, in turn, at 
least on a cursory reading could appear to have taken wealth, as distinguished from WM, 
to be of no social interest at all.  And Calabresi then in effect struck a middle course 
between the extreme Posnerian and erroneously-interpretable-as-extreme Dworkinian 
positions by holding that WM – or in his case, cost-minimization – was indeed a 
compelling social aim, but only as constrained by fairness:  In view of the different logics 
of the two values – WM was teleological, fairness was categorical – the two values were, 
as Calabresi put it, of different “types.”252  They accordingly did not compete, but worked 
in tandem:  One, we might say, was by definition an end worth pursuing; the other was a 
limit on means that could properly be employed in the pursuit.  That accords with 
common sense, of course, as codified in familiar counsels to the effect that ends of course 
                                                 
 248 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1971); 
Guido Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 553 (1980).  
 249 Note that Calabresi titles a recent retrospective discussion of his seminal COSTS, id., 
“Neologisms Revisited.”  They were delightful neologisms, to be sure, but new coinage nonetheless.  See 
infra note 241.  
 250 For reasons that will shortly become apparent, I think that the “middle way” characterization 
might be misleading.  
 251 As seen above, in an unspecified sense and on unspecified grounds.  
 252 CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 241 at 24 n.1. 
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recommend means, but do not themselves always justify them.253  The view is also akin 
to the position that’s emerged over the course of the pages above, though perhaps also 
just a bit (subtly) different in a sense I’ll explain.  
 Calabresi’s treatment of fairness as a “veto” or “constraint” appears to be, if not a 
straightforward outgrowth of commonsense morality, then a consequence of two 
particular features of his understanding of fairness itself.254  The first feature of this 
understanding is its recognition that fairness is, at the very least, lexicographically prior 
to WM.  Fairness is ultimately “more compelling” than efficiency, simply in the sense 
that if conflicts between the two values are so much as possible – “conceptually on the 
cards,” in Dworkin’s idiom – then fairness in all cases straightforwardly “wins.”  It must 
be satisfied “first.”255  (Again, ends do not justify means, they only delimit the rational set 
from which we choose.) 
 The second feature of Calabresi’s understanding of fairness – or “justice,” as he 
also calls it – is that it is an elusive value to characterize affirmatively and 
comprehensively.256  Indeed, Calabresi claims, it is typically easier to recognize an unfair 
outcome as unfair than a fair one as fair.257  If we combine this feature of Calabresian 
fairness – its violation’s being more immediately recognizable than its satisfaction – with 
the first one – its lexicographical priority – it is easy to see why Calabresi would 
                                                 
 253 It also accords, of course, with the rough characterization of jointly operative moralities of 
“aspiration” and “duty” elaborated in LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 3-35 (1964); and with the 
celebrated characterization of “rights as trumps” upon generally permitted teleological pursuits in RONALD  
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).  
 254 These themselves, I should note, seem to be features of commonsense morality.  
 255 CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 241 at 24.  See the second sentence on the page.  
 256 Id.  See third sentence on the page.  At least until further along in the 1970s, that observation 
was a commonplace.  For reasons that are obscure to me it still seems to be commonplace among some 
scholars.  See, e.g., infra Part III.B.   
 257 Id. at 24-25.  See also, in this connection, J. R. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 1 (1980) (first chapter titled 
“Unfair”); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, FACES OF INJUSTICE (1992).  Experimental economists have to some extent 
borne Calabresi out, at least as a matter, again, of commonsense morality.  Unfairness appears to be more 
“salient” – more immediately discerned – than is fairness.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 231.  
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characterize the relation of fairness and wealth in the way that he did:  Fairness is on the 
lookout for unfairness, so to speak.  And then, since fairness trumps wealth, unfairness’s 
being found in a policy will disqualify the policy, at least in comparison to any competing 
policy (any co-member of the rational set) that is not unfair. 
 My conjecture is that this two-fold characteristic of Calabresi’s thinking accounts 
substantially if not entirely for the apparent difference between his position and 
Dworkin’s – an apparent difference which seems to have occasioned some unnecessary 
and in consequence regrettable controversy between the two.258  For insofar as one does 
lack an elaborated affirmative theory of fairness, even if he be Dworkinian at bottom he 
will tend to be Calabresian at the surface.  That’s to say that he will of course suppose 
that “we” wish to minimize “our” truly collectively confronted costs, so long as our doing 
so does not offend the terms of our “collecting,” so to speak – our ethical equality, hence 
fairness.  It is only after working out a satisfactorily fulsome affirmative understanding of 
fairness in a polity whose policies decisively affect the disposition and distribution of 
benefits and burdens, that we are equipped to see that all ethically cognizable aggregate-
maximizing is already – as it were “automatically,” per Parts II.D and II.E above – taken 
care of in our acting collectively to satisfy the proper distribution formula by means of 
the appropriate distribution mechanism. 
 A plenary understanding of the specified sort was not only thought by Calabresi 
to be elusive at the time of his earlier writing:  It seems to have been thought at least 
somewhat so by Dworkin as well at the time of his responsive writing, at least if we read 
                                                 
 258 See Calabresi, Letter, supra note 241; also Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited: Remarks of 
Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 746-47 (2005); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: 
Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1223 n.35 (1991).  
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his call for a theory of “deep equality” at that point quite literally.259  The root difference 
between Dworkin and Calabresi, then, I think is actually that Dworkin for what ever 
reason – perhaps greater confidence or optimism? – was more prepared than Calabresi to 
hazard an effort at that more affirmative, plenary theory of “deep equality.”  And of 
course shortly thereafter, Dworkin indeed supplied at least the rudiments of precisely 
such a theory.260  Part 3 above, I hope, informed both by that and by other developments, 
indicates how to complete and indeed consummate that most worthwhile effort. 
 
B. Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair: Fairness “versus” Welfare 
 
 Recent years have witnessed a revival of some of that heat which the early LE-
foundational debates occasioned.  The prompting occasion in this case is a series of 
articles, followed by a monograph, authored by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.261  
Kaplow and Shavell’s project purports to be meant to displace what the authors call 
“notions of fairness” from policy – including legal – analysis altogether, and to supplant 
commitment to these “notions” with commitment to what they call “welfare.”  Not 
surprisingly, one supposes, in light both of fairness’s centrality to ethical thinking and of 
what most of us take for its relation to welfare itself,262 this proposal has generated a 
good bit of objection, some of it indignant objection.263 
                                                 
 259 Dworkin, supra note 219 at 320.  In light of his immediately subsequent publications, it is 
difficult now not to read Dworkin’s call here as calling for something he either planned or immediately 
afterward decided to supply.  See of course Dworkin, supra note 115.  Note also that Calabresi, in Pointless 
Pareto, supra note 250 at 1224, eleven years later still seems to have been planning to turn to working out 
such a theory.  And there are further hints at such forthcoming work in Neologisms, id. at 746-47.  
 260 Dworkin, id.  
 261 See, in particular, LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto 
Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281 (2991); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of 
Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999).     
 262 See discussion of Calabresi supra Part III.A.  
 263 See, e.g., Symposium on Fairness versus Welfare, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 303 (2003); Jules Coleman, 
The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, Should We All Be Welfare 
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 Upon careful – and in particular, what I have been calling “grammatically 
informed” – examination, however, it is difficult not to conclude that much of the 
controversy is rooted in misunderstanding.  And that misunderstanding, I think, is to be 
laid at the feet of Kaplow and Shavell themselves.  For the foundational material found in 
their monograph and the articles from which it derives is, more than anything else, an 
extended exercise in the misuse of English and the muddling of basic concepts.  One 
consequence, in turn – or is it a cause? – is a truly remarkable misunderstanding of ethics, 
ethical theory and metatheory.  I think we can show this and set things in order through 
simple recourse to the material above at Parts I and II, as well as to Kaplow’s and 
Shavell’s own words – supplemented here and there by a dictionary or thesaurus. 
 Begin, sensibly enough, with the critical terms themselves:  Kaplow and Shavell 
offer two kinds of definition for what they intend to denote by their “notions of 
fairness.”264  One of these is what we might label “negative,” in a sense I shall presently 
explain.  The other’s a bit more “affirmative,” in a sense that I’ll also explain.   
 The negative characterization involves defining the class of “fairness”-actuated 
prescriptions simply as the complement of a putatively different class:  Fairness 
prescriptions are all prescriptions not found in the latter class.  The latter class, in turn, is 
the class of prescriptions entailed by what Kaplow and Shavell call “welfare economics” 
(in part but not whole our WE, so I’ll in some instances call it “Kaplow-Shavellian WE,” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Economists? 101 MICH. L. REV. 979; Daniel Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economists Say About Equity? 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1791 (2003); Marc Fleurbaey et al., Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment 
Violates the Pareto Principle: A Comment, 111 J. POL. ECON. 609 (2003); Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare 
Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002); Joseph William 
Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2002); Howard F. Chang, A 
Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 173 (2000); 
Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L. J. 251 (2000).  
 264 We’ll get to Kaplow-Shavellian “welfare” below.  
 144 
or “KSWE”265):  “Under [KSWE],” Kaplow and Shavell observe, “normative evaluations 
are based on the well-being of individuals,” and “nothing else.”266   
 In light of what we have seen through Parts I and II, the latter characterization is 
apt to leave us scratching our heads.  (It will leave many welfare economists scratching 
their heads as well, as we’ll note below and in the Appendix.)  How can one “base” legal 
and other policy prescriptions upon well-being “and nothing else?”  One cannot answer 
the question, “What should we do?,” by saying no more than, “Welfare,” can he?  
Mustn’t we also say who’s to receive or enjoy that welfare, via what means and in what 
amounts pursuant to what pattern as determined by what principles?  Indeed, didn’t we 
see at Part I both that all legal and policy prescriptions effectively prescribe distributions 
of perceived goods and ills, and accordingly that where these critical – indeed, 
definitional – inputs to well-being are scarce, we must engage in distributive-ethical 
assessment?  And didn’t we then see at Part II that determinate distributive-ethical 
prescriptions, in turn, to prescribe anything at all must be “based” not just on views as to 
what things are to be distributed – like well-being, which is itself either a distribuendum 
or a distribuendum’s byproduct – but also on views as to who or what we are to take our 
distributors, distribuees, distribution formulae, and distribution mechanisms to be?   
 We did.  But let us hear Kaplow and Shavell out a while longer:   
 Kaplow and Shavell familiarly take “well-being” for roughly synonymous with 
“subjective utility,” “welfare,” “preference-satisfaction,” and so on.267  No surprise there.  
                                                 
 265 I’ll explain “for the most part” below.  The short version is that Kaplow and Shavell show 
surprising lack of familiarity – or indeed even awareness – of a quite large and distinguished body of WE 
literature concerned with the economics of … yes, fairness.  See infra note 298.  
 266 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 18.  This might be true of KSWE, which we’ll see 
proves prescriptively empty, but it is not true of any prescriptive WE.  See infra.    
 267 Id.  
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But they also, now more controversially and ultimately more vitiatingly, we’ll see, leave 
what counts as welfare undelimited and indeed unevaluable.  Two closely related respects 
in which they do so will prove relevant for our purposes:   
 Kaplow-Shavellian “well-being” is, first, notwithstanding the ethical ring of the 
terms “welfare” and “well-being,” in no manner ethically delimited:  In the idiom of Part 
II.C above, the “well-being” of thieves is improved, the thieves themselves made “better 
off,” when the thieves manage to steal more goods.  Hence unethical – indeed fairness-
violative – satisfactions enjoy the cover of ethical christening.268  We’ll see below that 
this raises not only ethical problems, but prescriptive determinacy problems as well.269     
 The second sense in which Kaplow-Shavellian “well-being” is undelimited has 
less directly to do with ethics than with determinacy – though again, we’ll see that the 
two difficulties trace down to one:  Kaplow-Shavellian welfare is not stratified or 
insulated against impredicativity or interminable recursion.  Individual preferences 
concerning aggregate preference-satisfaction itself – or, therefore, the distribution of 
preference-satisfactions – are included in the aggregate of distributed preference-
satisfactions.  So social welfare functionals end up, via impredicative self-reference, 
prescriptively empty.  We’ll come back to these interconnected features of Kaplow-
Shavellian “well-being” presently. 
 Now it is clear that this characterization of well-being still leaves us scratching 
our heads as before.  For there is nothing in well-being, thus characterized, to dispel the 
                                                 
 268 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 18-19 (“The only limit on what is included in well-
being is to be found in the minds of individuals themselves, not in the minds of analysts.”)  This proves 
unsurprisingly to lie at the root of the confusions to come.  When unethical preferences receive ethical 
blessing through ethical naming – “welfare,” “well-being” – of course we are set for an ethics (fairness) vs. 
“ethics” (“welfare”) showdown.    
 269 Rather as ethically unfiltered (distribution-indifferent) “wealth” raised prescriptive determinacy 
problems for Posnerian WM as discussed supra, Parts II.E and III.A.  
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puzzlement mentioned several paragraphs up:  How we’re to “base” prescriptions upon 
well-being “and nothing else” when, again, per Part I all legal and policy prescriptions 
have the effect of distributing benefits and burdens, and per Part II any determinate, 
actually followable prescription must prescribe not only what’s to be distributed – 
welfare or some welfare-input – but also by whom and to whom and by what means per 
what formula.  What, then, are Kaplow and Shavell actually recommending? 
 The answer is that they are recommending nothing – quite literally nothing – and 
deep down they know it.  For Kaplow and Shavell, nearly as often as they repeat the 
“well-being and nothing else” mantra, repeat such directly contrary observations as this 
one:  “[B]ecause analysts generally assume that each individual’s well-being affects 
social welfare in a symmetric manner, [WE] is understood to include . . . a requirement 
that individuals count equally in an important sense.”270  But this of course means that 
WE “analysts” take positions on distribution formulae – and in particular, on distribution 
formulae that they take to treat individuals fairly (“equally,” “symmetrically”) – in so 
much as formulating the social welfare functionals on the basis of which they prescribe.  
And that in turn means that they “base” their prescriptions on more than any mere 
distribuendum – like welfare – alone.     
 As if to drive home the point, after first conceding it Kaplow and Shavell go on 
immediately in effect to repeat it.  They do so, in fact, in the very next sentence, though 
curiously treating it here as a “new” point assigned a new paragraph and new number in a 
                                                 
 270 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 26.  Please note the occurrences of the words 
“symmetry” and “equally,” which the authors use profusely throughout their text while studiously avoiding 
these words’ synonym, “fairly.”  More on this below.  The “important sense” of “count[ing] equally” to 
which Kaplow and Shavell refer, incidentally, is the familiar sense that we saw above at Part II.5.1 to 
amount to a mere mistake – the ultimately ethically irrelevant sense in which maximization norms treat 
something akin to foreheads or noses, not persons, equally.  See id. at 25, n16 especially.  But this is not 
our present concern.  It’s simply indicative that this is all simply a warmed-over slice of stale utilitarianism 
if it’s anything at all.    
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putative enumeration of distinct observations:271  “Second, a method of aggregation is of 
necessity an element of [WE], and value judgments are involved in aggregating different 
individuals’ well-being into a single measure of social welfare.”272  That’s a relief to hear.  
But what are such “value judgments?”  They are precisely, by Kaplow and Shavell’s own 
definition – recall, all that is not “welfare and nothing else” – judgments proceeding from 
“notions of fairness.”  And we know from Part II above that they could not fail to be.  
Welfare “exclusively,” as we now know, cannot determine a “method of aggregation.”  
Nor can any other distribuendum determine its own distribution formula.    
 Now as if to close the deal, Kaplow and Shavell admit that “[t]he choice of a 
method of aggregation involves the adoption of a view concerning matters of 
distribution.”273  And finally, we’re told:  “Various methods of aggregation [hence what 
I’m calling distribution formulae] are possible.”274  Bingo.  But this again of course 
means (a) that we must select a method of aggregation, and (b) that we’ll have to make 
“value judgments” concerning distribution – i.e., appeal to “notions of fairness” – in 
selecting from among the various possible methods of aggregation.  The trouble is that 
Kaplow and Shavell keep denying this just as often as they admit it.   
 Now all of this literal nonsense is precisely the sort of trouble that Part II above is 
intended to clear up.  The appeal to a conception of fairness in selecting from various 
possible methods of aggregation will amount to none other than determining what vector 
of distribuee-construal, distribuendum, distribution formula and distribution mechanism 
                                                 
 271 I think that this repetition of one point as if it were two points is simply another symptom of the 
authors’ comprehensive conceptual confusion.  They’ve simply not sorted things out or achieved order in 
their thinking.  The present paper’s in part meant to show how to arrive at such order.   
 272 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 26, emphasis mine. 
 273 Id., emphasis again mine.  
 274 Id., emphasis again mine.  
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best coheres with our overall distributive ethic, or “isoquant” as I’ve called it by way of 
analogy.  To admit that we must make that determination and at the same time suggest 
that we can effect it by appeal to welfare “and nothing else” is a bit like agreeing that we 
all must get dressed, then running triumphantly out through the door wearing only one 
sock.  It isn’t helpful; it’s self-defeating.  And let us be clear about the incoherence at 
work here:  The point is not that there’s an occasional mis-statement that stands in some 
tension with some later mis-statement.  The incoherence is unremitting, it runs through 
the whole work quite incessantly.  Indeed it’s constitutive of the Kaplow-Shavellian 
project itself.  It is the project.275   
 The point’s only further borne out by Kaplow and Shavell’s continual use of 
sundry cognate forms of the words “symmetry” and “reciprocity” throughout their 
monograph.276  On anyone’s reckoning, these words are synonyms for – yes, “fairness.”  
Indeed, as we noted above at Parts II.D and II.E, “fairness” even in nontechnical parlance 
consistently connotes equal treatment, albeit always within the bounds of some practice 
the purpose of which determines what counts as “treatment.”  To treat fairly is to treat as 
identical in respect of that characteristic which the practice takes or defines to be salient.  
Common synonyms of “fairness” accordingly include, unsurprisingly: “equity,” 
“impartiality,” “even-handedness,” “disinterestedness,” and the like.277  Fair persons, 
processes and distributions are in turn commonly said, again unsurprisingly, to be 
                                                 
 275 For formal treatment of the incoherence I am discussing, with generalization to cognate cases, 
see Robert Hockett, The Impossibility of a Prescriptive Paretian (2006) (working paper, under review).  
 276 See, e.g., the half-page of page-cites under “symmetrical/reciprocal contexts” in the book’s 
index, id. at 539-40.  Likewise the half page of page-cites under “distribution” and “distributive,” id. at 
517-18.  
 277 See cite to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at Part II.5, supra note 142.  See also, e.g., DOUBLEDAY 
ROGET’S THESAURUS 243 (Sidney I. Landau ed., 1977).    
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“unbiased,” “just,” “equitable,” and so on.278  Technical usage straightforwardly tracks 
ordinary usage:  Synonyms in this case include not only such as I’ve here enumerated, 
but additionally such terms as “symmetry,” “reciprocality,” and the like – to which, 
again, Kaplow and Shavell themselves have unceasing recourse even while studiously 
avoiding use of those words’ widely used synonym, “fairness,” in any but an 
unrecognizable pejorative sense.   
 None of these words or phrases, it apparently cannot be emphasized enough, 
connotes anything one way or the other about welfare or well-being conceived as 
unfiltered preference-satisfaction or anything else.  Nor, of course, could they.  For as 
ought to be plain after Part II if ordinary grammar alone weren’t enough, fairness is, 
again, a property of distributions – what I’ve called a distribution formula.  And welfare 
is an object of distributions or the byproduct of such object – what I’ve been calling a 
distribuendum.  One can treat others equally, equitably, impartially, even-handedly, 
disinterestedly, unbiasedly, justly, symmetrically and so on with respect to what ever she 
bestows upon them, be that welfare, illfare, actions or items from which welfare or illfare 
are derived, or anything else.   
 Kaplow and Shavell appear obliquely to realize that there is great oddity in all of 
their talk against “fairness” and “notions of fairness” on the one hand and for 
“symmetry,” “value judgments,” and distributive normativity on the other.  That is to say 
that they recognize not only that their claims risk committing them to prescriptive 
indeterminacy, but also that their claims are jointly incoherent.  They register this 
awareness first in a footnote, then re-register it in a subsection-closing paragraph 
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immediately following the footnote, while then going on in each case to attempt, quite 
amusingly, to defuse it.  The footnote provides all we need.  It reads in pertinent part: 
Throughout this book, we refer to [WE] as employing measures of 
social welfare that depend only on individuals’ well-being.  What we 
mean by this expression is that, once a social welfare function is 
chosen (that is, once a judgment about aggregation is made, see note 
15), any two policies can be compared using only information about 
how each policy affects individuals’ well-being.  We note that there is 
some potential for confusion about our statement that social welfare 
depends only on well-being because of the very fact that one needs a 
method of aggregating information about individuals’ well-being in 
order to make an overall assessment.  In this sense, the evaluations 
under [WE] do not depend purely on the data (facts) about individuals’ 
well-being.279  
 
 Indeed.  But what is exceedingly strange here is that Kaplow and Shavell 
effectively void their entire project with this remark and its succeeding remark (to which 
I’ll return), yet oddly appear either not to recognize it or unwilling to admit it.  (Perhaps 
that is why the fullest statement of the point is relegated to a footnote.)  There is not 
merely “some potential” for “confusion.”  The potential is fully realized – again, 
unremittingly and constitutively, throughout the whole project.  And the confusion – or 
rather, again, full-blown incoherence – is no one’s but their own.  They own it, it’s theirs.  
Why repeat, over and over and over, that what one calls WE is, and that LE ought to be, 
concerned “only with information bout individuals’ well-being,” when one recognizes 
and admits quite expressly that it must be concerned also – and indeed at least as 
crucially, since all policy rides on its shape – with information concerning the character 
of the correct social welfare functional, hence the correct distribution formula?  
 As best I can tell, the only diagnosis on offer for this strange case of aphasia is 
some manner of confusion about what one is doing in formulating a social welfare 
                                                 
 279 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 27-28 n. 23, first emphasis in original, second one – 
“not” – supplied.  
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functional – or, in the words of note 15 incorporated by reference in the just-quoted 
passage, making “a judgment about aggregation.”  That confusion itself is perhaps 
rooted, in turn, in failure to appreciate (a) the interformulability of equalization and 
maximization formulae discussed above at Part II.D.3; and more generally (b) the equal 
semantic or cognitive status, so to speak, of all of the distributive grammar-opened 
variables – the need to fill all of them at once before one can prescribe or describe 
anything prescribable-about at all – that Part II as a whole is intended to convey.  For in 
the remainder of the footnote I’m citing, after conceding that WE does not, after all, 
concern itself solely with “data about individuals’ well-being,” Kaplow and Shavell go 
on to say that “[their] contrast with notions of fairness, however, concerns the data 
themselves.”280  But what could that mean?   
 Kaplow and Shavell speak as if the repetition of such phrases as “the data 
themselves” (at other points they use the word “information”) were sufficient to 
underwrite some salient contrast.  It is as if the referenced “data” were data in some 
fundamental or normatively relevant sense radically distinct from that in which data 
concerning the appropriate or chosen mode of aggregation hence distribution is.     
 Now if by “data” the authors mean nothing more than what I mean by 
“distribuendum” – which might be the case given the way in which the term 
“information,” which Kaplow and Shavell use as a synonym for “data,” typically figures 
into the WE literature281 – then there is indeed at least a categorical distinction, as I’ve 
indeed been at pains to emphasize over the course of this paper.  But in that case, as we 
also have seen, there simply is no capacity in the context of the quote for a relevant 
                                                 
 280 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 28, n 23 carryover.  
 281 See, in particular, Sen as cited at Part II.C.1, supra note 79, where this now canonical use of the 
term appears to have originated.  
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“contrast” with “fairness,” which names a distribution formula not a distribuendum.  
Objects and patterns of distribution do not compete in prescription, they’re jointly 
required to complete any prescription – including that made through a maximization-form 
social welfare functional.  And certainly no one to my knowledge ever has recommended 
“distributing” a “notion of fairness” itself, which is what would have to be in the offing 
for Kaplow and Shavell intelligibly to contrast it with welfare as “datum” in the 
distribuendum sense.   
 If, on the other hand, Kaplow and Shavell do not mean by “data” simply my 
“distribuendum,” but instead mean roughly what I mean by “variable opened by 
distributive case grammar,”282 then they are no better off.  For there is no ethically 
relevant, cognitive or foundational distinction at all between “data” or “information” 
concerning the distribuenda that a distributive ethic takes for salient and “data” or 
“information” concerning what aggregation rules or distribution formulae that ethic 
settles upon.  This too ought to be clear after Part II above.  The distribution-constitutive 
variables are indeed all interdependent, as we have seen, in jointly constituting an overall 
distributive ethic.283  But no one of them alone is uniquely determinative of all of the rest.  
                                                 
 282 And what else they could mean if not this or distribuendum?   
 283 Note that Kaplow and Shavell eschew committing to such an overall ethic.  See KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 27 (claiming “not [to] endorse any particular view about the proper distribution 
of well-being or income.”).  Were they so to commit, then it would at least have been open to them to avoid 
nonsense in committing to welfare as distribuendum and in so doing claim to be committing against 
fairness as distribution principle.  I can’t see how it would be plausible, but at least one could imagine its 
not being syntactically nonsensical.  For one could argue, by reference to an overall distributive ethic – 
what I’ve called a “distributive isoquant” – that one variable’s valuation, at least in conjunction with others, 
might as constrained by the isoquant rule out another variable’s proposed valuation.  This is what I alluded 
to earlier at note 14.  Note that, in light of the grammatical observation that animates this paper – that one 
must fill all of the variables, including the distribution formula variable, in order to claim anything at all – 
if they really intend not to endorse any view about proper distribution Kaplow and Shavell cannot 
responsibly endorse any particular view about welfare either.   
 Note that there’s cognate confusion afoot in Kaplow and Shavell’s attempt to quarantine another 
problem that their inattention to distributive valence grammar occasions: their incapacity, given the one 
value of a distributive grammar-opened variable to which they confine themselves – welfare, for the 
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If the Kaplow-Shavellian “analyst” casts her prescriptions in maximizing form, as we 
saw at Part II.D.5, she’ll describe the maximandum in one way.  If she holds the same set 
of distributive-ethical commitments but casts her prescriptions in equalizing form, she’ll 
describe the equalisandum in another way.  But in both cases – and this is the critical 
point – she will do so to yield the same distributive output, the same “isoquant,” which 
itself is the product of her inevitably multivariate distributive-ethical commitment.   
 Now all of this means, of course, that any particular distribuendum-
characterization or distribution formula-formulation is in a certain sense arbitrary.  It is as 
arbitrary as Kaplow and Shavell’s own self-limitation, registered and indeed emphasized 
by the authors themselves in the passage cited above, to “once [that is, after] a social 
welfare function is chosen.”  For there’s no reason to restrict one’s attention in this way, 
at least it we are in effect inquiring at “square one” as to what our mode of policy 
assessment is to be, hence what our distributive ethic entails.  And especially if one 
claims to be purging all recourse to “notions of fairness.”  One does not choose a social 
welfare functional merely at random.  One chooses that functional – including its shape 
i.e. aggregation rule i.e. distribution formula – by reference to reasons.  Those reasons in 
                                                                                                                                                 
distribuendum variable – to say anything at all about how we should delimit or construe the class of 
distribuees.  At KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 26 n.19, we’re told that “a complete account of 
social welfare” will “address questions about membership in the group of individuals whose utilities are to 
be aggregated,” then told that the subject is “beyond the scope of [their] inquiry.”  Yet we’re then assured 
nonetheless that the “difference between evaluative principles that are denominated solely in terms of well-
being and principles that are based in whole or in part on other factors” will be “qualitatively similar 
regardless of how these other questions are answered.”  That of course is not simply untrue; it is incapable 
of being true and it is indeed difficult to see how anyone could think it true save by not even so much as 
having considered how the distributive variables might inter-relate, let alone having so much as begun to 
attempt to work out a full social ethic.  For of course the same general set of value considerations to which 
one will appeal in attempting to address the question of who the distribuees are will figure into one’s 
attempt to address what should be distributed to them and what pattern or formula should characterize the 
distribution.  That’s of course another way of saying that something which meets Kaplow and Shavell’s 
peculiar definition of “notions of fairness,” not to mention that of “value judgment” which they admit to 
bear upon the choice of aggregation rule, will figure into the valuation of all of the variables, not simply 
one or all but one.       
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turn can of course not themselves be “individual welfare and nothing else,” because the 
very question with which we’re concerned in selecting the functional is what weight to 
accord – i.e., how to distribute – particular satisfactions, pursuant to what ethical criteria.  
And so the choice of the functional itself is inevitably carried out pursuant to, by Kaplow 
and Shavell’s own definition, a “notion of fairness.”     
 The only thing that is entirely nonarbitrary in elaborating a distributive ethic, then, 
is the “full package” – what we have called the distributive isoquant, so to speak, that is 
our full set of distributive-ethical commitments.  And that means in turn that there is no 
normatively important or otherwise fundamental distinction to be drawn or appealed to 
between information or data concerning what is distributed on the one hand, information 
or data concerning how it is distributed on the other.  All such information simply is 
valuation of open distributive case grammar variables, all of which must be filled before 
anything can be prescribed at all.  And so, to note again what we’ve noted above, in 
proposing the filling of but one of the six distributive variables, which in their case takes 
the form of taking no position as to the appropriate aggregation rule, Kaplow and Shavell 
prescribe literally nothing, nothing at all.       
 It follows from all of this that in a certain sense all of the remainder of Kaplow 
and Shavell’s monograph is, at best, quite unmotivated by the would-be foundational 
discussion of the book’s first part.  For the first part, being quite literally empty so far as 
recognizable description and determinate prescription go, can offer literally no guidance 
at all in respect of tort, contract, procedure or “law enforcement” – the substantive topics 
of the second part.284  At best the first part entails the second in but the trivial manner of 
                                                 
 284 Kaplow and Shavell’s favorite betes noir appear to be corrective justice as a theory of tort law, 
promissory obligation as a theory of contract, and retributive justice as a theory of criminal punishment.  To 
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material implication – the manner in which literally anything and everything is implied 
by the null set.285  That yields an interesting consequence from the point of view of 
distribution mechanisms as discussed above at Part II.E:  In prescribing nothing, and in 
thus being incapable of saying anything helpful in the way of evaluating actual legal rules 
and policies, Kaplow and Shavell’s foundational material is fully as mechanism-
indeterminate as we saw crude utilitarianism, Rawlsian justice theory and traditional 
normative LE above to be.  (Indeed it is yet further from determinacy.)  We can say 
nothing about what a regime that conformed to Kaplow-Shavellian tastes would look 
like.  Nor, yet more poignantly, can Kaplow and Shavell.   
 I should turn now, however briefly, to Kaplow and Shavell’s attempt at a more 
“affirmative” characterization of what they call “notions of fairness,” to which I promised 
before to return.  For this characterization flows directly out of the follow-up remark 
disclaiming their own incoherence that I noted before to succeed the block-quoted 
footnote devoted to the same end.  It also nicely brings forth some additional ethical-
theoretic confusions, some of them seemingly more widespread than those I’ve been 
covering, that result from insufficient attention to distributive grammar:   
 Immediately following the block-quoted footnote, Kaplow and Shavell close this 
full section of their monograph, and thus all of the puzzling discussion just discussed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
comment upon what they have to say about these bodies of thought will not be to present purposes, but we 
can say at least two things without being led too far afield.  First, that any prescription in respect of tort, 
contract or criminal law will stem just as fully from a Kaplow-Shavellian “notion of fairness” as do 
prescriptions stemming from corrective justice, promissory obligation or retributive justice theories; they’ll 
simply be different “notions of fairness.”  That’s clear from what we have said in the foregoing paragraphs.  
Second, Kaplow and Shavell’s criticisms of the promissory theory of contracts in particular, which sound in 
the familiar language of efficient breach, both (a) unsurprisingly neglect such considerations as those 
adduced supra, Part II.E.2 in connection with distribution mechanisms, and (b) manifest confusion similar 
to Sen’s in connection with autonomy rights as discussed infra, note 284 and accompanying text.     
 285 For again, as we’ve seen repeatedly now, no basis from which legal or policy assessment might 
proceed does not incorporate one or more “notions of fairness” per the authors’ own definition and 
characterization.  And indeed nothing could ever be prescribed without such incorporating.  Yet more on 
this below.   
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with a paragraph which repeats their admission that “there may appear some tension 
between [their] accepting the legitimacy of distributive judgments within [WE] and 
[their] criticizing notions of fairness, particularly since many views about distribution are 
expressed using the language of fairness.”286  They go on to assure us, however, that “[i]n 
fact . . . there is no tension because of the manner in which we define notions of fairness 
for purposes of this inquiry.”  In fact that is false, as we’ve seen:  For it is precisely what 
we have called Kaplow and Shavell’s “negative” definition of “notions of fairness” that 
produces their incoherence.  But it happens that the “affirmative” characterization of 
“notions of fairness,” to which the authors immediately turn upon offering the just-quoted 
assurance, doesn’t help either.  In fact it just makes matters worse.  For unlike the 
“negative” characterization, which deprives Kaplow and Shavell of the capacity to 
prescribe, this one reveals that there’s no defined class of “analysts” against whom they’d 
like to prescribe.  Watch:       
 Kaplow and Shavell’s first affirmative characterization of “notions of fairness” is 
as bearing “problematic aspects of meaning.”287  It’s far from clear what, or whom, they 
might mean.  We’re told that “analysts often use words like ‘fairness’ without defining 
them.”288  But Kaplow and Shavell name no such “analysts.”  They simply cite 
Bentham’s and Sidgwick’s (both of course utilitarians) having leveled similar conclusory 
                                                 
 286 The “particularly” and “many” here of course constitute gross understatement.  As likely is 
clear in view of the thesaurus cite just above if it wasn’t clear before that, not merely “many,” but virtually 
all “views about distribution” are expressed using “the language of fairness.”  Concern with distribution in 
nearly all cases just is concern with fairness.  The only exception, if such it be, is the case of the income-
equalizers mentioned above at Part II.D.3 who have advocated equalization in the name of maximization in 
light of the diminishing marginal utility of income.  
 287 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 45.  
 288 Id.  
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accusations at again unnamed persons over a century ago.289  Nor do Kaplow and Shavell 
say anything as to why they think the term “fairness” sufficiently intuitively unclear as to 
require defining in what ever unnamed context they have in mind.  And as we’ve noted 
above, dictionaries, thesauri, ordinary folk and “analysts” alike all seem quite clear about 
“fair”’s connoting equal treatment, impartiality, lack of bias, and so on:  They employ the 
term, that is, rather as Kaplow and Shavell use the terms “symmetrical” and “reciprocal” 
– all while typically expatiating much more than do Kaplow and Shavell on those latter 
two terms.   
 It might also be true that some specific analyst or analysts whom Kaplow and 
Shavell have actually in mind often are “incomplete” in their elaborations of the 
principles that they have in mind, including as to the scope of those principles’ 
application.290  Or it might be that some such analyst or analysts have failed to specify 
how they propose to resolve conflicts between apparently conflicting values, as Kaplow 
and Shavell accuse.291  But who ever it might be who is guilty of these charges is unlikely 
to have been less complete than are Kaplow and Shavell themselves in claiming first that 
value judgment is necessary in determining an aggregation rule in prescriptive WE, then 
that they will not defend any specific way of aggregating.292   
                                                 
 289 Id. at 45-46 n.60.  They cite the posthumous 1907 edition of Sidgwick’s Methods.  They also 
cite Jim Henderson’s 1991 empirical study of judicial reliance on public policy rationales in products 
liability decisions.  But of course here the concern is not with whether “notions of fairness” bear 
“problematic aspects of meaning,” but with whether judges in penning decisions appeal intuitively to 
fairness considerations or instead present comprehensive analytical accounts of fairness which they then 
apply.  Not surprisingly, of course, it turns out that they do the former.  One wonders how many judicial 
opinions include comprehensive accounts of “the concept of well-being.”     
 290 See id. at 46.  
 291 Id. at 46, including at n.61.  Now the cite is to the conclusory claim of another 19th Century 
utilitarian who names no offending “analyst,” Mill, and to a quite incontestable and, regrettably, irrelevant 
observation by Hardin to the effect that conflicts between rights are difficult to resolve absent appeal to a 
prior principle according to which to resolve such conflicts.       
 292 Id. at 26-27.  
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 It also seems unlikely that any analyst – again if any such there be – will be any 
less “specific” about “how to resolve conflicts between values”293 than are Kaplow and 
Shavell.  For in declining to take any position as to the appropriate method of aggregation 
that must be embedded in any multivariate social welfare functional, of course, Kaplow 
and Shavell avoid precisely the place where such conflicts will tend to turn up.  Again, 
then, it is simply obscure – entirely obscure – what Kaplow and Shavell can mean by 
“meaning problems” in their stab at more affirmatively defining what ever it is they 
intend to single out with their “notions of fairness.”   
 There is also, I’d be remiss not to note, a remarkable irony here.  For there is a 
vast, vast WE literature on fairness, fairness by name, in which indeed the term itself 
figures both prominently and precisely.294  It is much more than puzzling that two self-
proclaimed “welfare economists” could devote book and articles to attacks upon 
“fairness” and “notions of fairness” without so much as once registering so little as the 
existence of this vast, distinguished, and indeed growing literature.  And it is more 
bizarre still that this should happen in a monograph that’s unsparing in its repetitive 
chastisement of LE practitioners for restricting attention to none but an over-narrow slice 
of WE.295   
 The second affirmative characteristic that Kaplow and Shavell attribute to 
“notions of fairness” is no more helpful in singling anything out than was the first.  It is 
                                                 
 293 Id.  
 294 See, e.g., cites to Baumol, Daniel, Foley, Pazner, Schmeidler, Thomson, Varian, etc., supra 
note 167.  None of this literature is mentioned or so much as cited in the work of Kaplow and Shavell – 
rather an ironic lacuna, “to say the least,” in light of (a) its canonical stature in the WE literature, (b) its 
being overtly – indeed by name – concerned with fairness, and (c) Kaplow’s and Shavell’s lamentation 
over some LE practitioners’ misunderstandings or misrepresentations of WE at various points in KAPLOW 
& SHAVELL, supra note 261.  See, in particular, id. at 28-38.   
 295 See supra note 294.  
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these “notions”’ putatively “nonconsequentialist character.”296  This one too is of obscure 
meaning, at least as used by the authors; and again, by now unsurprisingly, no “analyst” 
or approach is named as exemplar.297  “Consequentialism” is of course ordinarily taken to 
designate a particular attribute of fully elaborated ethical theories – specifically, their 
judging deeds, rules or policies by reference to the outcomes that the latter do or are 
thought likely to yield.298  Fairness, of course, is as analytically independent of and 
applicable within that orientation as it is of distribuenda and to specific distributive 
outcomes.  Just as any distribuendum – wealth or welfare, for example – can be 
distributed fairly or unfairly, and just as any distribution can be a fair or an unfair 
distribution, any consequence can be fair or unfair, depending simply upon how affected 
parties who are ethical equals are in fact (consequentially) treated – viz., symmetrically 
(equally, fairly) or asymmetrically (unequally, unfairly).   
 Indeed if anything fairness as an attribute appears to be more readily applicable in 
evaluating consequences than what ever it is that might be thought ought be evaluated 
instead of consequences.299  And in fact when the latter, what ever they be, are evaluated 
for their fairness it seems more than likely that the evaluation will actually be 
                                                 
 296 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 47.  
 297 Nor, now, are any 18th or 19th Century utilitarians or others cited as having made similar 
conclusory remarks.  
 298 The term originates with Anscombe.  See G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 
PHIL. 1 (1958).  Consequentialist ethical systems typically are understood by contrast to such alternatives as 
“virtue ethics” and Kantian “deontology.”  I’m ultimately inclined to doubt the usefulness of these 
distinctions or this taxonomy, but that is a concern that need not presently detain us.  
 299 We do not, for example, typically judge one’s virtues – her temperance, her courage, her 
charity, etc. – as fair or unfair.  We do not typically judge one’s Kantian “good will” as fair or unfair.  We 
presumably might deem the distributive circumstances that partly account for one’s development of these 
virtues as fair or unfair.  And we presumably might find that people who have developed such virtues or 
wills are more ready to acquit themselves fairly and to seek or advocate for fair distributive outcomes.  For 
indeed it is typically decent people who are more apt to be fair and affirm fairness.  But neither “we” 
generally nor “we” analysts typically engage in such forms of inquiry.  Instead we employ the category of 
fairness to judge distributions of resources, deficits, welfare and illfare more generally.  And that is what 
just about everyone does.  
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transparently parasitic upon the fairness status of consequences:  It is difficult to imagine, 
for example, within the renascent “virtue ethics” tradition, how the oft-cited virtue of 
justice might be attributed to anyone without reference to her tendency (a) to treat others 
fairly and (b) will that others treat them fairly – hence to will and to work toward fair  
consequences.  All of this should be clear in light of Part II.D.5 above. 
 The third and final feature that Kaplow and Shavell attribute affirmatively to 
“notions of fairness” is an alleged “ex post character.”300  This attribution is as mystifying 
as the attributed “nonconsequentialist character.”  Indeed it is moreso, once the latter has 
been attributed, since to attribute both characteristics at once is akin to attributing “round-
squaredness” – to attribute, that is, again incoherently.301  As with distribuenda and 
consequences, however, the ex ante / ex post divide is quite analytically independent of 
the divide between fairness and other proposed distribution principles.  One can adjudge 
distributions following some action or event – hence ex post – fair or unfair.  And one can 
judge contemplated actions – ex ante – as right or wrong, better or worse by reference to 
the fairness of their reasonably anticipated distributive consequences.   
 There is one sense, however, in which the commitment to fairness does in fact 
incline one to favoring one of the terms in the ex post / ex ante divide.  And, ironically, 
the orientation that fairness inclines one to favor is precisely the ex ante rather than the ex 
post – while fixating on welfare in isolation from fairness actually inclines one to think 
more in ex post terms:  Recall that, as observed above at Part II.D, concern with fair 
distribution, as most straightforwardly operationalized in the opportunity-egalitarian 
                                                 
 300 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 48.  
 301 See id. at 48-49, where again-unnamed “analysts” who employ “notions of fairness” are said to 
tend to “focus on outcomes” – i.e., consequences – and the “situational character of events” (that last 
phrase obscure and left unelaborated).    
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distribution formula, fixes on that distribuendum which is distributed directly to active 
distribuees prior to their acting – viz., material opportunity – when the actual 
distributing’s done.  By contrast, it is precisely when one ignores (a) the natures of 
distribuees – their actively fate-forging, responsible agential characters – and (b) the 
fairness of the distribution of what actually can be literally distributed – resources, 
wealth, material opportunity – that one tends to fixate upon ex post welfare levels 
considered apart from distribuees’ role in producing their own welfare.   
 Kaplow and Shavell of course miss all of this precisely because they dodge all the 
thinking that must go into fashioning an aggregation rule for the social welfare functional 
– precisely that place where all of the action is in an actually worked-out distributive 
ethic when the latter is formulated within the traditional maximization-form apparatus of 
Bergson-Samuelson WE.  And they duck that thinking, I believe, again precisely in 
owing to a failure to see that to think at all about inevitably resource-distributive rules or 
policies – to harbor real thoughts, cognitively complete propositions – one must fill all of 
the distributive variables.  You’re simply not dressed when you’re wearing one sock. 
 I’d like now to wrap-up discussion of Kaplow and Shavell’s stillborn project first 
by returning to the earlier-mentioned intimate link between the nullity of their set of 
“notions of fairness” on the one hand, their unfiltered conception of well-being on the 
other; then by remarking upon something more general that their efforts show about the 
broader family of well-known impossibility theorems to which Kaplow and Shavell take 
themselves for contributing.  For it happens that these matters all hang together, and 
moreover that closing with them serves quite nicely to chart future worthwhile efforts. 
 162 
 Kaplow and Shavell’s unwillingness to delimit what can count as welfare is both 
a product of their broader prescriptive indeterminacy – their failure to fill all, or indeed 
even more than but one, of what I have been calling the distributive variables – and in 
turn a guarantor of yet more indeterminacy.  The sense in which it is a product of their 
broader indeterminacy is this:  As soon as we see that we must fill-in all of the 
distributive variables to prescribe determinately at all, we see that we must take a position 
in respect of the appropriate distribution formula – or, in Kaplow Shavell’s preferred 
apparatus, of the aggregation rule that shapes the social welfare functional.  But as soon 
as we do that – and it’s surprising that anyone wouldn’t see this – we have in the very act 
delimited “welfare:”  We have taken a position as to what can count as welfare.  For any 
preference that is effectively a preference against the distribution formula (or aggregation 
rule) itself will perforce be a preference that is not honorable by, hence not cognizable as 
welfare rather than mere un- or anti-ethical preference by, the ethic to which that formula 
gives expression.302     
 An example might help to clarify:  I spoke before, both at Part II.C.2 and at the 
beginning of the present subsection, of the thief’s having succeeded in more thievery’s 
not being prescriptively cognizable as an improvement in the thief’s well-being.  Rather, 
I suggested, the thief is no more than “more satisfied.”  It is both false and corruptive, I 
noted, to afford the theft ethical sanction – the ethical sanction that comes with the 
ineluctably norm-laden terms “welfare” and “well-being” themselves.  But this itself 
indicates precisely the sense in which the definitions of “welfare” and “well-being” must 
be formulated by reference to a view as to what is the appropriate distribution formula.  
                                                 
 302 This is of course, per discussion throughout Part II, a sense in which it will not be cognizable as 
welfare by “us,” the polity in whose name the distributive ethic prescribes. 
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For it is precisely that formula which determines each person’s rightful share – what each 
person properly holds.  And so it is precisely that formula which determines what counts 
as “thievery” – the expropriation of others’ rightful holdings as determined by our 
distributive ethic.   
 There is no way to distinguish welfare or well-being – things that “we” 
appropriately, collectively, are ethically required to honor – from the broader sphere of 
mere ethically neutral or indeed ethics-antagonistic preference-satisfaction, without 
preference-filtering.  Filtering’s simply to fence out the un- or anti-ethical satisfactions 
from that broader class of satisfactions which “we” jointly honor.  And to determine a 
satisfactory filter, in turn, which is simply to determine which preferences aren’t ethical, 
aren’t rightful claims cognizable by “us” – ethics’s subjects – just is to determine a 
satisfactory distribution formula – i.e., the precise expression of a conception of 
fairness.303  It is precisely that conception which not only determines the distribution 
formula hence aggregation rule, but also converts the mere “is” of brute preference to the 
“ought” of collective prescriptive obligation.   
 The sense in which Kaplow and Shavell’s ethically unfiltered “well-being” 
underwrites further – now more than ethical alone – indeterminacy is this:  Because they 
are grammatically unable to do without a distribution formula in order to prescribe at all, 
and because they evidently sense this dimly at some “level of consciousness,” Kaplow 
                                                 
 303 Kaplow and Shavell, in defending their unwillingness to distill unfiltered preferences into 
filtered well-being, attack some of the literature on objectionable and “external” preferences, which 
typically are characterized either as preferences to inflict suffering – so-called sadistic preferences – or as 
preferences in respect of others’ welfare – so-called “external” or “other-regarding” preferences.  I think 
that much, though far from all, of the literature on objectionable preferences of those forms is nearly as 
confused as are Kaplow and Shavell themselves.  And I think it is so precisely because it attempts to 
unpack “objectionability” without view to distribution formulae, rather as Kaplow and Shavell themselves 
neglect to think about how distribution formula always perforce partition preferences that are socially 
cognizable “oughts” on the one hand, mere brute “is”’s on the other.      
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and Shavell of course find themselves forced to smuggle distributive prescription back 
into their picture via distribuees’ individual welfare functions themselves – as what they 
bizarrely call “tastes for notions of fairness.”304  But to render fairness a “taste” rather 
than an external limit upon precisely which tastes are to be collectively – i.e., ethically – 
honored is not only violative of distributive ethics’s logical form (recall the early 
Posner’s puzzling use of the word “sensibilities” rather than, say, “prohibitions” against 
slavery in the previous subsection).305  It also renders pseudo-ethical prescription on the 
basis of such “tastes” recursively impredicative and thus indeterminate – again 
prescriptive of nothing at all.   
 Once more a simple example might prove helpful:  Render my individual 
satisfaction function thus:  u(x, y, z …), where “u” denotes my satisfaction and “x, y, z 
…” denote sundry particular determinants of my satisfaction – i.e., inputs into my 
satisfaction function.  Render the social welfare functional, in turn, thus:  U(u1, u2, … un), 
where “U” denotes the social welfare aggregate and “u1, u2, … un” denote the satisfaction 
levels of all the n members of the society in question, aggregated – hence distributed – 
pursuant to some aggregation rule.   
 Now suppose that I hold mere “preferences” in respect of the correct distribution 
formula hence the correct aggregation rule, rather than that that formula determines 
which of my preferences might plausibly underwrite obligations of general application, 
ethically to be honored by “us.”  The only would-be ethical significance of the 
distribution formula vis a vis me, that is, is not the ethical equality – the fairness – with 
                                                 
 304 This truly deranged locution turns up quite frequently.  See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 
261 at 540 for a list of entries.  The earlier occurrences found through Part 1 of the monograph appear 
meant to assure us that WE indeed makes room for distributional concern.    
 305 See supra Part III.A. 
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which it treats me, or the way in which it reflects a collective judgment about which of 
my preferences treats my compatriots as equals – i.e., treats them fairly – but simply its 
effect upon my “satisfaction.”  Suppose also that I am, of course, one of the members of 
the society all of whose “u”’s are to be aggregated per the aggregation rule and then 
maximized.  And call my satisfaction function “ume.”  Then my satisfaction function will 
be characterizable thus:  ume(x, y, z …U(u1, u2, u3 …ume)).  Ignoring extraneous – non 
“me” – inputs for the moment, my satisfaction function will of course be expressible, in 
pertinent part, thus:  ume(U(ume)).  That’s to say that my welfare’s a function of social 
welfare which is a function of my welfare, which is a function of social welfare which is 
a function of my welfare, which …306   
 You get the idea.  There’s little point in going on with this empty shell game.  The 
whole project has misunderstood the structure of prescription – its grammar, so to speak 
– from the start.  Hence it has misunderstood the category-structured relation that subsists 
between, among other pairs, distribuenda like well-being on the one hand and distribution 
formula like fairness on the other.  It misunderstands that these are, to recur to Calabresi 
                                                 
 306 A variation on the problem here would be that in which I perversely derive satisfaction from 
social disutility.  Rendering the prefix “dis” as “¬,” we would have  ume(¬U(ume)).  See generally Robert 
Hockett, Recursive Social Welfare Functions (2006) (working paper).  The examples I’ve mentioned here 
amount merely to particularly simple cases of the more general phenomenon that goes by the name of 
“interdependent utilities” in the economic literature on altruism and the family.  See, seminally, Robert A. 
Pollak, Interdependent Preferences, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 309 (1976); also Theodore C. Bergstrom, Systems 
of Benevolent Utility Functions, 1 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 71 (1999). The trouble that interdependent 
utilities present WE stems from their posing multidimensional fixed point problems, which, if not solved, 
leave either multiple (indeed infinitely multiple) or no solutions to the optimization problems that are WE’s 
stock in trade.  The challenge is typically circumvented in the literature by assuming contraction, in 
particular so-called “p-contraction,” a property whose most straightforward intuitive interpretation is as 
entailing that agents weight their own welfares more heavily than they weight others’.  See, e.g., Gary 
Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974).  Contraction is widely appreciated 
as empirically implausible in many contexts, if not indeed most (saving, perhaps, in the case of some 
economists).  And it is not available as a solution to Kaplow and Shavell in any event because reliance 
upon it renders the solubility of maximization problems contingent upon empirical accident – something 
that Kaplow and Shavell view as disqualifying.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness 
Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L. J. 237 (2000).    
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as discussed in the previous subsection, of different “types.”  They are so just as u and x 
in the formulation of my satisfaction function, or U and u1 in the formulation of the social 
welfare functional, or indeed nouns, verbs and adjectives more generally, or subjects and 
predicates and relational expressions, etc., are themselves all of differing functional 
types.  Mutual ethical obligations – all too often misleadingly labeled “social values” – 
are not “preferences” any more than societies are individual persons.  They delimit what 
individual preferences “we” are obligated collectively to honor.  And so the Kaplow and 
Shavell project, precisely because it cognitively miscarries by running distinct categories 
together and in consequence dissolving the very basis of structured thinking itself, is as 
fully as misbegotten and incapable of determinately prescribing – indeed it is moreso – as 
was the early Posnerian WM discussed earlier.307   
      In light of all of this incoherence, muddle and consequent indeterminacy I’ve 
been describing and diagnosing, one might wonder what ever could have prompted two 
“analysts” to embark on so ill-starred a project as Kaplow and Shavell’s.  A proximate 
though not ultimate answer, I think, lies in plenary misunderstanding of the import of the 
formal “results” Kaplow and Shavell announced in the periodical literature before writing 
their monograph.308  For we enounter much the same confusion in their descriptions and 
interpretations of those “results” that we have found afflicting the monograph itself.  
Rather than simply replicating the foregoing discussion in connection with those results, 
however, I think we’ll do better to take note of the relations between the latter and the 
                                                 
 307 At least the latter attempted to take a position as to the distributor, distribuee, and distribution 
formula and mechanism variables.  Its problems stemmed simply from not taking more care in respect of 
defining the distribuendum – “wealth” – which effort would have revealed the inter-related ethical 
implausibility and ultimate prescriptive indeterminacy of the project.      
 308 See cites supra, note 261.  The “ultimate” answer to which I allude, of course, is failure to think 
valence-grammatically.  
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broader literature to which Kaplow and Shavell take themselves for having contributed.  
For it turns out that theirs is no more than the most acute case thus far of a disease that’s 
more widespread, even if generally in lower-grade form.  We thus find occasion to 
indicate means by which health might be restored to the agendas of WE and LE.  And 
that takes us back both to the discussion at III.A over the first foundational debates in LE, 
and indeed full circle to this paper’s very first motivating paragraphs:  
 Note first that in all of the foregoing discussion of this subsection we have found 
no occasion to say anything about Pareto.  That’s because Kaplow and Shavell’s 
monograph doesn’t either, at least not above the footnote line, save for one page.309  Yet 
the articles from which the book derives are couched uniformly as showing “conflicts” 
between  “notions of fairness” and “the Pareto principle,” or “violations” of the latter by 
“non-welfarist method[s] of policy assessment.”310  And it’s taken for granted in these 
pieces that such conflicts or violations must perforce disqualify, not Pareto, but the 
“notions of fairness” or “non-welfarist methods of policy assessment” that are in tension 
with Pareto.311   
 There’s a sense, then, in which Kaplow and Shavell can be taken for assuming the 
contrary to Sen in an earlier-announced “conflict.”  I think, however, that the best way to 
view both Sen’s earlier and Kaplow and Shavell’s later “results” is as misunderstandings 
grounded in misapprehension of matters discussed through Parts 2 and 3.  Indeed we 
have in effect indirectly addressed these misunderstandings already, in discussion over 
how best to interpret Sheinman’s intuitions as reported in the previous subsection.  And 
indeed we can now show more fully why that latter discussion is warranted, by  
                                                 
 309 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 56.  
 310 See articles cited supra note 261. 
 311 See Coleman, supra note 263 in particular on this point.   
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considering Sen’s results on the one hand, Kaplow and Shavell’s on the other, with 
reference to what we’ve observed about Kaplow and Shavell here already. 312 
 By “the Pareto principle” Kaplow and Shavell familiarly intend what more 
commonly and more helpfully goes by the name of “the Pareto indifference criterion,” or 
“Pareto indifference,”313 pursuant to which all individuals’ being indifferent as between 
two social states translates directly into the social welfare functional’s indifference as 
between those states.  The contrast, no surprise, is with the so-called “weak” and “strong 
Pareto” criteria, pursuant to the former of which one social state is said to dominate 
                                                 
 312 See, of course, A. K. Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970).   
Sen was correct, I believe, in sensing a tension between Paretianism and what he called “liberalism.”  But I 
think that the conflict is more general, and moreover that the more general conflict ironically is not 
implicated by the particular example Sen adduces to illustrate the conflict.   
 The more general conflict, as argued below and proved in Hockett, supra note 275, is between 
Paretianism and any form of prescription what ever.  The sense in which Sen’s story scarcely implicates it 
is that it fails to treat a right as something which the right-holder may invoke, or refrain from invoking, at 
will.  See, of course, Allan Gibbard, A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim, 7 J. ECON. THEORY 388 
(1974); also Kaushik Basu, The Right to Give Up Rights, 51 ECONOMICA 413 (1984).  The sense in which 
this confusion amounts to unclarity about what I am calling “Part I” matters in this paper is that, as we saw 
at Part I, distributive-ethical assessment, and the rights held by distribuees pursuant to distributive ethics, 
are not implicated or apt absent conflicting claims.  And Sen’s story, of course, involves no conflicting 
claims.  Note that for similar reasons there is no real conflict in theory (at most there might be one in 
practice, as an informational matter in the absence of stipulated damages) between efficient breach and the 
promissory theory of contract – at least if the non-breaching party is indeed paid the expectancy and 
particularly if any surplus gleaned, to the degree it is windfall, is split.  See supra Part II.E.2, and note 284 
in this subsection.     
 Sen was nonetheless on to something, however, and was only prevented from seeing it, I think, by 
dint of a feature of his story that’s shared by Sheinman’s first story discussed in the previous subsection.  
That feature is the effective restriction of the field of possible conflict to mere binary preference – 
prefer/disprefer fare.  Those cases obscure Pareto’s incompatibility with ethical normativity by dint (a) of 
their not implicating Pareto at all when claims conflict, and (b) of their not implicating ethical normativity 
when claims are in harmony hence in no need of adjudication.  The same fact, of course, tends to obscure 
the superfluousness of Pareto.  More on this below.  
 We should also note an irony in connection with Sen’s paper and the Kaplow & Shavell project 
we’re here discussing:  Kaplow and Shavell on the one hand claim that Sen’s result is a “special case” of 
their own.  See Kaplow & Shavell (2001), supra note 261 at 282-83.  Yet they also claim, on the other 
hand, that the conflict that Sen identifies actually stems merely from his inadequate understanding of the 
logic of rights – precisely the invalidity in the argument first identified by Gibbard loc. cit.  See KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 54 n.75.  It is of course bizarre both to credit a particular result as a special 
case of one’s more general result, and to deny the validity of the special case; indeed it amounts to a 
reductio ad absurdum of one’s own putatively more general result.  (If p entails q, then not-q entails not-p.)  
But in light of what we have been cataloguing throughout this subsection, another incoherence will not 
likely occasion surprise.    
 313 I say “more helpfully” because “Pareto Principle” quite often also is used to designate an 
entirely distinct phenomenon also associated with Pareto – the observation that the income distribution 
pursuant to which 20% of a society commands 80% of that society’s wealth is surprisingly oft-encountered.   
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another such state when all individuals prefer the one to the other, and pursuant to the 
latter of which one social state dominates another when at least one person prefers it and 
no one disprefers it.  (Please see the Appendix for fuller discussion of the relations among 
so-called “welfarism” and the several Pareto criteria.)      
 Now the first thing to note about Kaplow and Shavell’s results is that what they 
actually prove, in effect, is that it is impossible normatively to assess policy at all without 
potentially coming into conflict with, or “violating” as they say, Pareto indifference.314  
For that which in their proofs yields the conflict with Pareto – what they call the 
normative relevance of something additional to a formula-contoured aggregate of 
satisfactions alone315 – is precisely what we have seen in the foregoing paragraphs to be 
the prescriptive element of any social welfare functional:  It is the “value judgment,” or 
“notion of fairness,” which both dictates the shape of and mandates conformity with that 
functional.  It is precisely what converts potential satisfactions from the mere “is” of 
preferences to the cognizable “ought” of preferences formulaically-summed and then 
“maximized” in a particular way.   
                                                 
 314 See Appendix and Hockett, supra note 275.  At least this is the case insofar as we assent to 
Kaplow and Shavell’s continuity assumptions and recognize, as Kaplow and Shavell appear not to have 
noticed, that Pareto indifference and “welfarism” are equivalent only if we restrict attention to a single 
profile of utility functions.  Continuity as assumed by Kaplow and Shavell of course can be and has been 
contested, in particular by Chang, supra note 261.  And Kaplow and Shavell’s rejoinder to the challenge 
amounts to a mere repetition of what we saw above at Part III.A in connection with Posner’s and 
Sheinman’s answers to Dworkin’s hypothetical – namely the question-begging assertion that the forced 
transfer would not be objectionable were the WTP $300 or $3000 instead of $3.  See Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 306.  Chang points this out clearly, in an observation reminiscent of Calabresi’s earlier-noted 
treatment of fairness as a constraint upon maximization.  See Chang, supra note 261.  What Chang points 
out no more than Kaplow and Shavell – or for that matter anyone else thus far – however, is that if we do 
reject continuity, then there is no need to reconcile Paretianism and fairness or liberalism or anything else.  
For again in such case Pareto’s superfluous.  The only time Pareto really does anything at all is when it acts 
to prevent fairness, and indeed any prescription what ever.  See again supra, Part III.A, supra, note 312, and 
Hockett, Prescriptive Paretian, supra note 275.  Also the Appendix.      
 315 See in particular Kaplow & Shavell (2001), supra note 261.  
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 If the social welfare functional is actually to prescribe, rather than simply to 
describe a particular possible pattern of satisfactions, it must be possessed of this 
element.  It must issue out of a “value judgment,” a “notion of fairness” of precisely the 
sort that renders it ethically required rather than merely accidentally isomorphic.316  And 
again it is precisely this element that brings “notions of fairness” into conflict with 
“welfarism” and Pareto.  But this again means, in turn, that what Kaplow and Shavell 
actually have in effect “proved” is that to prescribe at all is to raise possible conflict with 
Pareto, meaning of course that if we’re to prescribe or “assess” or evaluate or opine at all, 
we are committed to acknowledging that there’s something unsatisfactory about Pareto.  
More on the implications of this presently. 
 The next thing to ask in connection with Kaplow and Shavell’s results is whether 
there really is anything that ought even occasion surprise, let alone troublement, in this 
fact.  I think that the answer is quite clearly no.  We can approach this in either or both of 
two ways:  First we can remind ourselves of a few basic features of the nature of value-
judgment or prescription in general, and its relation to ethically unfiltered satisfaction – 
which is all that Kaplow-Shavellian “welfare,” recall, amounts to – in particular.  And 
then, when we see that there really is no surprise at all in the fact that value-judgment 
might conflict with mere fairness-indifferent (ethically unfiltered) satisfaction, we can 
remind ourselves why it might be that it’s been thought in some circles to be troubling or 
paradoxical, or even why the Pareto criterion might ever have been thought useful, let 
alone ethically attractive, in the first place. 
 So first, as to that matter of prescription and its relation to subjective satisfaction:  
Is it really surprising that value-judgments – including those that determine the 
                                                 
 316 The distinction here is cognate with that between normative rule and mere positive regularity. 
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aggregation rules that shape social welfare functionals – can come into conflict with 
subjective satisfaction?  Hardly.  It is in the nature of value-judgments that they deem 
some satisfactions as not rising to the level of ethical claims, i.e. as not being entitled to 
“our” collective sanction.317  It is in the nature of acknowledgement of normativity as 
such, of there being a divide between right and wrong, how ever demarcated, that certain 
actions can be wrongful, hence that certain satisfactions – which are, after all, merely the 
successful consummations of actions – can be wrongful.  And so it is far from surprising 
that it is at least conceptually on the cards that everyone within a particular class might in 
fact will wrongfully – be satisfiable only through wrongdoing.  It’s of course quite 
unlikely ever to happen, but it’s in the structure of right/wrong judging – of normativity – 
itself that that is conceivable.318   
 There was a time, for example, when perhaps everyone who thought about the 
subject considered the earth to be flat.  If so, they were all wrong.  It is just so with 
ethical judgment.  If we believe that there is ethical right and wrong at all, then it is on 
the same footing with cognitive right and wrong so far as the possibility of incorrectness 
goes.  Again it is generally quite unlikely, but it’s quite unsurprisingly conceivable.  
Indeed it seems likely that it is wrong, for example, to torture animals, or to enslave 
                                                 
 317 Note that this means they can’t be prescribed.  See generally Hockett, supra note 275.  
Heavens, even every welfare economist’s favorite oracle, Kenneth Arrow, has long made remarks along 
these lines.  See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 73 (“[D]esires in 
conflict with reality are not entitled to consideration.”).  
 318 Welfare economists themselves have been, in stark contrast to Kaplow and Shavell, well aware 
of this.  See, e.g., the venerable HLA MYINT, THEORIES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 199-200 (1948) (“Thus 
when we have demonstrated that a particular pattern of allocating resources satisfies given wants better 
than others, this does not amount to a categorical imperative that this pattern ought to be adopted.  To 
obtain that we need a further premise, viz. that these given wants are of the same ethical quality of 
goodness.”) 
    Rudimentary misunderstandings of normativity quite reminiscent of Kaplow and Shavell’s are 
manifest throughout a recent book on int’l law and its relation to normativity.  See Robert Hockett, The 
Limits of Their World, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1720 (2006) (reviewing JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW).  
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human beings whose ethnicities were deemed to be “inhuman” ethnicities.  And yet it is 
possible that there have been communities in which all or nearly all people enjoyed, or 
were unaware that or untroubled by the fact that others enjoyed, bear-baiting, and hence 
enjoyed wrongfully.  And we know quite intimately that there have been societies of 
people who have thought this way in respect of slavery.   
 Kaplow and Shavell themselves, we have seen, are committed to this possibility 
as self-professed welfare economists – precisely as soon as they assent to the prospect of 
its being prescriptively required or rightful to satisfy a social welfare functional.  For 
what ever “value judgment” they ultimately assent to as the correct one to appeal to – the 
one that it would be wrong not to agree with – in determining the functional’s method of 
aggregation, that judgment will be one that in principle could end up being “dispreferred” 
by everyone.  Again quite unlikely to happen, of course – and even less likely to be 
honored by any polity – but conceptually possible.  And it’s such remote possibilities 
alone that Kaplow and Shavell view as disqualifying such value judgments.319   
 So what Kaplow and Shavell really are saying, if they are saying anything at all, 
is that we are to abandon all thought of right and wrong, hence all normativity and 
normative assessment, tout court.320  In the name of Pareto indifference one is simply to 
squish about indifferently to the normativity that is structured thinking, satisfy 
preferences indifferently to the normativity that is fair distribution of satisfactions, and in 
                                                 
 319 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell (2001), supra note 261 at 284 (“It is irrelevant to this conclusion 
that Pareto dominance will be rare among actual policy alternatives.”). 
 320 Note that this is nearly explicit in their earlier-cited “whose to judge?” remark made in 
attempting to justify their unfiltering stance toward “well-being.”  See supra note 272.  So is the self-
undercutting to which I refer next.  If we “prefer” they be “wrong,” they are thereby rendered wrong on 
their own reckoning.  
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essence live like no more than amoebae.  That’s not only unattractive, it’s self-
undermining:  It cannot be said without violating its own stricture.  Time to start afresh. 
 Since there really is no surprise that normativity itself could in theory “conflict” 
with Pareto indifference, the next question is why anyone ever would have thought it 
surprising, or equivalently, why anyone would have found this commonplace troubling.  I 
think there are at least two related answers.  The first has to do with the earlier-noted 
normative valence of such terms as “welfare” and “well-being” themselves.  By using 
these words unreflectively simply in labeling ethically unfiltered preferences, “analysts” 
like Kaplow and Shavell have unconsciously conferred ethical compellingness upon 
those preferences.  They’ve unconsciously elided from the mere “is” of preference and 
satisfaction, which is all that the terms as proffered by Kaplow and Shavell actually 
denote, to the “ought” of entitlement, which is what the words more ordinarily tend to 
connote.  And thus it has naturally struck them as “paradoxical” – as pitting ethical value 
against ethical value – when it’s turned out that preferences might actually conflict with 
what’s right.  But again, it is rightness itself – Kaplow-Shavellian “value judgments,” 
“notions of fairness” – that determine which preferences bear ethical weight, are 
regardable as compelling and indeed as true well-faring by “us” rather than simply as 
unbounded wants pressed by thieves.   
 The second answer has to do with both (a) the appeal in which Pareto itself 
grounds itself, and (b) our discussion in connection with that appeal carried out above in 
respect of Sheinman’s reported intuitions in response to his posited hypotheticals.  The 
putative attraction of all forms of Pareto is, as is often remarked, that they posit 
circumstances to which all are claimed to assent or at any rate not to dissent, so that 
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questions of distribution might be avoided.  And we’re bewitched into thinking that there 
might be such situations by the way in which choices are typically posited – as merely 
ordinal binary, “prefer”/“disprefer” affairs – by those trafficking in Paretianism.  For if 
all really “prefer,” who but a tyrant could deny us our preference?  This is what 
accounted, recall, for Sheinman’s reported intuition in respect of his first hypothetical.321 
 The problem, of course, is that questions of distribution never are really avoidable 
– merely ordinal or binary – unless there’s no scarcity or conflict at all (recall Part I), or 
distribution already is viewed implicitly as fair (hence again no conflict, recall Part I).  
Nor will all generally assent unless either there is lack of scarcity, or that perceived 
fairness, or there is coercion.  That’s what we saw in discussing Sheinman’s second two 
stories.322  So Pareto really is “pointless,” and even moreso, I think, than Judge Calabresi 
pointed out some years back.323  It has been, from its very inception, a dodge – an attempt 
at escaping distributive judgment.324  But there’s neither reason, nor, as we’ve seen in 
connection with Kaplow and Shavell’s own admissions in respect of how social welfare 
functionals are constructed, so much as a real prospect, for dodging distributive 
assessment.   
 As we have noted now since the beginning of this inquiry, all actions result in 
distributions of benefit and burden.  All such distributions call out for distributive-ethical 
assessment.  And all such assessment requires deployment of “value judgment.”  There’s 
no getting round this, and there’s no prescription that isn’t effectively doing this.  
                                                 
 321 See supra Part III.A.3.  See also supra note 314 and accompanying text.  
 322 Id.  
 323 See supra note 7.  
 324 See Hockett, supra note 275.  
 175 
Pareto’s once-perceived raison d’etre has long since vanished – indeed it never existed.325 
And it is more than remarkable that Kaplow and Shavell, who chastise LE practitioners 
for thinking that WE avoids distributional judgment,326 raise as the only disqualifier of 
“notions of fairness” – and the very notions that they themselves employ at that – the fact 
that these can conflict with a stale and sterile device that exists for no reason but to avoid 
distributional judgment. 
 Why, then, has the Pareto criterion so puzzlingly persisted as something that’s 
viewed as attractive, when we no longer fear, and see that we cannot avoid, distributional 
judgment?  I think there’s a complex set of interconnected reasons, some cultural-
historical, some disciplinary-sociological, others moral-psychological, which I elaborate 
elsewhere.327  But perhaps the most forceful one, and the one which we have already 
taken time to investigate above, is that which we’ve seen in connection with Sheinman:  
We tend implicitly to view any Pareto improvement wrought, synchronically in one 
transaction, against a backdrop of many transactions extended diachronically, in which 
transactions we tend to play differing roles over time.  And so we envisage, under the 
aspect of Pareto, a world in which we each of us never lose and often gain – thus a world 
in which the aggregate is grown and grown fairly.  And that is to say we envisage, in 
short, a world like that envisaged by Guido Calabresi some thirty-five years ago. 
 
C. Appendix: The Impossibility of Prescriptive “Welfarism” or Paretianism 
 
 It might be helpful to provide formal expression to some of the claims made in 
Subpart B just above.  Here I undertake to do that: 
                                                 
 325 Id.  
 326 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 261 at 26-28 in particular.  
 327 Hockett, supra note 275; also Robert Hockett, On the Puzzling Persistence of Paretianism 
(2006) (working paper, on file with author).  
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 Let “x” denote a possible state of the world as viewed under a normatively 
complete description.  A normatively complete description includes all details that might 
be deemed salient under a mode of evaluation.  Those details include facts concerning all 
individuals i belonging to a defined population N of n members.  N may be defined to 
comprise individuals living at an instant, or to comprise individuals living at all instants 
along a defined temporal interval.  It will sometimes be convenient to call x simply “a 
world,” or “a possible world.”   
 Let X be the set of possible states of the world invariant in N.  We are interested 
only in possible worlds inhabited by the n individuals i who jointly constitute N. 
 A social welfare function, W, is a mapping from the set of possible states of the 
world that concern us, X, onto an ordering, R.328    
 An individual i’s satisfaction function, Ui, is also a mapping from X onto R.329 
 The internal structure of either a social welfare function W or an individual 
satisfaction function Ui can in principle be multivariate, mapping vector values onto R, or 
univariate, mapping scalar values onto R.    
 DEFINITION 1.  A “satisfactionist,” or equivalently, “at least partly satisfactionist” 
social welfare function, Ws, is a social welfare function of the form W( • , U1(x), …, 
Um(x)) the domain of which includes, but need not be limited to, m individuals’ 
satisfaction functions Ui.  It is thus possible in such case that there exist x, x’ є X such 
that Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i and yet Ws(x) ≠  Ws(x’).  It is also the case here that n might 
exceed m.  In such case Ws can be characterized as “oligarchical.”  If m were precisely 1, 
Ws could be characterized as “monarchical.”   
 DEFINITION 2.  An “exclusively,” or equivalently, “strictly satisfactionist” social 
welfare function, We/s, is a social welfare function of the form W(U1(x), …, Um(x)) the 
domain of which is restricted to individuals’ satisfaction functions Ui.  Hence it is a 
social welfare function for which there exist no x, x’ є X such that Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i 
and yet W(x) ≠  W(x’).330  Thus the following hold true: ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) . ≡  
. We/s (x) > We/s (x’).  And:  ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) < Ui(x’) . ≡  . We/s (x) < We/s (x’). 
                                                 
 328 The proofs here are derived from those in Hockett, supra note 275.  I employ the apparatus of 
social welfare functions rather than functionals here in order to speak within the now prevailing Bergson-
Samuelson-Arrovian idiom; but I could just as well have employed more generic social welfare functionals.  
Because most of the analysis to follow involves comparison between pairs of possible worlds alone, 
complete ordering of all possible worlds will not, strictly speaking, be necessary to it.  Nor even will the 
prospect of a quasi-minimal Senian “choice function” per Sen, supra note 312.  Comparability and 
asymmetry of (ordered) pairs of worlds will suffice.  What holds true of any W  here will hold trivially true 
of any information-rich Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, and of any less information-cognizant, 
non-Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functional F defined in the more abstract space of satisfaction 
profiles.  
    
 329 I speak of “satisfaction” rather than “welfare” or “well-being” for reasons associated with the 
conclusions drawn via the present analysis and discussed prior to the present Appendix.  
       
 330 “Exclusively,” or “strictly satisfactionist” is extensionally equivalent both to “individualistic” 
as employed by Kaplow & Shavell (2001), supra note 261 (and earlier by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson 
(1947)), and to the, since Sen (1979), more commonly encountered “welfarist.”  Reasons for preferring the 
term offered here are again associated with the conclusions drawn via the present analysis and discussed 
prior to this Appendix.  The sources just referenced are: Abram Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain 
Aspects of Welfare Economics, 52 Q. J. ECON. 310 (1938); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF 
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 DEFINITION 3.  A satisfactionist social welfare function Ws is what we shall call 
“interpersonally aggregative,” or equivalently, “interpersonally distributive,” if and only 
if it is non-monarchical – i.e., is a function of more than one individual’s satisfaction 
function Ui.  Hence it is of the form W( • , U1(x), …, Um(x)), with m > 1.331  An 
exclusively satisfactionist social welfare function We/s, being a member of a proper 
subclass of the full class of satisfactionist social welfare functions Ws, can of course also 
be interpersonally aggregative if non-monarchical, in which case it will take the form 
W(U1(x), …, Um(x)), with m > 1.   
 COMMENT 1-3.  It proves pertinent below that every interpersonally aggregative 
social welfare function Ws is possessed of an internal structure, or “shape,” determined in 
part by the comparative weights assigned individual satisfaction functions Ui in its 
domain.  Just as any multivariate social welfare function W is possessed of an internal 
structure determined in toto by the comparative weights assigned all of the variables in its 
domain.   
 DEFINITION 4.  The assignment of weights to individual satisfaction functions Ui 
in the domain of an interpersonally aggregative social welfare function Ws will be called 
Ws’s “aggregation rule,” or equivalently, its “distribution rule,” A.   
 COMMENT 4.  I note that the assignment of weights constituting an aggregation 
rule A might be deliberate, arbitrary, or inadvertent – effected “by default” so to speak.  
In cases of the latter sort A might in some contexts usefully be termed a mere “regularity” 
as distinguished from a deliberately formulated “rule” or “norm.”  
 DEFINITION 5.  A “prescriptive” social welfare function, Wp, is a social welfare 
function at least one of the constitutive features of which is deliberately selected or 
formulated with a view to giving effect to a normative principle – to a value judgment or 
set of value judgments.  That is to say that at least one of its constitutive features is, 
normatively speaking, neither arbitrary nor inadvertent.  Because one or more of its 
features is selected or formulated in order to give effect to a normative principle, 
moreover, a prescriptive social welfare function Wp is constructed or adopted with a view 
to its own incumbency in the world (see Definition 6).  A “non-prescriptive” social 
welfare function, W/p, is simply a social welfare function that is not prescriptive.332   
                                                                                                                                                 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947); Amartya Sen, On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in 
Social Welfare Analysis, 45 ECONOMETRICA 1539 (1977). 
   
 331 Where n > 1 but m = 1, there is a sense in which Ws is interpersonally aggregative “by default”:  
It counts the non-monarchs for naught.  
 
 332 I am of course assuming a bivalent logic with excluded middle in so defining “non-
prescriptive.”  See Hockett, Nonstandard Logics, supra note 165 for more on the significance of that 
assumption, and of assuming alternatives, in welfare economic and other social choice contexts involving 
perceivedly problematic comparisons.  I relatedly ignore here a conceivable distinction between what might 
be called “completely prescriptive” social welfare functions on the one hand and mixed cases, wherein 
some but not all features of the function would be selected or formulated with a view to giving effect to a 
value judgment or set of value judgments, on the other hand.  In such case we might designate the mixed 
function an “incompletely prescriptive” social welfare function Wp~.  A “non-prescriptive” social welfare 
function Wp¬ then would be a social welfare function that is neither completely nor incompletely 
prescriptive.  Because the present analysis is laid out to demonstrate the inconsistency of strict 
satisfactionism and Paretianism with any degree of prescription, the mixed cases needn’t further concern 
us.     
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 DEFINITION 6.  A social welfare function W is “incumbent,” or equivalently, 
“operative,” if functionaries or other agents are obliged to act in conformity with it – in 
particular, to act in a manner reasonably calculated to maximize W’s output value along 
R.333  I note that W’s being incumbent is a feature of the world, hence is partly constitutive 
of x, the world as completely described. 
 The reader may now verify the truth of the following observation.  
 OBSERVATION 1.  All else being equal, a prescriptive social welfare function Wp 
deems a world better if Wp is itself incumbent in that world.  Somewhat more formally, 
∀x, x’ є X , if x is a world in which Wp is incumbent and x’ is a world in which Wp is not 
incumbent, then Wp (x) > Wp (x’).334     
 REMARK.  (See Definition 5.)  The value judgment(s) pursuant to which Wp is 
constructed or adopted will itself (or themselves) deem Wp’s incumbency normatively 
superior to its non-incumbency.  A satisfactorily prescriptive social welfare function Wp, 
for its part, gives full operational form to a value judgment or set of value judgments.  
Hence Wp, in giving that full operational form to the value judgment(s) pursuant to which 
it is constructed, likewise will deem its incumbency superior to its non-incumbency.335    
                                                                                                                                                 
 (Here, in the event it’s of interest, is how I suppose a social welfare function might turn out to be 
“mixed”:  If some such function were multivariate and some but not all of its variables were selected, or its 
variables’ comparative weightings assigned, inadvertently or arbitrarily, it would fall short of completely 
prescriptive.  Suppose, for example, that W deemed world x better, ceteris paribus, than world x’ in virtue 
of x’s being possessed of a larger proportion of “beautiful” inhabitants than x’. Then W would in part be a 
species of deliberately “perfectionist” (or better, “fetishist”) social welfare function.  (Fetishism, I think, is 
simply to treat as ethically decisive that which is ethically arbitrary.)  If it accordingly recommended, 
through differential weighting, the directing of more resources to beautiful people on the supposition that 
these people would in consequence procreate more, and then unthinkingly left all of the nonbeautiful 
peoples’ satisfaction functions weight-wise undifferentiated, W would be incompletely prescriptive.  It 
would forthrightly prescribe with respect to beautiful people, but would only inadvertently default to a (still 
fetishist) weighting in respect of the nonbeautiful people (inadvertently favoring those born with steep 
utility curves over those not so born – the respect in which classical utilitarianism is fetishist).)   
   
 333 I have deliberately left “obliged” broadly open as to matters of specific normative valence and 
mode of enforcement.  It might mean “ethically expected” or merely “authoritatively mandated,” and the 
obligation might be “voluntarily observed,” “culturally sanctioned,” “strictly enforced,” etc.  I leave 
“functionaries” and “agents” open as applicable to anyone who might act in vindication or enforcement of 
the norm or fall under its jurisdiction.  If only a planner or other state functionaries are obliged to act upon 
the social welfare function, then “functionary” will designate only such functionaries.  If all citizens are 
regarded as being morally obligated to act in, or not to act out of, conformity with what ever social ethic 
receives expression in the social welfare function, then they too can be considered “functionaries” or 
“agents” for present purposes.  
  
 334 We could refine the grain here.  A social welfare function’s output might vary with degrees or 
orders of incumbency, for example, varying between desuetude on the one hand, widespread or universal 
observance on the other.  We may leave such prospects to one side in the present context because all that’s 
required to make the point is that some measure of incumbency renders the world better by the lights of any 
prescriptive social welfare function.  I emphasize that incumbency is but a bare minimal entailment of 
prescriptivity.  Fuller entailments include, among other things, any particular distribution of benefits and 
burdens over individuals prescribed via the prescription.  More on the significance of that fact presently.  
 
 335 It seems to be in the nature of prescription that the prescriber deems the world to be better, 
ceteris paribus, when functionaries or other agents are obliged to act upon the prescription.  Any injunction 
giving complete expression to the prescriber’s judgment will accordingly deem it likewise.  I of course 
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 DEFINITION 7.  A satisfactionist social welfare function Ws is “interpersonally 
satisfied” when resources are distributed to individuals i in a manner consistent with Ws’s 
maximization.336   
 OBSERVATION 2.  It follows trivially upon Definition 7 that an exclusively 
satisfactionist social welfare function We/s will be interpersonally satisfied if and only if it 
is maximized.  But a satisfactionist social welfare function Ws that is not exclusively 
satisfactionist may be interpersonally satisfied even when not maximized.  (Things may 
fall short of •’s being maximized.) 
 OBSERVATION 3.  I note further that interpersonal satisfaction and incumbency are 
jointly independent.  A satisfactionist social welfare function Ws can be interpersonally 
satisfied without being incumbent, and can be incumbent without being interpersonally 
satisfied.     
 DEFINITION 8.  A satisfactionist social welfare function Ws’ “interpersonally 
replicates,” or equivalently, “is interpersonally isomorphic to” (symbol “≈ ”) another 
satisfactionist social welfare function Ws at an instant, t, if and only if they are both 
satisfied at that instant.  Somewhat more formally, if x is the world in which functionaries 
happen to act in conformity with Ws and x’ is the world in which functionaries happen to 
act in conformity with Ws’, then Ws ≈  Ws’ . ≡  . ∀i: Ui(x) = Ui(x’).337    
                                                                                                                                                 
combine semantic/propositional content with pragmatic/attitudinal stance, what formal logicians and 
linguists call “sentential force,” in the Wp as thus characterized.  Since the social welfare function in order 
to prescribe must be articulated by a prescriber (in the present context, presumably some designated 
representative or functionary of the polity), I do not know how things can be otherwise if the function 
would be complete as a program embodying the prescriber’s (hence polity’s) intention.  The only objection 
that I can envisage might be to the self-referential recursion implicit in the formulation.  But that would not 
do.  For one thing, recursion’s a common enough phenomenon in most formal theories, including 
economics and indeed within the Bergson-Samuelson-Arrovian framework itself.  See, e.g., Barberà & 
Jackson (2000), Koray (2000), both supra note 306.  For another thing, any social welfare function that 
includes unfiltered satisfaction functions in its domain will itself be recursive – indeed vitiatingly so.  See 
Hockett (2006a).  One need only consider the case where individual satisfactions are interdependent, or 
where individual satisfaction is a function of social welfare itself, by way of particularly simple examples.  
We then can have W = W(Ui(W)).  Absent an assumption of p-contraction, which would be strong, 
empirically implausible, and in any event at best merely contingently and fleetingly warranted, there will be 
either no solution or an infinite number of solutions to the multidimensional fixed point problem that W’s 
optimization requires.  See generally Bergstrom (1999), Hockett (2006), both supra note 306.  I note finally 
that self-reference appears to be latent in prescription itself:  Prescription imports a divide between correct 
and incorrect, and recognition of such a divide would seem to import the possibility of self-assessment and 
self-correction in light of the divide.  Perhaps recognition of something like this underlies the resonant story 
of Adam and Eve, who become aware of their nakedness after violating a command not to eat of the fruit 
that imparts knowledge of good and evil.  
       
 336 In the limiting case, unqualified “satisfaction” is merely a synonym for “maximization.”  That 
is, a social welfare function is satisfied with respect to all of its variables when it is maximized.  It of course 
follows that an exclusively satisfactionist social welfare function is interpersonally satisfied precisely when 
it is maximized.  
  
 337 I have indexed by temporal moment for heuristic reasons.  It would seem empirically unlikely, 
to say the least, that intensionally distinct social welfare functions, i.e., social welfare functions formulated 
pursuant to differing sets of desiderata or normative criteria, would recommend extensionally identical 
distributions over persons for extended periods.  But it is of course conceivable, meaning that I could in 
theory dispense with the temporal index.  
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 ASSUMPTION.  For any prescriptive social welfare function Wp considered at an 
instant, t, there is a non-prescriptive social welfare function W/p which interpersonally 
replicates it at that instant.  (Simply suppose Wp’s being interpersonally satisfied without 
being incumbent, by way of minimal example.)  
 PROPOSITION 1.  No prescriptive social welfare function is exclusively 
satisfactionist. 
 Proof. Assume a world x in which the prescriptive social welfare function Wp is 
incumbent.  Assume another world x’ in which a non-prescriptive social welfare function 
W/p interpersonally replicates Wp at instant t but is not incumbent.  We then know the 
following to hold true at t:  By Observation 1, Wp(x) > Wp(x’).  Hence Wp(x) ≠  Wp(x’).  
By Definition 8, Ui(x) = Ui(x’) for all i.  Hence by Definition 2, Wp is not exclusively 
satisfactionist. Q.E.D.    
 That’s strict satisfactionism.  Now Pareto.  
 DEFINITION 9.  A social welfare function W is “Paretian” if and only if it satisfies 
one or more of the Pareto indifference (PI), weak Pareto (WP) or strong Pareto (SP) 
conditions.  Somewhat more formally:  Either PI holds of W, i.e. ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) = 
Ui(x’) . ⊃ : Wp (x) = Wp (x’); or WP holds of W, i.e., ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) . ⊃ : 
Wp (x) > Wp (x’); or SP holds of W, i.e., ∀i є N; x, x’ є X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) & ∃i є N; x, x’ є 
X: Ui(x) > Ui(x’) . ⊃ : Wp (x) > Wp (x’). 
 COMMENT 5.  So-called “full Pareto” (FP), defined in the literature as the 
conjunction of PI and SP, is of course trivially embraced by Definition 9.  Definition 10 
and Proposition 2, below, will afford warrant to our lumping all versions of Pareto 
together as here. 
 SUPPOSITION.  There exists at least one indefinitely divisible resource, r, which, 
were every individual i to possess an increment ε > 0 more of it, would leave each 
individual i more satisfied.  Somewhat more formally, taking ri /r(x) for person i’s 
allotment of r in world x, and ri /r(x’) for i’s allotment of r in world x’, we have ∀i є N: ri 
/r(x) – ri /r(x’) = ε . ⊃ . ∀i є N: Ui(x) > Ui(x’).338   
                                                                                                                                                 
 I note one additional point of importance in connection with the temporal indexing here, a point 
with significance for the analysis of Paretianism’s relation to strict satisfactionism and prescription below:  
A prescriptive principle which motivates a particular aggregation hence distribution rule will of course 
recommend one distribution at t1 and another distribution at t2 when the circumstances to which the 
principle is sensitive change in the interval.  It would be a most remarkably happy accident, to say the least, 
were the change in distribution between t1 and t2 not to produce “losers” relative to the status quo ante.  
And it would be yet more remarkable were the change to yield not only no “losers,” but no differential 
“winners.”  So incumbency truly is but a minimal entailment of prescription, one that we’ll see 
immediately to rule out strict satisfactionism and thus, given the premises of the present analysis, Pareto 
indifference and “pure” weak or strong Paretianism as well.  Prescription’s fuller entailment – changing 
distributions in response to changing circumstances across temporal intervals – of course even more 
immediately evidently to rule out Paretianism.  
   
 338 One could word this somewhat more technically by saying that each Ui is responsive only to i’s 
own allotment, not to others’ allotments, of the resource r and is at least weakly continuous and 
monotonically increasing in that allotment.  See, e.g., Kotaro Suzumura, Pareto Principles from Inch to Ell, 
70 ECON. LETTERS 95 (2001).  By “weakly” continuous here I mean simply that if ri /r (x) > ri /r (x’), then 
there is a neighborhood V(ri /r (x’)) of ri /r (x’) all of whose members ri /r (x) exceeds.  See, e.g., Donald E. 
Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND WELFARE, VOL. 1 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, & Kotaro Suzumura eds. 2002).  I note 
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 DEFINITION 10.  A social welfare function W is “unremittingly,” or equivalently, 
“unalloyedly,” “strictly” or “purely” Paretian if and only if for each individual i it is at 
least weakly continuous and monotonically increasing in ri /r(x) when ever the 
Supposition holds.339  
 COMMENT 6.  Specifying a few implications of Definition 10 in prose might 
facilitate more immediate intuitive grasp both of the next proposition and proof and of 
their import.  Here then is the intended interpretation:  An unremittingly PI social welfare 
function allows no non-satisfactionist value – including, for example, incumbency per 
Definition 6 above, which recall any prescriptive social welfare function will at a bare 
minimum count for something – to count for anything in determining an optimum.  
Unremittingly WP or SP social welfare functions, for their parts, will not “trade off” so 
much as an infinitesimally small increment of gain in r, whether the traded increment of 
forgone gain is itself divided over everyone (WP) or is a traded increment of gain that 
would be realized by but one person (SP), for any gain, no matter how large, in respect of 
some other value – again including incumbency per Definition 6 above, which recall any 
prescriptive social welfare function at a bare minimum will count for something.   
 PROPOSITION 2.  No prescriptive social welfare function is unremittingly Paretian.  
 Proof.  There are three cases to consider:   
 For PI:  We know from Sen (1986) that where that portion of the domain of what 
I have been calling a satisfactionist social welfare function which comprises individual 
satisfactions is restricted to a unique profile of individual satisfaction functions, weak 
transitivity and Pareto indifference jointly entail what I have been calling exclusive 
satisfactionism.  Here we are indeed considering but a single such profile (recall, that of 
the members of N) and at least weakly transitive social welfare orderings (both per our 
opening remarks and per Definition 10), so our unremittingly PI social welfare function is 
exclusively satisfactionist.  But by Proposition 1, no prescriptive social welfare function 
is exclusively satisfactionist.  So the unremittingly PI social welfare function cannot 
prescribe.340   
                                                                                                                                                 
further that, strictly speaking, the Supposition here does not function as an assumption, per Suzumura 
(idem) and Kaplow & Shavell (2001), supra note 261, but as a contingent condition, “assumed” only 
arguendo.  The idea, as will presently become clear, is that a Paretian purist is one who commits to certain 
consequences should the Supposition hold.  
  
 339 That is to say that W is itself weakly continuous and monotonically increasing in each 
individual’s allotment of the resource r.    
 
 340 The Sen reference is to Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory, in HANDBOOK OF 
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, VOL. 3 (K. Arrow and M. Intriligator eds., 1986). Two additional 
observations are germane in the present connection:  First, assuming independence of irrelevant alternatives 
and unrestricted domain per Arrow, supra note 317 – which many social choice theorists and welfare 
economists, including Kaplow & Shavell themselves, appear to find attractive – Pareto indifference proves 
equivalent to what I have been calling exclusive satisfactionism even in respect of all possible profiles of 
individual satisfaction functions, rather than simply in respect of a unique such profile, meaning that we 
could dispense with the latter assumption.  See again Sen, op. cit.  Second, under a weak set of four 
assumptions three of which – one indefinitely divisible resource, in which individual Ui’s and W are 
continuous and monotonically increasing – are largely incorporated into the analysis here and one of which 
– compensability in increments of the divisible resource – is commonly invoked in the literature of fair 
allocations and presumably acceptable to such as Kaplow & Shavell as well, all three Pareto criteria have 
been proved to be jointly equivalent.  See Suzumura (2001), supra note 338.  Were we to assume 
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 For WP:  We lightly modify the proof found in Kaplow & Shavell (2001), partly 
in keeping with the revised and supplemented apparatus employed in the present analysis, 
partly in light of observations made by Campbell & Kelly (2002) concerning the 
needlessly strong assumptions employed in that proof, and partly in light of a cognate 
proof offered contemporaneously by Suzumura (2001):  By Definition 2, we know that if 
a social welfare function W is not exclusively satisfactionist, then ∃x, x’ є X: ∀i є N: Ui(x) 
= Ui(x’) and yet W(x) ≠  W(x’).  Now suppose a particular such function and two worlds x 
and x’ for which (a) ∀i є N: Ui(x) = Ui(x’) and (b) W(x) > W(x’).  Next suppose a world 
x” identical to x’ in all respects save that each ri/r(x’) per the Supposition has been 
increased by ε > 0, so that ∀i є N: Ui(x”) > Ui(x’).  Now observe that, granted (even 
weak per the Supposition and Definition 10, not necessarily Kaplow & Shavell’s full) 
continuity, as well as monotonicity, in ri/r(x’), there is some ε sufficiently small that our 
W, which, recall, is assumed not to be exclusively satisfactionist, will rank worlds thus: 
W(x) > W(x”).  In that case since, per (a) just above we have supposed ∀i є N: Ui(x) = 
Ui(x’), it must also be the case that ∀i є N: Ui(x”) > Ui(x).  Hence if weak Pareto is 
satisfied, W(x”) > W(x).  But that contradicts what we found supposing weak continuity 
and monotonicity per the Supposition.  Hence the unremittingly Paretian social welfare 
function per Definition 10 relinquishes non-exclusive-satisfactionism.  But by 
Proposition 1, with that it relinquishes prescriptivity.341 
 For SP:  Strong Pareto trivially entails weak Pareto.  What is true of the WP case 
here is accordingly true a fortiori of the SP case.  (SP ⊃ WP; WP ⊃ no prescription;├ SP 
⊃ no prescription.)  Hence the latter too is incapable of prescribing.  Q.E.D. 342   
                                                                                                                                                 
compensability, then, which one suspects most Paretians would happily do, the proof of Proposition 2 
would now be completed.  
 
 341 I note that this portion of the proof goes through even when W is replaced by a weaker, 
nontransitive ordering relation falling short of functionality.     
   
 342 I observe here that Chang, supra note 261, constructs interesting mixed “liberal 
consequentialist,” or equivalently “Paretian liberal” social welfare functions that reject continuity.  These in 
effect give formal expression to the commonsense mixed teleological/deontological ethics pursuant to 
which maximization of one or more goods is enjoined, subject to a side constraint sounding in rights to 
fairness or some basic minimum.  See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 242 at 3-32 (jointly operative moralities of 
“aspiration” and “duty”), CALABRESI, supra note 232 at 2-3 (lexicographically ordered “just[ice] or 
fair[ness]” and cost-minimization as goals of accident law), RAWLS, supra note 102 at 37-39 (“right” 
ordered as prior to “good”), DWORKIN , supra note 97 at 75 (rights as “trumps”) for canonical articulations.  
Chang’s social welfare functions also of course escape the consequences of the proofs I here offer, at any 
rate in such circumstances as those in which their non-Paretian components kick in.  For they are not 
strictly satisfactionist or unremittingly Paretian.  This leaves them in better stead than any social welfare 
functional that Kaplow & Shavell might have in mind, which Proposition 2 indicates would be incapable of 
prescribing anything at all.  I nonetheless think, by dint both of the results reached above in the text and of 
the interpretation of these results which I offer below, that we do best to abandon Pareto entirely for 
purposes of prescriptive welfare economics or social choice theory. 
 Here also is a fitting place to remark further upon the relation between Sen’s earlier, supra note 
312 referenced classic (1970) impossibility result and the results derived here.  On the one hand, I think 
that Sen’s result is that which has come closest in the past to those I’ve derived here.  On the other hand, I 
think that its fixing upon a “sphere of liberal autonomy” obscured what was actually at stake.  The critical, 
and more generally applicable point, it seems to me, is that individual satisfactions alone are not enough to 
prescribe at all, because the question for social decision is always at least in potential the distribution of 
preference-satisfactions, which preferences alone do not suffice to adjudicate.  The question of the proper 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 We have covered much ground here – I hope not too much.  As we have seen, 
though, there is much ground to clear, and perhaps that itself affords warrant for 
coverage.  Notwithstanding what we have done here, however, it seems clear that much 
more remains to be done.  Indeed, if I’m right in what I have been arguing, there is more 
to be done than we’ve realized.  For it seems we’ve been on the wrong track now for 
years, where the theory of law’s inter-linking with economy is concerned.  We have 
focused too long upon ultimately unmeasurable and ethically non-cognizable end-states.  
And all the while we should have been looking toward ethically relevant, guaranteed 
right-consequence-yielding “inputs” to our “life-building functions.”  Just as our deep 
opportunity-egalitarian commitments have been seen here to counsel.   
 If all collective action results in distribution, we cannot but think-through the 
ethics of distribution.  And if distributive ethics call out for the growing and spreading of 
ethically exogenous material opportunity, we must think-through how that can be done.  
Imagine the vastness of the research agenda that opens.  What are the real determinants of 
                                                                                                                                                 
sphere of liberal autonomy – i.e., the ethically cognizable divide between internality and externality – is 
simply a proper part of this larger question of rightful distributive shares.  And it is this larger question that 
both strict satisfactionism and Pareto have been – both from their inceptions and from the earliest days of 
“the new welfare economics” – employed in effect simply to dodge.   
 This deeper “issue” toward which I believe Sen was struggling was further obscured by what 
appears to me to have been a needless distraction raised by his misunderstanding, at the time, of the 
functional logic of rights: the way that rights “work” – viz., as rights to choose, including to choose not to 
use (to invoke), so to speak.  I suspect that Sen placed the weight of his argument on rights as thus 
misunderstood at least in part because he knew that there was something problematic about Pareto which 
had something to do with its inimicality to the prescription to which rights-concerned liberalism (then being 
rediscovered by political philosophers after a long period of utilitarian vogue) attempts to give voice, but 
hadn’t yet drawn a bead on just what that something was.  And no surprise here.  For we cannot quite see it 
till we widen the angle a bit (rather than narrowing it, as Sen did in immediately subsequent efforts, to see 
that liberalism is ultimately a theory of justice more plenarily understood, that justice in turn is about 
distribution thus plenarily understood, and then that all prescription prescribes distribution (of variegated 
benefits and burdens) thus understood – precisely what strict satisfactionism leaves no space for (since 
preferences do not suffice to adjudicate between preferences) and what Pareto’s employed to avoid 
grappling with.                    
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well-being – the real material opportunities?  What means can be developed for more 
carefully limning the boundary between ethically exogenous and ethically endogenous 
such opportunity?  How might we best then design means of properly spreading the 
former, such that the latter – the one ethically cognizable maximand – might be 
“maximized”?  What institutions are better at what in that project, and how much 
functional specialization of the sort that renders institutions less visibly part of just 
wholes can endure?  All of these questions and others press on us more urgently, the 
moment we see that we can’t really dodge them.   
 For far too long now – a century, in fact – Paretian complacence and its bedfellow 
fetishism have worked as a mere ball and chain.  Now that we see that they’re not only 
unnecessary, but in fact incompatible with prescription itself, it is high time we tossed 
them.  Think of how liberating that will be.  It will be freeing of us and our fellows in our 
roles as citizens, whose lives and life prospects together will vastly improve.  It will be 
freeing of scholarship too – work that can now be both practically useful and theoretically 
sound.  Think also of what this will mean both for law and for economics:  Both will be 
reconciled again to their origins, in ethics.  Both will again be moral sciences.  Both will 
be healthy again.  For they will be home.   
